U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken participates in a NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, Belgium, on March 4, 2022. Photo: Ron Przysucha via the U.S. State Department/ Public Domain. View license here.
By Blythe Gilbert
Introduction
In 2014, following the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine with the intent of seizing Crimea. Using an effective combination of disinformation, deception, and applied force, the Russian military was swiftly able to entrench itself in Crimea in the face of resistance from poorly-organized Ukrainian forces. However, this blatant act of aggression and subsequent annexation did not result in a dramatic reassessment of the European security situation by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter, NATO) countries; it failed to instigate widespread military reform, increase spending allocations, or even initiate a European withdrawal from heavy reliance on Russian oil and gas. Instead, only Ukraine would initiate a broad rearmament and reorganization program for its armed forces. Furthermore, the sanctions imposed by Western powers with the intent to “send a strong message to the Russian government that there are consequences for their actions that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine” only wound up costing the Kremlin approximately $50 billion over a five-year period since their enactment—not nearly enough to inflict permanent harm on a roughly 1.7 trillion-dollar economy.[i]
The second Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not predicated on hybrid warfare or subterfuge; it was an unabashed full-scale invasion. This, finally, prompted a real reaction from NATO and the European Union (hereafter, EU)—with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaiming on February 27, 2022 that the invasion was a Zeitenwende (turning point) in European defense policy.[ii] Indeed, the response from Europe has thus far been prompt and steadfast in its rejection of Russian claims and its support for Ukrainian sovereignty.[iii] In light of the war in Ukraine and the ongoing security crisis in Europe, the EU published the Strategic Compass for Security and Defense in March 2022 which established the EU’s strategic vision for Europe and provided for the creation of a joint Rapid Defense Capacity.[iv] This was closely followed by a June 2022 NATO summit in Madrid which produced the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept—the first update since 2010. This document provides a “blueprint for the Alliance in a more dangerous and competitive world,” and is intended to guide NATO member states’ foreign policy and strategic outlooks to achieve a coherent and objectives-driven European grand strategy.[v]
Nevertheless, international organizations like the EU or NATO are heterogeneous geopolitical actors made up of sovereign states, with their own grand strategies, historical conceptions of national purpose, and methods of achieving their goals. It is a truly monumental task to organize a useful guiding grand strategy for Europe that can be implemented pragmatically at both the international and national level—particularly as the war in Ukraine rages on. While commentators have frequently pointed out the practical difficulties and haphazard measures which characterize European defense projects, few have examined how European nationalstrategic documents relate to the implementation of European grand strategy.[vi] This paper will first outline the fundamentals of European grand strategy, and will then compare national strategic documents from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to ascertain how the three major European powers have responded to the 2022 NATO and EU strategic guidelines. The strategic documents chosen form the basis of the “big three’s” response to Europe’s new grand strategy, and therefore constitute starting points for examining Europe’s practical response to its novel grand strategy. A close analysis of these documents demonstrates that despite their priorities and objectives largely aligning with EU strategic principles, the European powers’ unique approaches to foreign policy seriously complicate the practical implementation of a European “grand strategy.”
NATO and the European Union’s Grand Strategy
The NATO Strategic Concept (hereafter, NATOSC) and EU Strategic Compass (hereafter, EUSC) function more as “a direction and not a cookbook, or a recipe,” in the words of Henry Kissinger (emphasis mine).[vii] While the EUSC does lay out certain actions to be taken immediately by EU member states, such as the creation of a rapid response capacity of 5,000 “modular” troops capable of being deployed in a variety of defense scenarios, the EUSC’s primary contribution is the commitment of EU nations to achieving certain overarching goals as soon as possible.[viii] With the exception of the creation of the European Union Rapid Defense Capability (hereafter, EURDC), the document’s chief purpose is to set the direction of EU strategic preparation. It identifies key geopolitical threats or potential realms of conflict, and establishes the framework by which the EU will prepare to respond to these threats.[ix] The NATOSC functions in a similar manner; it asserts that the three primary roles of NATO are defense and deterrence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.[x] After this, it establishes the need for a strategic review in the dangerous circumstances NATO must respond to and then outlines a set of high-level strategic guidelines that will define NATO’s approach to these developments. In short, both the NATOSC and EUSC provide guiding principles for European security, rather than mandating specific actions or approaches.
Before examining how the three major European powers have responded to this grand strategy, it is necessary to establish what guidelines these strategic frameworks set in place. The NATOSC and EUSC both:
- Identify the Russian war in Ukraine as the most prominent threat to European security—with its invasion signalling a rise of revisionist powers attempting to shape/dismantle international norms to suit their purposes.[xi]
- Enhance their ability to make united decisions and deliver coordinated responses as an international unit by bolstering credible collective defense and establishing common crisis management procedures.[xii]
- Re-dedicate the European community to upholding international laws and human rights in the face of revisionist states and despite regional competition.[xiii]
- Acknowledge the decline of disarmament treaties and call for a renewed effort to prevent nuclear and conventional arms proliferation.[xiv]
- Call for a rapid development of European cyber capabilities and deterrents in the face of Russia’s implementation of hybrid methods of warfare.[xv]
- Require member countries to build resilience capacity into their economies, which would better prepare them for future crises and enable them to carry on extended conflict.[xvi]
These guidelines represent a comprehensive response to the many challenges Europe faces today. Russia presents the most immediate short-and medium-term threat to European security, and demands an effective response since Ukraine has been recently granted EU candidate status, has submitted a NATO fast track bid in 2022, and remains a vital part of European supply lines.[xvii] China is the longer-term threat to European values, as its government seeks to use international law to its advantage or to ignore it outright. Despite this, its massive economy and global leadership status represent an opportunity for the EU and NATO to secure a favorable peace for both parties. The need for unity in the face of a rapidly changing world is also emphasized, with the EUSC noting that the EU must develop the means to act as a credible strategic actor on the world stage. International human rights form the cornerstone of the EU and NATO charters, and their protection is mandated by both strategic documents. Nuclear proliferation, conventional arms races, and the increasing risk of cyber-hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure all constitute major challenges that both documents identify as strategic priorities. Finally, responding to the increasing global security risk, both documents call for the bolstering of domestic security through economic, energy, and cyber resilience—to be fostered through international and bilateral agreements.
The NATOSC and EUSC thus lay out an eminently coherent framework for strategic development, cooperation, and prioritization of resource allocations. Although the only specific action mandated by the documents is the creation of a rapid defense capability within the EU itself, the NATOSC and EUSC combined constitute an effective grand strategy with which the European community can approach the rapidly evolving threats and opportunities that surround it. Because both NATO and the EU are international organizations lacking strong mechanisms of enforcement, and because this grand strategy lays out a framework and not specific actions, each nation is free to meet these requirements as it sees fit. This allows European grand strategy to be flexible, but it also means that if measures like the creation of a rapid defense force and the development of resilient civilian and military systems are to be accomplished, it is imperative that the core European powers’ own strategic documents sincerely align themselves with the pursuit of multilateral European cooperation. Unfortunately, as shall be demonstrated, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom’s fundamental strategic outlines each contain elements which threaten the effective implementation of European grand strategy—potentially leaving Europe without a unified response to both short- and long-term threats.
Germany: A Directionless Turning Point?
Germany was once the center of military might in Europe, to great and terrible effect. Much of the Cold War was dedicated to answering the “German question” in Europe—with both the US and the USSR concerned that a reunified Germany could bring about another European war. German foreign policy has for years, therefore, been dominated not by aggression but by compromise and efforts at forwarding European integration—which it views as the surest method of guaranteeing its own sovereignty. The 2023 National Security Strategy (hereafter, NSS) is the first foundational strategic document of its kind in German history, and forms the basis of Germany’s pivot away from its previous strategy, Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik refers to the “approach to the East” pioneered by German Chancellor Willy Brandt in the 1970s which emphasized détente[xviii] and focused on cooperation with the Soviet Union as a means of achieving German reunification. Ostpolitik’s effects have outlived the end of the Cold War, as exemplified by Germany’s crippling reliance on Russian natural gas imports. The intent was that a mutually beneficial relationship would build trust between the East and West—a vision that was shattered with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[xix]
Germany’s preference for cooperation over conflict lives on in the NSS. But this strategy, as dictated in the NSS, now precludes Russia, and instead prioritizes bolstering European defense structures and increasing NATO and EU cooperation. The NSS places the security and territorial integrity of Germany’s European allies on the same level as German sovereignty—a remarkable commitment.[xx] This strong emphasis on multilateralism makes the German document the most conducive to the successful implementation of European grand strategy, especially compared to France and the United Kingdom. However, perhaps because the NSS is Germany’s first attempt to concretely define its national strategy, it fails to elaborate on aspects of German foreign policy which could cause contention, not with Europe’s grand strategy as outlined in the NATOSC and EUSC, but instead with its most important aforementioned European peers—France and the United Kingdom. In particular, the NSS’s commitment to a values-based foreign policy does not provide policymakers with a framework for making tough decisions as to whether German interests or German values should be prioritized in cases where the two diverge.
As a whole, the NSS’s close alignment with NATO and EU grand strategy is truly remarkable. Its delineation of Germany’s security environment and core values practically mirrors those of the EUSC, and it foregrounds EU territorial integrity through the protection of the free democratic order and the strengthening of alliances in the Euro-Atlantic region. Moreover, its promotion of an international order based on international law and human rights is also entirely coherent with NATO’s principles and core tasks.[xxi] More important for the implementation of European grand strategy is the NSS’s evident commitment to viewing its own national interests as entirely intertwined with those of its European allies. Whereas France and the UK insist that national sovereignty is paramount (as will be elaborated below), Germany instead proposes “integrated security” as the cornerstone of its defense. Integrated security means “bringing together all issues and instruments that are relevant to protecting [Germany] from external threats,” and posits that as part of this integrated approach, “collective and national defense are one and the same.”[xxii] Not only does the NSS align itself with Europe’s interests and pledge to contribute to its defense, it also repeatedly casts Germany in the role of acting as a key pillar of European integrated defense by committing itself to spearheading joint arms projects, cyber defense initiatives, and military rearmament.[xxiii] Thus, Germany’s primary security document seems poised to further European collective defense in exactly the manner prescribed by the EUSC and NATOSC.
Waglkundgebung der SPD mit Bundesworsitszenden Willy Brandt in der Ostseehalle. March 14, 1975. Photo by Friedrich Magnussen. Wikimedia Commons. No changes made. View license here.
However, as mentioned, the NSS fails to delineate clearly where Germany will rely on a values-based foreign policy and where Germany will prioritize an interests-based foreign policy. The NSS describes German foreign policy broadly as “values-based and interest-driven,” with the understanding that “it is in [Germany’s] fundamental interest to defend our values.”[xxiv] The NSS lays out Germany’s interests according to values such as democratic order, freedom of speech, the rule of law, protection of the environment, and securing access to resources for women and minorities as established by Germany’s commitment to following feminist foreign policy principles.[xxv] Indeed, the NSS dedicates far more space to values-based initiatives—such as through its comprehensive focus on the Wehrhaft (robustness)of German democracy and on the protection of human rights outsideEurope—than do the corresponding French or British strategic documents.[xxvi] This is coherent with Germany’s lasting commitment to the strength of European norms. What the NSS fails to detail, however, is how Germany will respond—notably, whether the underlying motivation be values- or interest-driven—should it be faced with a situation in which preserving European norms is potentially detrimental to German or European interests. For instance, cooperating with Victor Orbán’s illiberal regime in Hungary is certainly in Germany’s interest, but potentially threatens European norms such as the freedom of the press. Hungary’s challenge to EU sanctions and the EU’s blocking of Hungarian funding in response has already proved this to be a relevant issue, but the NSS is not clear about whether policymakers should prioritize Germany’s interests or its core values in such situations.[xxvii]
France and the United Kingdom, as will be discussed, have not connected their own national security so closely to Europe. Germany’s NSS differs on some major points from its peers; for example, the NSS posits that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” and that conventional military strength is thus required from the German armed forces in order to uphold European defense.[xxviii] France, on the other hand, relies on its nuclear capacity as its primary form of deterrence. If Germany is to act as a core nation driving European defense integration, it will have to reconcile its support for nuclear arms control with France’s ongoing nuclear modernization program. Another practical example of this clash between Germany’s values and interests has arisen recently in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. While the NSS declares repeatedly that Germany, because of its historical guilt, will uphold Israel’s right to exist, such a foreign policy based on values makes enacting this commitment difficult. [xxix] What does “upholding the right to exist” mean? Does it mean providing economic or military aid to Israel as it wages a war whose civilian casualties far outstrip that of a war prosecuted according to international law? However, it also cannot mean abandoning Israel, as Hamas’s stated intentions are to destroy the state of Israel. Since Israel is a key Western ally in the region, this outcome would be fundamentally contrary to German interests. In such situations, the NSS does not make clear how Germany will balance its interests and values, other than prioritizing the security of European territory against aggression. The NSS’s ambiguity regarding its values and interests represents a major issue with German foreign policy, and could leave German policymakers without direction in a period when German leadership is desperately needed in Europe.[xxx]
France: The Grand Idea of Independence
As Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik influenced Germany foreign policy before the war in Ukraine, so too does the shadow of Charles de Gaulle loom large over French strategic thought. The introduction to the 2022 French National Strategic Review (hereafter, NSR)—the foundational document of French strategy—begins with President Emmanual Macron’s stated desire for France to solidify itself as both a globally influential power and a “driving force behind European autonomy.”[xxxi] Fundamentally, the NSR’s assessment of France’s strategic environment agrees with the NATOSC and EUSC in a series of 52 points: it assigns primacy of place to the Russian invasion, the rise of China, the need to bolster international institutions, and hybrid threats such as cyberwarfare, terrorism, and disinformation. However, the NSR proposes a method for answering these trends that is based in distinctly national strategic thinking. According to the NSR, France’s right to self-determination and independence on the international stage is paramount—just as it was under Charles de Gaulle. This approach, though in principle aligned with European grand strategy, presents its own unique challenges in practice by limiting the potential for real multilateral cooperation in favor of preserving French national liberty.
De Gaulle approached international relations with the aim to secure French “grandeur,” insisting on France’s autonomy in decision-making at the international scale, the refusal to accept American dominance in Europe (both military and cultural), and the prioritization of the nation-state and its defense above multilateralism.[xxxii] Grandeur was centered on French cultural authority and the legacy of French colonial power, which, although fading, still gave France unique inroads and diplomatic opportunities all around the globe. Furthermore, it was a way to achieve French goals by “aiming high” in a world where Cold War superpowers often dominated the allocation of resources.[xxxiii] When De Gaulle fell from power in 1969, France returned to the NATO command structure and has since largely supported European integration—most prominently by acquiescing to the United Kingdom’s application to join the EU. However, the shadow of grandeur still looms large over the French approach to foreign policy. One need only look to Jacques Chirac’s opposition to the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq or to Macron’s maverick attempts to broker peace in Ukraine following Russia’s 2022 invasion to recognize these lingering effects.[xxxiv] The NSR, although committing to support the NATOSC and EUSC grand strategy, continues to emphasize this independence.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets French President Emmanuel Macron during a state visit to France, 17 June 2019. Photo: Wikimedia Commons. No changes made. View license here.
The NSR strongly supports the development of collective European defense capabilities and a common strategic culture—even committing France to taking the lead in their development—however, it also firmly posits that France “refuses to be locked into bloc geopolitics.”[xxxv] Fundamentally, the document fails to establish how French sovereignty can be reconciled with the creation of an effective and united European defense system. The NSR repeatedly asserts the need for France to sustain its role as a “balancing power, placing this objective on par with the containment of Russia, the confirmation of the international order, and the modernization of French defense capability.”[xxxvi] The necessity of acting as a balancing power is a concept rooted in post-WWII French foreign policy—another legacy of De Gaulle.[xxxvii]
This is not to say the NSR does not attempt to balance these two opposing concepts. To connect French independence with European integration, the NSR declares that the promotion of French fundamental interests “cannot be limited to the national level” because Europe is “united in a common destiny.”[xxxviii] In short, the NSR argues pragmatically that French national interest lies in supporting the EU as a credible, united actor on the international stage because Europe’s defense is the defense of France. However, this does not get around the fundamental primacy of France’s right to self-determination, which the document repeatedly sets as a prerequisite for French security.
The NSR envisions France’s capacity to intervene in global affairs as a means of ensuring the protection of French territory, French citizens abroad, and French allies. According to the NSR, the ability to intervene militarily without the immediate support of allies lends credibility to French national standing and also to the credibility of its allies in Europe. However, French national interests are not guaranteed to align entirely with European grand strategic principles. France’s ongoing prosecution of counter-terror operations in Francophone Africa constitutes a contemporary example of this issue.[xxxix] The NSR does not establish a clear method for determining whether terrorism or European integrated defense efforts take priority—both are characterized as fundamental to French security.[xl] Following the French withdrawal from Mali at the Malian government’s request, West Africa’s increasing political volatility has made the region a hub for terrorism, violent civil wars, and—of particular cause for concern—Russian mercenary activity.[xli] It is possible to foresee a situation in which critical and already limited French resources could be diverted away from European defense to West Africa in the joint name of countering Russian influence and deterring terrorism. Since the terror attacks in France of the mid-2010s, counterterror operations have been particularly popular amongst the French electorate, so given the region’s current instability such a scenario is both plausible and an excellent demonstration of how the NSR’s emphasis on sovereign independence could problematize the implementation of European grand strategy.[xlii]
Additionally, it is interesting to note the precedence that the NSR gives to French nuclear autonomy. The NSR posits that French influence abroad rests largely on its status as a great power—again connected to its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and as a perennial European leader—and this emphasis has real implications for France’s defense priorities. France’s spending has thus far reflected the NSR’s commitment to nuclear independence, having dramatically increased its spending on nuclear modernization programs since 2019. Although Macron has assured European allies that France’s nuclear weapons remain a tool in the European arsenal of defense, it is does not bode well for the future of European grand strategy that a potential leader of European integration like France does not place its trust in the mechanisms of unified defense, but instead in unilateral nuclear capacity.[xliii] Not only is the use of nuclear weapons entirely impossible to integrate into a shared defense network—as only the President of France may employ them—but France’s reliance on nuclear weapons could encourage other European powers to seek similar “real” security.[xliv] Although the EUSC and NATOSC commit European nations to respecting the international laws of war, it is reasonable to assume that nations may follow France’s lead and seek “real” security elsewhere. If not from nuclear weapons, which few states in Europe could realistically produce, then from other non-conventional weapons systems which the EUSC condemns as destabilizing.[xlv]
As a careful examination of the French 2022 National Strategic Review exposes, the European grand strategy outlined by the NATOSC and EUSC has been considered and applied within the tradition of French foreign policy and national grand strategy. France remains proud of its role as a balancing power, and intends to uphold this autonomy at the potential expense of the European grand strategy. Although the NSR argues that French autonomy supports European strategic autonomy, this emphasis on national independence and sovereignty could seriously undermine the attempt to create a combined European military command—since every French military action must, according to the NSR, first-and-foremost defend French independence, even at the risk of its European allies’ security.
The United Kingdom: The Pragmatic Outsider
The United Kingdom (hereafter, UK) is unique among the three major European powers, as it is part of NATO but not of the EU. Since leaving the EU in January 2020, the United Kingdom has had to reorient its defense strategy and position in Europe, having concomitantly been excluded from the body charged with formulating the EUSC. This has not, however, diminished the importance of the UK as a European actor or as a member of NATO. The UK retains its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and has been a staunch supporter of Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion. An analysis of the UK’s current primary strategic document, the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (hereafter, IRR), demonstrates that the UK largely shares the same principles as those espoused by the NATOSC and EUSC, but, like Germany and France, its response to these principles presents potential problems for the future of European defense coordination.[xlvi] The strategy put forward in the 2023 IRR places great emphasis both on pursuing pragmatic partnerships that augment British strengths rather than pursuing strictly values-based objectives, as well as on maintaining the UK’s ability to actively shape international events. This strategy results in a British foreign policy that is far less-European oriented than that of France or Germany.
The 2023 IRR approaches the question of European security from a “Euro-Atlantic” viewpoint instead of a strictly European one. Much of the review is not centered on Europe, but rather on the maintenance of the UK’s close ties with its allies around the globe, from Canada to Australia.[xlvii] However, this is not to say that the UK review does not strongly support the upholding of NATO’s defense capacity—in fact, Britain is the only power to explicitly pledge itself to committing more than 2% of its GDP which is the baseline of the NATO Defense Investment Pledge.[xlviii] Furthermore, the UK has maintained its position of prominence within NATO, as London has been selected as one of two Defense Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) headquarters, with the set to operate out of Tallinn, Estonia. This is a significant commitment to maintaining the UK’s security ties to the continent; however, the UK does not tie itself to a “common destiny” with Europe or position itself as the center of multilateral cooperation. Instead, the UK commits itself to upholding the British legacy of a European balancing power. As Robert Johnson writes, British foreign policy is uniquely influenced by historical considerations. Akin to France’s role as a “balancing power,” the UK’s foreign policy is primarily concerned with upholding a favorable balance of power on the continent and around the globe. Although not always expressed, this consideration has influenced British foreign policy from the Napoleonic Wars through the World Wars and is still evident in the UK’s emphasis on working alongside global partners like the US, Australia, and India.[xlix]
The enthusiasm to partner with states outside Europe necessarily results in a foreign policy that is more tolerant of ideological differences. For example, while Germany’s NSS accuses China of being a revisionist power trying to “remould the world order in its image,” the IRR asserts that Britain will strive to work bilaterally with China to defend British and international security as long as their policies do not infringe on British interests.[l] This approach, called “promiscuous bilateralism” by critics, has long been part of the UK’s strategy to maintain the global balance of power and has come at the cost of developing enduring multilateral understandings in Europe.[li] This is a fundamentally realist approach to foreign policy, based on the long-term goals of the UK rather than on the defense of European security. Continental defense is important to the UK, but the IRR makes it clear that countering threats to international stability “will mean working through other groupings and beyond the Euro-Atlantic theatre.”[lii] This includes nations that are not explicitly bound to upholding British values, like China, but which are “willing to work with us on the basis of respect.”[liii] The IRR stresses that the British definition of multilateralism relies on national independence to realistically assess state interests and create multiple bilateral arrangements in the pursuit of international stability and on honing the UK’s strategic edge, rather than establishing deeper ties with European states or pursuing a foreign policy based on European values.[liv]
Furthermore, the IRR’s repeated emphasis on the UK’s strong relationship with the United States means that British pragmatic bilateralism could force the country to divide its resources between the United States and its European allies should their respective interests separate.[lv] While the Ukrainian conflict has largely coordinated UK and European efforts, this sort of cooperation is not guaranteed to extend into future conflicts, such as in the potential case of a war over Taiwan—a region in which the EU and the UK have diverging strategic commitments. The European community, although largely supportive of Taiwanese independence, has not committed to defending Taiwanese sovereignty as has the United States. As the war in Ukraine rages on and European resources remain employed defending European territory, it is possible to foresee a scenario in which Chinese aggression against Taiwan is deemed too costly by the EU to resist militarily, but the UK—respecting its close alliance with the United States—joins a US-led coalition. Such a situation would inevitably divert British resources away from European defense, thereby weakening the UK’s commitment to its NATO obligations in Europe.
NATO Ministers of Defense and of Foreign Affairs meet at NATO headquarters in Brussels 2010. October 14, 2010. Photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison via U.S. Department of Defense. Wikimedia Commons. No changes made. View license here.
Although the UK’s 2023 IRR emphasizes Britain’s continuing commitment to NATO and its broad adherence to the European grand strategy as laid out in the NATOSC, Britain’s unique position following Brexit means it does not need to follow EU strategic guidelines, offering Britain greater freedom to form independent alliances. Accordingly, the IRR seeks to maximize the UK’s position by emphasizing British freedom to create alliances based on fundamentally pragmatic considerations in order to preserve the international balance of power. Such an approach, however, could seriously damage the UK’s ability to cooperate meaningfully with its European allies. For example: Germany has committed to a foreign policy based on European values and the preservation of the international order—can this approach tolerate a rogue United Kingdom’s willingness to work with “revisionist” states? In a world of increasing strategic competition, it is unclear whether Britain will be able to effectively balance its commitment to European defense and European priorities with its pursuit of strategic advantage across the Atlantic and elsewhere.
Conclusion: Solid Foundation, Shaky Superstructure
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the re-emergence of major-power competition have provided the impetus for a major reassessment of European defense strategy and integration. The NATO Security Concept and European Union Strategic Compass are more than just a “geopolitical awakening;”[lvi] they form a set of coherent principles for directing European multilateral efforts and utilizing Europe’s resources to their greatest effect in the pursuit of strategic security. This grand strategy prioritizes the short- and medium-term threat to European security posed by Russia’s destabilizing invasion of Ukraine, the long-term risk posed by China and other revisionist powers, the modernization and integration of European defense capabilities, and the need to create resilience among all aspects of European economies—from cyber capabilities to energy independence. Above all, the NATOSC and EUSC provide a framework by which member states might become a credible, united actor on the global scale—and whereby non-NATO and non-EU countries might align with these organizations’ respective strategic principles. These two documents cannot be understood without reference to another; they are part of the same attempt to define European grand strategy. To this end, they have succeeded.
However, the difficulty of enacting international principles—even when coherently developed and universally agreed upon—remains. In the absence of a federalized “United States of Europe” (a near impossibility given European national sentiments), each individual member of NATO and the EU are free to decide for themselves how to implement this European grand strategy. At first glance, the documents from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom appear to be remarkably aligned with European principles. All three identify the same key threats and challenges, and they often propose similar measures to counter them. Yet on closer inspection, it is evident that national interests and strategic thought still prevail in practice. Germany, although committing wholeheartedly to European integrated security, has not defined how its values-based foreign policy will address the interests of its potentially divergent partners. France, though willing to cooperate, remains intent on upholding its absolute sovereignty and reserving its right to act unilaterally—a real roadblock for European defense integration efforts. Finally, the UK (already a non-EU member) has laid out a foreign policy approach that prefers bilateral, pragmatic, and interests-based relationships (particularly with the US) over a long-term multilateral understanding with Europe. Its insistence on maximizing its strategic advantages through these bilateral partnerships does not preclude it from establishing treaties outside the European defense community that could be detrimental to the ongoing effort to re-integrate the UK into the European Defense Community following Brexit.
Thus, Europe is left with a remarkably coherent grand strategy that lacks the mechanisms to enforce its own principles. This has remained an ongoing problem of the European integration project—one that even the outbreak of war on the European continent has not been able to solve and which presents real challenges in formulating a unified European response to aggression in Europe and abroad. Despite this, it is worth noting that real progress has been made since 2014. The creation of a rapid defense capability and the modernization of all the three powers’ militaries is a substantial boost to European credible defense. Furthermore, although these national strategic documents differ in approach, their acknowledgement of similar objectives provides some common ground for negotiation that is much needed in a world increasingly defined by insecurity and evolving international competition.
Endnotes
[i] Vitalis Mbah Nankobe, “Great Power Politics in Post-Cold War Period: The Ukraine Crisis of 2014,”
European Scientific Journal 17, no. 33 (2021): 21, https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2021.v17n33p1;
United States, Ukraine and Russia Sanctions | U.S. Department of State, United States, 2014, Web Archive, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/.
[ii] Sven Biscop, “European Defence: No Zeitenwende Yet,” Defence and Peace Economics (April 2023): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2201739.
[iii] Biscop, “European Defence: No Zeitenwende Yet,” 2-3; Sabine Siebold and John Irish, “NATO expected to raise munitions stockpile targets as war depletes reserves,” Reuters, February 13, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nato-expected-raise-munitions-stockpile-targets-war-depletes-reserves-2023-02-13/.
[iv] European Union: “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense,” 6-7, March 21, 2022 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf
[v] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid: NATO, 2022), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.
[vi] Sophia Besch, “EU Defense and the War in Ukraine,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 21, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/21/eu-defense-and-war-in-ukraine-pub-88680; Matthew Karnitschnig, “The truth about Germany’s defense policy shift,” Politico, February 27, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-zeitenwende-defense-spending-nato-gdp-target-scholz-ukraine-war-russia/
[vii] Applying the lens of “grand strategy”—which is generally a national term—to a multinational organization requires a broader view of the notion of grand strategy. This paper will rely on Brand and Porter’s conception of grand strategy as grand principles. They note that “[grand strategy] may not dictate every decision, but it lays down the basic parameters by which interests are defined, opportunities and challenges are assessed, and power is applied.”[vii] Indeed, this is exactly how the EUSC and NATOSC function. See Hall Brands, Patrick Porter, “Why Grand Strategy Still Matters,” National Interest; and Kissinger, Henry A. “Background Press Briefing by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Foreign Relations of the United States 1969—1976, vol 1.
[viii] EU Strategic Compass 2022, 25.
[ix] EU Strategic Compass 2022, 17-24; Jordan Becker, Michael Dudab, and Douglas Lute, “From context to concept: history and strategic environment for NATO’s 2022 strategic concept,” 1-3, DOI:10.1080/14702436.2022.2082959.
[x] NATO Strategic Concept 2022, 1.
[xi] The EUSC defines revisionist states as states which “[promote] a strict sovereigntist approach that constitutes in reality a return to power politics.” Essentially, those states which reject the international rules-based order that the European community has striven to uphold. NATOSC, 4-5; EUSC, 4-5, 17-18.
[xii] NATOSC, 6-7; EUSC, 25-28.
[xiii] NATOSC, 10; EUSC, 10, 14, 28.
[xiv] NATOSC, 8; EUSC, 15, 18, 22.
[xv] NATOSC, 7; EUSC, 34-35.
[xvi] NATOSC, 6-7; EUSC, 34, 38-41.
[xvii] Tom Balmforth, “Ukraine applies for NATO membership, rules out Putin talks,” Reuters, September 30, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-ukraine-applying-nato-membership-2022-09-30/.
[xviii] The relaxation of political relations through diplomatic efforts.
[xix] Per Högselius, Red Gas, 105-109, 135.
[xx] NSS, 21.
[xxi] NSS, 22-24; EUSC, 17-23; NATOSC, 3, 6-8.
[xxii] NSS, 30.
[xxiii] NSS, 31-33.
[xxiv] NSS, 20.
[xxv] The Federal Foreign Office of Germany outlines what Feminist Foreign Policy (hereafter, FFP) means in Germany and how it will be applied in a 2023 Guideline entitled “Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy.” In short, German FFP is centered around “three R’s”: rights, representation, and resources. This means upholding the equal rights of women and minorities worldwide, ensuring foreign and domestic equitable participation of women or minorities in all areas of society, and ensuring women and minorities’ equal access to natural, educational, societal, or financial resources. This method “attempts to center gender equity and human security more strongly in foreign policy activities,” and constitutes a profoundly values-led foreign policy—not simply a policy limited to women’s issues. (See Uwe Fromm, “Feminist Foreign Policy—A Question of Definition,” EURAC Research, and Federal Foreign Office of Germany, “Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy.”)
[xxvi] NSS 29, 46-48, 51-52.
[xxvii] Lorne Cook, “EU proposes to suspend billions in funds to Hungary,” Associated Press (AP) News, September 18, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/hungary-executive-branch-viktor-orban-aefd56b81ace179655d58ba0735dd292.
[xxviii] NSS, 32.
[xxix] NSS, 11,19.
[xxx] Saskia Brechenmacher, “Germany has a new feminist foreign policy. What does that mean in practice?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 8, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/03/08/germany-has-new-feminist-foreign-policy.-what-does-it-mean-in-practice-pub-89224.
[xxxi] French National Strategic Review 2022, 1
[xxxii] Thierry Balzacq, “French Grand Strategy,” in Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases. ed. Balzacq, Dombrowski, and Reich, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 99.
[xxxiii] Philip Gordon, A Certain Idea of France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 18-20.
[xxxiv] As David Styan argues, Chirac’s opposition arose from a uniquely French line of diplomatic thought, which prioritized the UN Security Council as the main method of solving international disputes and which also considered France to be in a unique position to uphold the developing world against the unilateral actions of the US—which France rejected on principle. (See Styan, “Jacques Chirac’s ‘non’: France, Iraq and the United
Nations, 1991–2003,” Modern and Contemporary France 12, no. 3, 372).
[xxxv] NSR, 13-15. Emphasis mine.
[xxxvi] NSR, 7.
[xxxvii] France’s position as an alternative to the established great powers has continued after the collapse of the USSR; for example, it has sold advanced weapons systems to nations such as Qatar which do not meet the strict democratic or human rights requirements necessary to purchase from the USA or Germany. As an example of this trend, see Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “Rafales on the upswing? French fighter eyes additional Mideast sales,” Defense News, September 7, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/09/07/rafales-on-the-upswing-french-fighter-eyes-additional-mideast-sales/.
[xxxviii] NSR, 19.
[xxxix] For more on this, see Gani Joses Yoroms, “France’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy in Africa,” in Routledge Handbook of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Africa, ed. Usman Tar (New York, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2021).
[xl] In fact, the NSR at times seems to place counterterrorism above European defence. “Protection of the national territory, including France’s overseas territories, and of French nationals against external threats and attempts at internal destabilization, including the terrorist threat” takes precedence before “Security of EU Member States and the Euro-Atlantic area.” More bluntly, the NSR states that “France’s main lever for defending its interests remains the long-term maintenance of its autonomy of decision-making and sovereign action in response to all threats that arise.” The priority of French national interests makes the hierarchy between terrorism and European security an ambiguous one. See NSR, p 19.
[xli] For more on the French withdrawal, see Catrina Doxsee, Jared Thompson, and Marielle Harris, “The End of Operation Barkhane and the Future of Counterterrorism in Mali,” CSIS, March 2, 2022. Russian forces have been accused by the UN Human Rights Watch of committing various crimes against civilians in their anti-terror operations in the Central African Republic. Wagner’s presence serves to both bolster the Kremlin’s control over regional resources and disrupt Western influence. See United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, “CAR: Russian Wagner Group harassing and intimidating civilians—UN Experts,” October 27, 2021.
[xlii] Jonathan Fenby, France: A Modern History from the Revolution to the War on Terror (New York: St. Martin’s Press; 2016), 475-478.
[xliii] Michel Rose, “Amid arms race, Macron offers Europe French nuclear wargames insight,” Reuters, February 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-defence-macron-idCAKBN20119O/.
[xliv] Meaning, security backed not by treaties or agreements but by boots-on-the-ground warfighting capacity.
[xlv] EUSC, 22. The NATOSC makes clear that NATO’s goal is “a world without nuclear weapons,”—inconsistent with France’s elevated view of its own nuclear capacity, see NATOSC 5, 7-8; and “Russian drones, missiles and shells target Ukrainian infrastructure,” Al Jazeera, November 3, 2023.
[xlvi] For areas where the UK’s priorities match the European grand strategy outlined in the NATOSC and the EUSC, see 2023 Integrated Review Refresh 4-6, 44-45, 49.
[xlvii] 2023 Integrated Review Refresh, 10-11, 17.
[xlviii] 2023 Integrated Review Refresh, 43.
[xlix] Robert Johnson, “UK Grand Strategy,” Comparative Grand Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) 123-127; 2023 Review, 19.
[l] 2023 Review, 34-35; NSS, 23.
[li] Richard G. Whitman, “Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK’s European diplomatic strategy?” International Affairs, no. 3 (2016): 511.
[lii] 2023 Review, 20.
[liii] 2023 Review, 23.
[liv] Reiterating that “traditional multilateral approaches and defending the post-Cold War ‘rules-based international system’ are no longer sufficient on their own,” the review pledges the UK’s foreign policy to “actively shape the environment in which it operates.” Freedom to operate is not enough to secure British interests, rather, the UK must pursue arrangements that generate strategic advantage. In the face of growing powers like China and established blocs like the EU, the review asserts that the UK must define its core strengths and seek to enhance these advantages through careful manipulation of the international order. These core strengths include the London Stock Exchange, the UK’s cyber capabilities, and the fact that the UK has the second highest GDP in Europe. See 2023 Review, 22-23, 57-58.
[lv] The IRR repeatedly stresses the UK’s close relationship with its “most important ally and partner”—the United States. See 2023 Review, 23.
[lvi] EU Strategic Compass 2023, 4.
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