By Sylvia Lorico
To: Charles Michel, President of the European Council
From: Members of the EU Commission for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Subject: Policy Memorandum “Intensifying the Impact of Economic Sanctions on Russia in the Wake of Prolonged Conflict in Ukraine”
This memorandum analyzes the impact of the European Union’s (EU’s) economic sanctions on the Russian economy. While sanctions have had short-term impacts, Russia has benefited from high oil/gas prices and imposed strong financial controls to stabilize its economy. Subsequently, this memorandum identifies three areas where the Russian government continues to draw revenues, including oil/gas exports, nuclear energy exports, and financial inflows, while emphasizing Russia’s key economic weaknesses: its dependence on foreign currency and energy exports.
The memorandum concludes by proposing three ways the EU can intensify economic sanctions: further sanctioning Russia’s top banks, imposing a tariff on Russian oil exports, and imposing phased-out sanctions on Russian nuclear exports.
Summary of Economic Sanctions Since February 2022
As of writing, the EU has issued ninepackages of sanctions against Russia, with measures covering the energy and financial sectors.1
1. Energy-related Sanctions
These sanctions include export bans and restrictions on “oil refining technologies” and other “equipment, technology and services” in the sector and an importation ban on Russian fossil fuels.2 There are also prohibitions on all new Russian investments into the EU’s energy fields, and on Russian vehicles accessing EU ports, roads, and locks.3 Russia’s nuclear energy industry remains exempt from both.4
“No to war, no to Russian oil & gas,” protest graffiti in Vienna, Austria. March 2022. Photo: Herzi Pinki/Wikimedia Commons. No changes were made. View license here
Furthermore, since May 2022, the EU has sought to eliminate almost 75 per cent of Russian oil/gas imports by December and then a complete separation by 2030.5 Sanctions to this effect include a phased-out six-month and eight-month ban on crude oil and refined petroleum products respectively in June, and a price cap on remaining oil sales in October, which prevents non-compliant EU ships from transporting Russian oil to third countries.6 A price cap sets a maximum rate that can be charged for crude oil and fuels. It should be noted that as of February 2023, the EU has banned all Russian crude oil imports into the EU.7 The price cap is put in place to ensure that insurance and shipping based in the EU and other Group of Seven (G7) nations can trade Russian oil internationally while minimizing the impacts on the global oil market.
2. Financial Sanctions
Current sanctions include a Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) ban for some of the top ten Russian banks and four Belarusian banks, including Sberbank, Russia’s largest financial institution.8 The ban unplugs Russian banks from using the SWIFT messaging system to facilitate cross-border payments, which will make interbank transactions more complex, since thousands of banks internationally rely on SWIFT.
There is also an asset freeze on the Russian Central Bank and bans on projects funded by the Russian Direct Investment Fund(Russia’s sovereign wealth fund), as well as a ban on any Russian companies engaging in public procurement in the EU.9 To reduce further Euro inflows, there is also a ban on the “sell, supply, transfer or export of the Euro to Russia” and any Russian/Belarusian entities.10
Analyzing the Impact of the EU’s Economic Sanctions on Russia
According to an October 2022 report by the World Bank, the Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to decrease by 4.5 per cent in 2022 and then another 3.6 per cent in 2023due to the impact of economic sanctions.11 A similar report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects growth of -3.4 per cent in 2022 and then -2.3 per cent in 2023, less severe than initially projected because of “resilience in crude oil exports and in domestic demand with greater fiscal and monetary support and a restoration of confidence in the financial system.”12
MEPs unanimously condemned the brutal invasion and urged the EU to further sanction Moscow and protect the European economy. Photo: European Parliament/Wikimedia Commons. No changes were made. View license here.
Sanctions from the EU and its allies also resulted in Russia’s imports contracting by 22 per cent in the second quarter of 2022. Exports contracted in Russia by 12.3 per cent and are expected to contract by 9.3 per cent in 2023. However, it should be noted that oil export volumes only dropped by 0.4 million barrels per day (mb/d) because Russia offset the impact of sanctions by increasing exports to China, India, and Turkey.
The same World Bank report notes that consumer inflation is projected to be at 13.9 per cent in 2022 and is expected to remain higher than 4 per cent until 2024, the target that the Russian Central Bank has set for the country.13
In the immediate aftermath of sanctions, the ruble dropped 29% compared to the US dollar.14 However, the ruble has since recovered because of “capital controls and current account strength.”15
Based on the statistics mentioned above, it is evident that the EU’s sanctions have contributed to some notable impacts on Russia’s economy. However, given Russia’s resilient financial system and crude oil exports, further sanctions are needed in both areas to increase the intensity of sanctions.
Key Areas of Weakness in the Russian Economy
The EU and its allies must continue to intensify sanctions in two key areas: its energy exports and its continuing dependence on foreign currencies as reserve currencies. Increasing sanctions in these areas would further undermine Russia’s economy.
Firstly, Russia remains highly dependent on energy exports, especially oil and nuclear exports to Europe. In 2021, the Russian government exported 4.7 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil worldwide, with 2.4 million bpd of that total going to Europe.16 Economic ministry documents obtained by Reuters estimated that revenues from oil and gas would reach $337.5 billion (about 346 billion Euros) in 2022, a nearly 38% increase from last year.17
In the nuclear energy sector, Russia dominates the market as the largest supplier of nuclear energy technologies.18 Furthermore, Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear energy company, has projected that profits from its international projects will reach $8.4 billion (8.6 billion Euros) in 2021 alone.19 Given the nation’s dependence on energy exports, the intensification of sanctions would further restrict Russia’s revenues.
Secondly, Russia remains dependent on foreign currencies, like the Euro, as reserve currencies. Figures from the Central Bank of Russia in 2021 show that about 30% of its foreign exchange reserves are held in Euros.20 Intensifying sanctions would restrict Russia’s ability to facilitate global investments and reduce inflows of currency.
More Stringent Financial Sanctions Are Needed on Russian Financial Institutions
Despite the EU’s targeted financial sanctions, Russia’s strong capital controls, imposed after the Ukraine invasion to prevent foreign currency outflows, have helped stabilize the ruble and minimize effects on the Russian GDP.21
The ruble initially collapsed to 150 rubles/euro in March 2022 but then recovered to 50 rubles/euro by June.22 Additionally, the Russian GDP is now projected to decrease by 4.5 per cent in 2022 and then another 3.6 per cent in 2023, less severe than initially estimated.23
This projection is suggested to be significantly less than initially estimated, because currency inflows continue to occur in top Russian-owned banks and their subdivisions not sanctioned by the EU, including Gazprombank.
Thus, an imposition of full sanctions on the top thirty banks in Russia and their associated subdivisions, with certain narrow exemptions (i.e., for certain transactions with Gazprombank), will further discourage currency inflows into the nation.24
Tariff-based Sanctions Recommended to Further Reduce Russian Oil/Gas Export Revenues
Despite sanctions, the Russian government continues to profit from high oil and gas prices. Crude oil prices increased by 3.5 per cent between February and August 2022, and prices currently sit at $120/barrel (123 Euros/barrel).25 Additionally, it is estimated that from the onset of the war to August 2022, Russia made about 158 billion Euros in earnings from fossil fuel exports.26
The EU’s sanctions initially influenced Russia’s oil/gas exports. Eurostat reported that EU imports of oil by Russia dropped from 25.9% of its total petroleum imports to 21.3% in the second half of 2022. EU imports of natural gas from Russia dropped from 39.7% in 2021 to only 22.9% in the second half of 2022.27
However, it should be noted that oil export volumes only dropped by 0.4 mb/d world wide because Russia mitigated the impact of sanctions by increasing exports to its allies in Asia (China/India), as well as in Turkey.28 These factors have allowed Russia to run an account surplus of approximately $250 billion (256 billion EUR), primarily from energy exports.29
The EU’s current “price cap” approach poses a risk that Russia might avoid adhering to the price cap to squeeze already impacted EU energy markets.30
An alternative to this plan is an “adjustable import tax.”31 This form of taxation levies a value-added tax on Russian oil/gas imports coming into the EU. Taxation would be more flexiblethan a price cap, can be aligned with the planned phase-out, and would still draw oil/gas revenues away from Russia. Revenues could be redistributed to help struggling consumers within member states.32 Finally, this tariff could be coordinated by a “large demand cartel” made up of Western oil/gas producers to minimize Russian tax evasion, while increasing the costs of Russian retaliation.33 This would ensure adherence to the tariff while minimizing impacts on EU member states.
Russia Continues to Profit from Nuclear Energy Exports to the EU
Russia’s nuclear energy sector accounted for nearly 20% of the EU’s total uranium delivery, 24% of conversion services, and 31% of enrichment services in 2021.34 Estimates by Investigate Europe, a European investigative journalism outlet, estimates that the EU spent 210 million Euros on uranium imports from Russia last year.35 Currently, eighteen Russian-made nuclear reactors (VVERs) operate mainly in Central/Eastern Europe and rely on Russian technology.36 Rosatom is currently building two new reactors in Hungary and two in Slovakia.37
The EU’s current sanctions contain exemptions for the nuclear energy sector.38 The exemptions have allowed Russia to continue to profit from nuclear energy via EU imports of uranium and maintenance of Russian-made VVERs.
Sanctions in this industry are recommended to significantly restrict Rosatom’s foreign earnings, as well as to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian energy. Russia is a powerful player in the global nuclear energy market and such sanctions should further reduce its energy revenues.
However, considering some member states’ dependence, a targeted, phased-out,and coordinated approachwith the EU and its allies is needed to implement sanctions on nuclear energy. These sanctions must be coupled with continuing efforts to diversify away from Russian nuclear energy.39
The first round of nuclear sanctions would involve sanctions on Rosatom, covering projects currently under construction and future projects. It would begin with a ban on new investments into Rosatom projects, followed by restrictions related to the provisions of services, an export ban on specific goods and technologies in the nuclear energy field, and, eventually, a phased-out embargo on nuclear trade with Russia over several months. Certain exemptions would have to be made for those member states considered dependent on nuclear energy, and exceptions would also have to be made for services related to nuclear safety, security, and disposal.
Several months into the war, Russia has managed to mitigate the effects of EU sanctions on its economy. The EU’s current packages of economic sanctions contain certain exemptions in the oil/gas sector, the nuclear sector, and the financial sector to balance the need for sanctions with possibly detrimental effects on its populations.
Nevertheless, further intensification of sanctions that target Russia’s energy sectors and financial dependence on Western currency is needed.
Therefore, the following is recommended:
- Replacement of the oil price cap with an adjustable taxon all remaining oil imports coming into the EU, to be aligned with the planned phase-out.40
- Further sanctions on the top thirty banks in Russia, to further restrict currency inflows.41
- A phased-out, gradual approach to prohibiting Russian nuclear energy, beginning with sanctions on new investments and projects currently under construction by Rosatom and then intensifying over several months, should Russia continue its actions in Ukraine.
These sanctions are necessary to increase pressure on Russia and to demonstrate that continued escalation in Ukraine is unacceptable.
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2. “EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine (Since 2014).”
3. “EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine (Since 2014).”
4. “Timeline – EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine.”
5. “REPowerEU: A Plan to Rapidly Reduce Dependence on Russian Fossil Fuels and Fast Forward the Green Transition,” European Commission., May 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3131.
6. “Timeline – EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine,” European Council.
7. Jackie Northam, “Europe Bans Russian Oil Products, the Latest Strike on the Kremlin War Chest,” NPR, last modified February 5, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/02/03/1153833640/europe-russian-oil-products-ban.
8. “EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine (Since 2014),” European Council.
9. “EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine (Since 2014),” European Council.
10. “Timeline – EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine,” European Council.
11. “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Fall 2022: Social Protection for Recovery,” World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/38098.
12. “Regional Economic Outlook Report Europe, 2022,” International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/EU/Issues/2022/10/12/regional-economic-outlook-for-europe-october-2022.
13. “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Fall 2022, World Bank.
14. Weizhen Tan and Natasha Turak, “Russian Ruble Plunges Nearly 30% Against the Dollar Amid Sanctions Over Ukraine Invasion,” CNBC News, Feb 28, 2022, https://www..com/2022/02/28/russian-ruble-dives-nearly-30percent-against-the-dollar-amid-sanctions-ukraine-crisis.html.
15. “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Fall 2022,” World Bank.
16. “World Energy Outlook 2022, International Energy Agency, published October 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/830fe099-5530-48f2-a7c1-11f35d510983/WorldEnergyOutlook2022.pdf.
17. “Russia Sees 38% Rise in Energy Export Earnings This Year – Govt Document,” Reuters, August 17, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exclusive-russia-forecasts-export-gas-price-will-more-than-double-2022-2022-08-17/.
18. Mycle Schneide et al, “The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2022,” published October 2022. https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2022-v3-lr.pdf.
19. “Newsletter: Highlights in 2021,” Rosatom, last modified January 2022, https://rosatomnewsletter.com/2022/01/31/rosatom-highlights-in-2021/.
20. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, “Russia’s External Position: Does Financial Autarky Protect Against Sanctions?,” Brookings Institute, published March 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2022/03/03/russias-external-position-does-financial-autarky-protect-against-sanctions/.
21. “Regional Economic Outlook Report Europe, 2022,” International Monetary Fund.
22. Ilya Matveev et al, “Russian Analytical Digest: Economic Dysfunctionalities,” Center for Security Studies (CSS), published June 2022, https://css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad/rad-all-issues/details.html?id=/n/o/2/8/no_285_economic_dysfunctionalities.
23. “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Fall 2022,” World Bank, October 2022, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/38098.
24. “Strengthening Financial Sanctions Against the Russian Federation,” International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, published June 2022, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_0wsGmgcM8wD7G78x4WO-VBeuPbJdSov/view.
25. “Regional Economic Outlook Report Europe, 2022,” International Monetary Fund.
26. “Financing Putin’s War: Fossil Fuel Exports from Russia in the First Six Months of the Invasion of Ukraine,” Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, September 2022, https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/financing-putins-war-fossil-fuel-exports-from-russia-in-the-first-six-months-of-the-invasion-of-ukraine/.
27. “EU Imports of Energy Products – Recent Developments,” Eurostat, September 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments#Overview.
28. “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Fall 2022,” World Bank.
29. Girish Luthra, “The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Sanctions: An Assessment of the Economic and Political Impacts,” Observer Research Foundation: Occasional Paper. No: 374, October 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-and-sanctions/.
30. Julian Lee, “Russian Oil Price Cap May Not Be the Hoped-for Fail-Safe,” Washington Post, October 17, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/russian-oil-price-cap-may-not-be-the-hoped-for-fail-safe/2022/10/16/e4989e40-4d17-11ed-8153-96ee97b218d2_story.html?utm_source=ground.news&utm_medium=referral.
31. “Energy Sanctions Roadmap: Recommendations for Sanctions Against the Russian Federation,” International Working Group on Sanctions, May 2022, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Lk6RgmTd0uTc_vj-45HZf066wYScPq1qihpA9blrZgQ/edit.
32. Hannes Lenk, “The Costs of War: How Tariffs Could Help Europe Give Up Russian Oil and Gas,” Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, May 2022, https://www.sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2022/perspective_the-costs-of-war.pdf.
33. Ricardo Hausmann et al, “Cutting Putin’s Energy Rent: ‘Smart Sanctioning’ Russian Oil and Gas,” Brugel Working Paper, April 2022, https://www.bruegel.org/working-paper/cutting-putins-energy-rent-smart-sanctioning-russian-oil-and-gas.
34. “Market Observatory: Uranium EU Prices,” Euratom Supply Agency, 2022, https://euratom-supply.ec.europa.eu/activities/market-observatory_en.
35. Sigrid Melchior et al. “Russia’s Multi-Million Euro Nuclear Exports Untouched by EU Sanctions,” Investigate Europe, October 2022, https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2022/russias-multi-million-euro-nuclear-exports-untouched-by-eu-sanctions/.
36. Tony Wesolowsky, “The Rosatom Exemption: How Russia’s State-Run Nuclear Giant Has Escaped Sanctions,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 15, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/rosatom-russia-nuclear-giant-escapes-sanctions/31899192.html.
37. Melchior, “Russia’s Multi-Million Euro Nuclear Exports Untouched by EU Sanctions.” /
38. “EU Sanctions Against Russia Explained,” European Council/Council of Europe, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/.
39. Matt Bown and Paul Dabbar, “Reducing Russian Involvement in Western Nuclear Power Markets,” Center on Global Energy Policy, May 2022, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/commentary/reducing-russian-involvement-western-nuclear-power-markets.
40. Ricardo Hausmann et al, “Cutting Putin’s Energy Rent: ‘Smart Sanctioning’ Russian Oil and Gas.”
41. “Strengthening Financial Sanctions Against the Russian Federation.”
Bown, Matt, and Paul Dabbar. “Reducing Russian Involvement in Western Nuclear Power Markets.” Center on Global Energy Policy. May 2022. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/commentary/reducing-russian-involvement-western-nuclear-power-markets.
Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. “Financing Putin’s War: Fossil Fuel Exports From Russia in the First Six Months of the Invasion of Ukraine.” September 2022. https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/financing-putins-war-fossil-fuel-exports-from-russia-in-the-first-six-months-of-the-invasion-of-ukraine/.
European Commission. “REPowerEU: A Plan to Rapidly Reduce Dependence on Russian Fossil Fuels and Fast Forward the Green Transition.” May 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3131.
European Council/Council of Europe. “EU Sanctions Against Russia Explained.” 2022. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/.
“European Council/Council of Europe. “Timeline – EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine.” 2022. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/.
Euratom Supply Agency. “Market Observatory: Uranium EU Price.” 2022. https://euratom-supply.ec.europa.eu/activities/market-observatory_en.
Eurostat. “EU Imports of Energy Products – Recent Developments.” September 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments#Overview.
Hausmann, Ricardo, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Axel Ockenfels, Ulrich Schetter, Simone Tagliapietra, Guntram B. Wolff, and G.Zachmann. “Cutting Putin’s Energy Rent: ‘Smart Sanctioning’ Russian Oil and Gas’,” Working Paper 05/2022. Bruegel. Published April 28, 2022. https://www.bruegel.org/working-paper/cutting-putins-energy-rent-smart-sanctioning-russian-oil-and-gas.
International Monetary Fund. “Regional Economic Outlook Report Europe 2022.” April 2022. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/EU/Issues/2022/10/12/regional-economic-outlook-for-europe-october-2022.
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The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions. “Energy Sanctions Roadmap: Recommendations for Sanctions Against the Russian Federation.” May 2022. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Lk6RgmTd0uTc_vj-45HZf066wYScPq1qihpA9blrZgQ/edit.
The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions. “Strengthening Financial Sanctions Against the Russian Federation.” June 2022. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_0wsGmgcM8wD7G78x4WO-VBeuPbJdSov/view.
Lee, Julian. “Russian Oil Price Cap May Not Be the Hoped-for Fail-Safe.” Washington Post, October 17, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/russian-oil-price-cap-may-not-be-the-hoped-for-fail-safe/2022/10/16/e4989e40-4d17-11ed-8153-96ee97b218d2_story.html?utm_source=ground.news&utm_medium=referral.
Lenk, Hannes. “The Costs of War: How Tariffs Could Help Europe Give Up Russian Oil and Gas.” Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. May 2022. https://www.sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2022/perspective_the-costs-of-war.pdf.
Luthra, Girish. “The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Sanctions: An Assessment of the Economic and Political Impacts.” Observer Research Foundation: Occasional Paper. No: 374. October 2022. https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-and-sanctions/.
Matveev, Ilya, Andrei Yakovle, Janis Kluge, Michael Rochlitz, Olga Masyutina, and Ekaterina Paustyan. “Russian Analytical Digest: Economic Dysfunctionalities.” Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. No: 285. June 2022. https://css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad/rad-all-issues/details.html?id=/n/o/2/8/no_285_economic_dysfunctionalities.
Melchior, Sigrid, Pascal Hansens, Harald Schumann, and Maria Maggiore. “Russia’s Multi-Million Euro Nuclear Exports Untouched by EU Sanctions.” Investigate Europe. October 2022. https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2022/russias-multi-million-euro-nuclear-exports-untouched-by-eu-sanctions/.
Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria. “Russia’s External Position: Does Financial Autarky Protect Against Sanctions?” Brookings Institute. March 2022.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2022/03/03/russias-external-position-does-financial-autarky-protect-against-sanctions/.
“Russia Sees 38% Rise in Energy Export Earnings This Year – Govt Document.” Reuters, August 17, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exclusive-russia-forecasts-export-gas-price-will-more-than-double-2022-2022-08-17/.
Rosatom. “Rosatom Newsletter: Highlights in 2021.” January 2022. https://rosatomnewsletter.com/2022/01/31/rosatom-highlights-in-2021.
Schneider, Mycle et al. “The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2022.” October 2022. https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2022-lr.pdf.
Tan, Weizhan and Maria Turak. “Russian Ruble Plunges Nearly 30% Against the Dollar Amid Sanctions Over Ukraine Invasion.” CNBC News,February 28, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/28/russian-ruble-dives-nearly-30percent-against-the-dollar-amid-sanctions-ukraine-crisis.html.
Wesolowsky, Tony. “The Rosatom Exemption: How Russia’s State-Run Nuclear Giant Has Escaped Sanctions.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 15, 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/rosatom-russia-nuclear-giant-escapes-sanctions/31899192.html.
World Bank. “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update: Social Protection for Recovery.” Fall 2022. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/38098.