United by Fear Alone: The Failed Baltic Entente in the Interwar Era

By Alexander Zamer

Abstract: This paper looks at how the three Baltic states, who today seem to be some of the most united countries in Europe, failed to achieve unity between the First and Second World Wars. Considering economic, political, and geographical issues, the paper breaks down the reasons why interwar cooperation was the exception rather than the norm for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, ultimately arguing that the failure of the Baltic Entente stemmed from two interrelated factors: deeply conflicting national interests among the three states and sustained interference by external powers, particularly the Soviet Union and Germany.

Following the First World War, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania emerged as independent but decidedly weakened states. Each faced distinct security priorities shaped by territorial disputes, economic devastation, demographic challenges, and divergent geopolitical orientations. Estonia and Latvia initially prioritized relations with Soviet Russia and Western Europe, while Lithuania’s foreign policy was overwhelmingly dominated by the unresolved Vilnius/Wilno dispute with Poland. These conflicting priorities undermined early initiatives for cooperation. The paper further demonstrates how Germany and the USSR actively exploited Baltic disunity. German economic influence and the political mobilization of Baltic Germans, combined with Soviet manipulation of Lithuanian–Polish tensions, systematically weakened prospects for collective security. Although a formal Baltic Entente was finally established in 1934, it remained politically constrained, militarily ineffective, and economically fragile. Persistent territorial disputes, incompatible neutrality strategies, and the absence of great power guarantees rendered the alliance incapable of responding to escalating external threats.

Keywords:  Interwar period, National security, Entente, Policy, Geopolitics, Baltics.

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Introduction

The Baltic countries are often regarded as being one of the most tightly aligned regions of modern Europe. From the Baltic Way movement in 1989, which connected all three capitals, to their accession to the EU and later to NATO, these three states have consistently seemed to be on a determined and united path in the recent period, even amidst instability on the continent. This, however, was not always the case, and unity was the exception rather than the standard in the interwar period. Logically, the question that follows is a simple one: if Baltic cooperation is such an obvious fact today, what stopped this from happening in the interbellum? This work argues that there were two key reasons for this: 1) the conflicting national interests of each of the three states; 2) the incessant interference from external actors, particularly the USSR and Germany. By analysing these two factors, it becomes clear why the roadblocks in Baltic cooperation were multifaceted and difficult to manage for these fledgling states.

Ultimately, after the First World War and the Russian Revolution, the three Baltic states emerged as independent entities. While analysing the process of achieving this is beyond the scope of this work, it is highly important to note that each of the three states was left significantly damaged in some way after the war. Bearing the aforementioned in mind, it is much easier to understand that the first roadblock to Baltic co-operation in this era were the conflicting national interests. While it is true that all three nations were sandwiched between the Soviet threat to the East and the German one to the West, they did not rise to meet all those perils at the same time; in fact, they did not appreciate some of these threats until much later. In the immediate period of independence, for Estonia and Latvia, the USSR was the most pressing issue; for Lithuania (which did not border the USSR after 1920), it was Poland’s control of Vilnius that was the most significant issue; and for all three, Germany seemed feeble and defeated at first.^[1]

This essay will first provide an overview of the individual national issues of each Baltic state that precluded the achievement of a Baltic entente in the early years of independence, followed by an analysis of the external actors who were earnest on preventing any form of union in the Baltic region.

Attempts at Baltic Unity 1918-1922

Before delving into the subject more specifically, a word on the topic of the history of a Baltic union is warranted. Even as early as 1914, sentiments had been expressed by Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and even Finns, that their union would only serve to benefit the common good; in 1917, the first steps towards this were taken by the Lithuanian activists Jonas Šliūpas and Stasys Šalkauskis, who proposed a union state with Latvia, with the goal of establishing an “equilibrium between the Germanic and Slavic worlds.”^[2] However due to the tumult and insurmountable challenges of the era, these initial plans were ultimately abandoned.

By November 1918, broader plans for regional cooperation were voiced by Latvian and Estonian activists, notably Zigfrīds Meierovics and Kaarel Pusta, who wanted to include Poland and Finland into this union.^[3] It was the Estonians who spearheaded this opportunity, as their geographical and historical ties with their neighbours to the south and the ethno-linguistic ties with their neighbours to the north placed them in a very central position. These earliest propositions were very lofty, however, amidst three layers of conflict: the Baltic wars of independence at a state level, the Russian civil war at the regional level, and the aftermath of the First World War at the continental level.

Estonia was the first Baltic state to jump to action in regards to serious foreign policy: on February 2, 1920 (after years of battling for a secured independence), Estonia and Russia (RSFSR) signed the Tartu Peace Treaty, establishing official borders and trade, and becoming the first two countries to each of them recognised.^[4] Estonians were thus able to quickly establish themselves as a bridge of trade between the RSFSR and the Western world, helping expand not only its weakened postwar economy, but also gaining international recognition from the United Kingdom and France in 1921 and the United States in 1922. Additionally, Estonia was interested in pursuing a strong relationship with its geographic and linguistic neighbour to the north, Finland. These factors established Estonia as the most progressive player of foreign policy in the Baltics, able to pursue active relations with its neighbours on all sides, and even further afield.

Latvia had started its path as an independent nation absolutely ravaged by the war. In fact, Latvia had suffered the greatest loss, proportionally speaking, of any state in the First World War: 30% of its population.^[5] Furthermore, Latvia was a divided nation, having been split into so many administrative regions under the Russian empire. While Estonia was split between the Governorates of Livonia and Estland, Latvians were divided into the Governorates of Livonia and Courland, as well as the Gubernias of Vitsyebsk and Polatsk, receiving, thus, the influence of the Protestant Baltic Germans on one side, and of the Orthodox Russians on the other. This divide is still very obvious today with Latgale, the eastern region which was controlled directly by the Russians, being far less developed than the rest of Latvia.^[6] It is worth mentioning on this demographic note that Latvia had a smaller percentage of its titular ethnic group (75%), as opposed to Estonia and Lithuania (88% and 84%, respectively) in that period.^[7] On top of the population crisis and the fragmentation of its society, Latvia also had a severe issue with deindustrialisation. While Rīga had been one of the most industrialised cities in the Russian Empire, the First World War had seen almost all of the manufacturing machines destroyed or sent back to Russia.^[8] One of the only hopes would lie in international trade. While weary of the Russian threat, Latvia was “predestined to serve as the entry area for all economic activity with Russia,”^[9] and its recognition by almost all European powers in 1921 and the United States in 1922 cemented its connections with the West. In this regard, along with its geographical location between Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia was predisposed to retain good relations with its neighbours on all sides, in order to not only protect its territory via diplomatic means, but also to gain the necessary financial wherewithal to function.

Despite the hardships faced by the other two states, it was Lithuania that truly was the hurdle for international cooperation. This, however, was not due to a small matter: Lithuania’s historical capital was not under its own control. It would be the territorial issues of Vilnius (Wilno in Polish) and Klaipėda (Memel in German), a topic that will be addressed later, which would have the greatest influence on Lithuanian foreign policy throughout the interbellum.^[10] In the aftermath of the war, the historic capital of Lithuania had ended up within the control of the Second Polish Republic. Accepting this was too dear of a pill for the Lithuanians to swallow and would prove to be the ultimate stumbling block inhibiting unity and cooperation within the Baltic sphere. From the Polish perspective, their rule of that region was justified, given that the area had a sizable Polish population, not to mention that Vilnius historically had a Polish and Jewish majority. It is in fact this struggle over Vilnius that placed the Lithuanians on slightly positive terms with the RSFSR, which on July 12, 1920 recognised Vilnius as Lithuanian in exchange for the unofficial right to pass Russian troops through Lithuania during the Polish-Soviet War.^[11] It was at this period, when the Lithuanians, not without the aid of the Red Army, were able to temporarily retake Vilnius from Polish control, opening the first serious chapter of inter-Baltic dialogue.

The first real steps towards a Baltic entente were achieved at the Rīga-Bulduri Conference in August of 1920. Here, for the first time, an idea of a strong and united collaboration of powers was taken seriously. Present were not only the three Baltic States, but also Poland, Finland and the People’s Republic of Ukraine (which had been recognised by all three Baltics States and had been invited as an observer); Sweden, Denmark and Norway did not participate, although they were indeed invited (an element which will prove to be crucial later).^[12] At this conference, the six states discussed ideas of defensive military agreements, the creation of an economic council, a common banking policy and the unification of railroad, postal, telegraph and maritime networks.^[13] While the progress made at this conference was significant towards establishing a strong entente in the Baltic region, the threat was clear: the rise of the communist power to the East. All of these states had only recently declared independence from the Russian Empire, and would be directly next in line if the Russian threat were to expand again. Unfortunately, the progress made at the Rīga-Bulduri Conference was cut short due to renewed tensions between Poland and Lithuania, where the Vilnius question was once again being re-examined by militaristic force.^[14]

The next time that the topic of a Baltic entente would come about in serious discussion was the Warsaw Agreement of 1922. By that time, much had changed: Lithuania had once more lost Vilnius to Poland, and all three of the Baltic states had joined the League of nations in 1921; this sense of international recognition had switched the thinking from defensive to neutral in order for the states to retain their existence in face of the two rising empires next door.

In Warsaw, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Finland met in order to revisit the unfinished work done at the Rīga-Bulduri Conference. Despite the effort, the provisions dictated in this new settlement were too indefinite, and the failure of Finland to actually implement them (coupled with Poland’s incessant quarrel with Lithuania over Vilnius) led to the ultimate abandonment of the idea.^[15] The failure of the Warsaw Agreement brought on many issues. Finland, while very cooperative at the beginning, gave up its hopes of a Baltic entente and turned its attention westwards, towards Sweden,^[16] following the example of the Nordic states in the aforementioned Rīga-Bulduri Conference. The insurmountable conflict between Lithuania and Poland only grew more tense, and Estonia and Latvia were weary that closer relations with Lithuania or Poland could only weaken their position; thus, the idea of a wider Baltic entente receded into the background.^[17]       

Foreign Influence in the Baltic States

In the decade between 1922 and 1933, a significant development had taken place in the region: Germany was now run by Adolf Hitler, who, together with his Tallinn-born Baltic German adviser on foreign affairs, Alfred Rosenburg, had set sights on eastward expansion.^[18] Historically, the relationship of the Germans with the Latvians and Estonians varied, but for the most part it was a negative one. Throughout the period of German colonisation and later of the feudal Russian Empire, the interrelation was very much that of master-servant, with the Germans occupying the highest roles in those lands. The numbers speak for themselves: as late as 1918, 90% of large landed estates and 58% of agricultural land was owned by ethnic Germans in Estonia, and 57% of agricultural land in Latvia was owned by the same.^[19]

However, with the conclusion of the First World War and the establishment of the independent Baltic states, Germany seemed weak and unimportant. In fact, Lithuania was able to forcibly annex the Klaipėda (Memelland)territory (albeit previously under French administration) in January 1923. With almost no resistance from the local German population, and gaining international approval in February of that same year, Lithuania saw this as no small triumph; the Germans themselves would finally accept this fait accompli in 1928.^[20] While the Germans had indeed been weakened by the War, the blindness of the West in seeing the immediate threat posed by Hitler placed the Baltic States directly in harm’s way.

The large community of Baltic Germans left in the Baltic states became known as the Auslandsdeutsche (literally: abroad Germans), and they, finding themselves in a much different position after the war than before it, were anxious to hear words of guidance from the German ‘motherland’. It was in fact Hitler who was able to effectively pick up on this with the Baltic Auslandsdeutsche; from the outset, he designed to make them militantly revisionistic in nature, and trained to serve as the fifth column that would hinder the development of the Baltic states.^[21]

By the end of the 1920s, Germany, along with Great Britain, had become the Baltic states’ largest trading partner, accounting for around 60% of Lithuanian, 30% of Estonian and 27% of Latvia’s exports.^[22] Despite the positive effect this had on the overall development of these three states, there was a second, less desirable effect achieved as a result: the Baltic Germans, who traditionally held the most important roles in economic, manufacturing and other spheres, once again began to wield some power. Furthermore, Hitler understood that he could use these Auslandsdeutsche to push his narratives within domestic politics.^[23] The Germans were also pleased with the USSR’s involvement in the Vilnius question: from Germany’s standpoint, adding fuel to this issue only weakened the possibility for a wider Baltic entente including both Poland and Lithuania.^[24]

The USSR itself was happy with its involvement in the Vilnius question: after all, Lithuania’s policy on this matter was one of the key impasses to a wider Baltic entente, and if the Soviets were able to keep these countries apart, it would be more beneficial for their own goals.^[25] With the conflict between Poland and Lithuania perpetually fueled, Estonia and Latvia would only get more anxious to find an alternative to Baltic cooperation. The USSR meanwhile had been able to profit off of the rising Baltic fears over Germany. By early 1932, all three of the Baltic states had signed a separate nonaggression pact with the USSR; due to the inability of the Baltic states to form any entente amongst themselves, they were only able to achieve a “guarantee” that the USSR would not invade them.^[26] The Baltic states themselves, however, did not pay much attention to the Soviet Union in this period, and ignored, what is in hindsight, a rather obvious threat. In Latvia, for example, the Soviet Union was so far away from people’s minds that “the only fact [one] knew about Soviet Russia was that it existed.”^[27] It is this mindset of keeping the enemy only mentally at bay that coloured the final stage of the efforts for a Baltic entente.

While all three countries had joined the League of Nations back in 1921 and were enjoying recognition of all the major and minor world powers, the shifting political realities in the region needed to be addressed. With Germany’s leaving of the League of Nations in October of 1933 and the rising presence of Hitlerism as an ideology, actions were taken on both the internal and external political levels across the Baltic region.

By 1934, all three of the Baltic states had rejected democracy as a means of government. In Lithuania, Antanas Smetona, who had been president since 1926, was the undisputed ruler. Kārlis Ulmanis in Latvia became the prime minister, and two years later added the role of president to his duties as well (titling himself Tautas Vadonis or ‘Leader of People’ and gracing his image on the banknotes). In Estonia, Konstantin ​​Päts together with the help of general Johan Laidoner had established authoritarian rule with severe limits on political freedoms, giving the epoch the epithet “era of silence.”

Seeing as the political climate in Europe of that time was becoming rather insalubrious, it is only logical that these three states would once again try and reach some form of entente, if only to maintain their spot on the map. This aforementioned nonaggression pact between Poland and Germany did little in subduing the fears of the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, whose ongoing border dispute with Poland caused only more consternation. However, Lithuania realised that it had entered a political cul-de-sac when Poland and Germany signed a nonaggression pact at the beginning of 1934. Now Poland had security both with the USSR (established in 1932) and with Germany, leaving Lithuania to be the odd one out.

In February of 1934, the foreign minister of Lithuania, Dovas Zaunius, gave a speech at the commemoration of Estonian independence stating that, “small nations should not always rely on the help of large states, they will be protected by uniting among themselves.”^[28] The realisation that ultimately neither the Soviets, nor the Germans would care much about the fate of the three Baltic states renewed talks of forming an entente at an unprecedented rate. With Poland and Finland already well out of the picture, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia immediately began to focus on the small Baltic entente. Originally, Estonia and Latvia had organised the first proper alliance in February of that same year, but by April Lithuania had issued a provoking five-point memorandum that prompted the Estonians and Latvians to include Lithuania only five days after it was sent out.^[29] On September 12, 1934, representatives of the three states met to hash out the final details and sign this tri-state entente, only to realise that the unresolved Vilnius question (on which Smetona was hellbent), together with the growing German interests in Klaipėda would prove to be dangerous. Lithuania was thus given the status of a country with a “special concern” over which the other two states could not “enunciate a unified attitude” for fear of souring their relations with Poland and Germany.^[30] For better or for worse, the entente of the three states was finally established.

Despite the signing of this historic entente, the meddling of the USSR, Poland and Germany made it very difficult for there to be any serious results from this new union. Latvia and Estonia had serious, and not unfeigned, concerns regarding their trade with both Poland and Germany, and closer economic ties to Lithuania only pushed the Poles and Germans further away.^[31] While Lithuania was still on good terms with the USSR against Poland, Estonia and especially Latvia, under Ulmanis, was much more sceptical of its eastern neighbour. Ulmanis maintained that the only way forward could be strict, almost Swiss-like, neutrality, significantly weakening any aspirations of a united militaristic force in the region.^[32] Furthermore, Germany tried its hardest to dissuade the Estonians and Latvians from entertaining any notions of solidarity with the Lithuanians over Klaipėda, reminding them that there would be no secure borders in the region until this question was settled.^[33]

It was with this renewed German revisionism that the maelstrom which led to the Second World War began to tug at the Baltic nations. By 1938, Poland and Lithuania were once again at incredibly heightened tensions, and in that same year Klaipėda was in the process of being annexed by internal and external German forces; the USSR and the Western powers did next to nothing in both cases.^[34] While there had been some interest in a Baltic entente amongst the Western Powers, in which France had been the most vocal, as any union of the Baltic states would, theoretically at least, hamper German expansion to that quarter.^[35] The West believed that the Baltic states could act as a logical barrier (from the Western perspective) to block the USSR and Germany from cooperating. Despite this obvious incentive to support the newly-formed Baltic Entente, there were no guarantors among the great powers in the event that military actions were to be taken up against the Baltic states.^[36]

Conclusion

As the Second World War approached, it appeared that any hopes or dreams of a united Baltic front had not been realised. While a formal alliance had been achieved in 1934, the failure of these three states to cast aside their own personal interests in order to fully support one-another led to the complete failure of any unity. The final stage of this almost 16-year-long process of forming an entente was certainly “anticlimactic.”^[37] With both the USSR and Germany managing to keep their paws on the internal politics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and especially Lithuania’s inability to achieve any form of understanding with Poland, all three countries were kept strategically separated when it mattered. Of course, this would prove very useful for the USSR in 1940 when it fulfilled its side of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and invaded the Baltic states, bringing their independence to an end until 1991.

Some years later, in 1960, the former Latvian Prime Minister, Ādolfs Bļodnieks, would return to the question of Baltic entente in his memoirs on Latvia, The Undefeated Nation. He blames the “disaster,” that is, the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, on the lack of cooperation amongst the states.^[38] According to him, it was only when all three of the Baltic governments had to go into exile that they truly found out how vital the idea of an entente was.^[39] Perhaps the period of the Soviet occupation had let this wisdom sink in, for when the Baltic states re-emerged on the world stage as independent states in 1991, they were certainly united with one voice in a uniquely westerly direction, towards the European Union and towards NATO.

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Endnotes

^[1] The Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Baltic States: A Survey of the Political and Economic Structure and the Foreign Relations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970), 63.

^[2] Bronis J. Kaslas, The Baltic Nations – The Quest for Regional Integration and Political Liberty (Pittston: Euramerica Press, 1976), 119-20.

^[3] Kaslas, Baltic Nations, 122.

^[4] Andres Kasekamp, A History of the Baltic States, Second Edition (London: Red Globe Press, 2018), 94.

^[5] Mara Kalnins, Latvia: A Short History (London: Hurst & Co., 2015), 123.

^[6] Kalnins, Latvia, 200.

^[7] Kevin C. O’Connor, The History of the Baltic States, Second Edition (Denver: Greenwood Press, 2015), 111.

^[8] Kalnins, Latvia, 124.

^[9] Hugh Rodgers, Search for Security: A Study in Baltic Diplomacy, 1920-1934 (Hamden: Archon Books, 1975), 9.

^[10] Zigmantas Kiaupa, The History of Lithuania (Vilnius: Baltos Lankos, 2002), 331.

^[11] Alfred Erich Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania and the Vilna Question 1920-1928 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966), 33.

^[12] Kaslas, Baltic Nations, 125.

^[13] Kaslas, Baltic Nations, 138.

^[14] Kaslas, Baltic Nations, 141.

^[15] Kaslas, Baltic Nations, 144.

^[16] Ādolfs Bļodnieks, The Undefeated Nation (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1960), 286.

^[17] Kaslas, Baltic Nations, 144.

^[18] The Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Baltic States: A Survey of the Political and Economic Structure and the Foreign Relations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970), 76.

^[19] John Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 36.

^[20] Kiaupa, History of Lithuania, 344-345.

^[21] Hiden, Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, 44.

^[22] David Crowe, The Baltic States and the Great Powers: Foreign Relations, 1938-1940 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 12.

^[23] Crowe, Baltic States and Great Powers, 13-14.

^[24] Magnus Ilmjärv, Безмолвная капитуляция: внешняя политика Эстонии, Латвии и Литвы между двумя войнами и утрата независимости (Москва: Росспэн, 2012), 113.

^[25] Ilmjärv, Безмолвная капитуляция, 109.

^[26] Crowe, Baltic States and Great Powers, 18.

^[27] Deniss Hanovs and Valdis Tēraudkalns, Ultimate Freedom – No Choice: The Culture of Authoritarianism in Latvia, 1934-1940 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 110.

^[28] Ilmjärv, Безмолвная капитуляция, 116.

^[29] Kaslas, Baltic Nations, 174.

^[30] Kaslas, Baltic Nations, 176.

^[31] Ilmjärv, Безмолвная капитуляция, 134.

^[32] Andrejs Plakans, The Latvians: A Short History (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 140.

^[33] Ilmjärv, Безмолвная капитуляция, 132.

^[34] Kiaupa, History of Lithuania, 359.

^[35] Ilmjärv, Безмолвная капитуляция, 133.

^[36] Kiaupa, History of Lithuania, 358.

^[37] Rodgers, Search for Security, 102.

^[38] Bļodnieks, Undefeated Nation, 285.

^[39] Bļodnieks, Undefeated Nation, 287.

References

Bļodnieks, Ādolfs. The Undefeated Nation. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1960.

Crowe, David M. The Baltic States and the Great Powers: Foreign Relations, 1938-1940. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

Hanovs, Deniss and Valdis Tēraudkalns. Ultimate Freedom – No Choice: The Culture of Authoritarianism in Latvia, 1934-1940. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Hiden, John. The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Ilmjärv, Magnus. Безмолвная капитуляция: внешняя политика Эстонии, Латвии и Литвы между двумя войнами и утрата независимости (с середины 1920-х годов до аннексии в 1940) [Silent Submission: Formation of Foreign Policy of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Period from mid-1920s to Annexation in 1940]. Moscow: Rosspen, 2012.

Kalnins, Mara. Latvia: A Short History. London: Hurst & Co., 2015.

Kasekamp, Andres. A History of the Baltic States. Second Edition. London: Red Globe Press, 2018.

Kaslas, Bronis J. The Baltic Nations – The Quest for Regional Integration and Political Liberty. Pittston: Euramerica Press, 1976.

Kiaupa, Zigmantas. The History of Lithuania. Vilnius: Baltos Lankos, 2002.

O’Connor, Kevin C. The History of the Baltic States. Second Edition. Denver: Greenwood Press, 2015.

Plakans, Andrejs. The Latvians: A Short History. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995.

Rodgers, Hugh I. Search for Security: A Study in Baltic Diplomacy, 1920-1934. Hamden: Archon Books, 1975.

Senn, Alfred Erich. The Great Powers, Lithuania and the Vilna Question 1920-1928. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966.

The Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Baltic States: A Survey of the Political and Economic Structure and the Foreign Relations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970.

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