Security at the Margins: A Human Security Lens on Lithuania’s Past, Present, and Future

By Luisa Reinhardt

“Protect the Future” mural in Vilnius, Lithuania by Žygimantas Amelynas, 2024.

Abstract: European Security materialises in Lithuanian everyday lives. At the geographical margin of Europe, Lithuania receives little attention despite its centrality to the NATO East flank’s security. This paper discusses Lithuania’s human security within the European security architecture. The discussion draws on the historical continuity of Lithuanian security in front of the post-Soviet background and marginalised children’s exemplary affectedness by dawning conflict to localise the human dimension of European security debates. The analysis connects Lithuanian patriotism, demographic development and national security policy to the broader regional discourse and a localised case study. The Lithuanian children at the social care centre Šakiai Diakonija are severely affected by the geopolitical insecurity, given Russia’s increasing hybrid warfare.  Discourses of geopolitical shifts and wartime preparations shape children’s national and personal identities. Pressures such as a shrinking national population and militarised social discourses add to geopolitical insecurity, enculturing fear in children’s development. This contrasts with the post-Cold War era’s relative economic and state security, constitutes a fundamental shift in the perception of European Security, and is a crucial factor in civil resilience-building programmes. This qualitative case study explores the concept of human security, centring the Lithuanian perspective on European security politics. It draws on academic literature and practical social work with marginalised Lithuanian youth. A feminist perspective reveals the connections between everyday practices and macro-political security. The identified vulnerabilities in this case study indicate innovative, transdisciplinary pathways to incorporate music and arts in social resilience-building programmes. This case study recentres the human experience of geopolitical security debates.

Keywords: National security, Policy, Border, Geopolitics, Feminism, Children.


Introduction

Lithuanian orphans sing patriotic songs at Šakiai Diakonija, a diaconal social work institution located just a 20-minute drive from the Russian border—and roughly 2 minutes for the medium-range missiles stationed in Kaliningrad. Many of these children, already carrying histories of familial violence, anxiously scan the skies for drones, fearing a war-torn future. As their social worker, I observe how political conflict informs early childhood. In Lithuania, where a legacy of Soviet history is omnipresent, today’s conflict connects understandings of past, present, and future security.

This paper explores the lived realities at the Lithuanian-Russian border. By centering the human dimension of international security, this paper offers a perspective on bottom-up resilience and highlights individual and collective strength for populations enduringrising military tensions. The case study complements academic literature on European security, as it draws on voices that are overlooked in traditional global security discourses through a feminist-critical lens. This paper addresses marginalised groups’ vulnerability to geopolitical tensions, pursuing the research question: How do rising military tensions affect the human security of marginalised communities, and what lessons do Lithuanian youth’s everyday lives in childcare centres reveal about resilience-building?

Given the importance of Lithuania to EU security, academics and practitioners can gather insights from this case study, which could inform European populations’ resilience amid increasing geopolitical insecurity.

The article first presents the theoretical debate between realist and feminist-constructivist security studies in an argument for an intersectional and localised investigation of changing social identities. The case is then outlined from macro to micro levels (Lithuanian nation to case location). The analysis discusses the continuity of past, present, and future. It traces their interaction along the themes of military and music, arguing that vulnerable youth must receive special protection from the impact of militarisation and conflict.

Theoretical Debates

Presenting a practice-informed case study, this paper contributes to humansecurity studies, against a backdrop of state security, military spending, and international conflicts that again dominate academia, diplomacy, and national policy within Europe.[1] Focusing on subnational, relational security, a feminist-constructivist approach to security studies pays attention to intersectional identities and interactions between the personal and political. This paper discusses the outskirts of a conflict that dominates EU diplomacy — Russia’s war on Ukraine — and amplifies often overlooked voices of the conflict: children at the Lithuanian-Russian border who fear a similar expansionist attack on their home country. Focusing on neglected perspectives in international conflict, this paper adds to academic and policy discourses on European security.

Resurging Realism in Europe

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European politics shifted towards realist frames of state security. Realist traditions share a state-centric view of security, assuming that states are self-interested and rational actors.[2] Structural realism explains that in the absence of a central authority, states compete for regional hegemony.[3] Among the most prominent realist theorists, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism emphasises the interest of states to seek domination through confrontative strategies.[4] Structural realists have described a three-agential structure that defines the “European-American coalition, a pro-China group, and a pro-Russia group of states” as the three competing powers.[5] An offensive realist view now frames Russia’s aggression as a response to Western expansionism, that is, EU and NATO enlargement.[6] Offensive realism can thus explain Russia’s war against Ukraine, framing the Russian striving for hegemony as a rational strategy.[7] The rearmament of European states is but one measure within offensive realist discourse, but it does not sufficiently explain how changes in security manifest on the ground.

Rearmament strategies align with states’ pursuit of power in a competitive and insecure geopolitical climate. To maintain relative strength, states operate through a growing military-industrial complex[8] and policing[9] — policies that are inherently state-centric. However, the nation-centred focus has been widely criticised,[10] among others for its inadequate explanation of state behaviour. Beyond realists’ traditional focus on nations’ defense capacities, psychology is a potential driver of state behaviour.[11] Acknowledging psychological factors even within the realist paradigm, political scientists Smith and Dawson explain Putin’s policies based on his social-psychological agenda.[12] Civilisation rhetoric, among others, draws on concepts such as culture and identity to explain Russia’s national interest in fighting U.S. hegemony.[13] Yet, the Baltics illustrate the centrality of culture and psychology; they are at the core of human security politics.

While realism offers an approach to analysing international power struggles, translating a nation-centred theory into policy tools does not necessarily meet local, real-world demands. In a defense of realism as an analytical tool, International Relations scholar Paul Poast acknowledges realist theories’ explanatory power, but criticises that realpolitik, i.e. policy inspired by realist theory, lacks the justification to shape policy.[14] In other words, a descriptive ‘is’ in political analysis does not give sufficient grounds for a normative ‘should’. Formulating policy based on a realist framework has two main downsides. On the pragmaticside, realists’ state-centrism misses how subnational interests, strategies, and actions drive national agendas. On the normativeside, the primacy of national perspectives discredits both the agency and affectedness of those ‘victimised’ by state aggression. Realists’ emphasis on state strategy, specifically rearmament in pursuance of power-accumulation, disregards human perspectives on and shaping of security. By contrast, this article frames resilience as reaching beyond militaristic capacity-building. Resilience extends beyond evacuation and similar short-term mitigative strategies. Resilience requires a prepared population, building a skill set that protects populations from long-term harm.

Feminist Focus on the Marginalised

This paper employs feminist-constructivist, critical security theory to illuminate the effect of rising military tensions on Lithuanian youth in childcare as a marginalised community, which may be addressed through transdisciplinary research on preventive strategies. Feminist-constructivist theory brings the most vulnerable in the security landscape to the foreground. Bringing structural and personal dimensions of politics into conversation, the theory pays special attention to everyday lives and thus develops a human security frame.

A feminist-constructivist ontology does not view the personal and political as distinct categories.[15] Connecting the personal or microdimension of human lives to macro-level politicalsecurity conflicts answers to the mismatch between local realities and state-centred realist analysis.[16] Feminist critical theory broadens and deepens the conception of security, as it expands the conception of concerned actors and deepens the meaning of secure living;[17] thereby, it adds valuable perspectives on conflict-prevention and -preparation.

Who is affected by conflict?

The marginalised are the actors farthest from the most powerful entity, the state, as proposed in realist theory. Yet, two reasons speak for recentring their experiences:

First, a normative perspective: The EU’s political promise of “security, freedom, and justice” (Article 3, paragraph 2)[18] commits to guaranteeing security for all EU citizens. Member states must therefore ensure their security politics consider all perspectives. As marginalised groups are disproportionately affected by conflict and war, their perspectives should receive particular attention in security politics.

Second, a pragmatic argument: Pragmatism will acknowledge that the marginalised are also the most vulnerable to hybrid warfare, undermining democratic resilience.[19] Russia uses hybrid warfare to influence political discourses,[20] for instance through election interference[21] or manipulating the historical self-conception of the Baltics’ independence.[22] Russia’s recent drone attack on Poland on September 10th, 2025, illustrated the detrimental impact targeted manipulation has on democracy. Shortly after Russian drones crossed into Polish air space, a Russian disinformation campaign showered media, blaming Ukraine for this interference. The Polish NGO Res Futura, specialised in information security, found that 38% of comments on social media believed the attacks to be Ukraine’s doing.[23] Such disinformation campaigns target specific groups: Among those most vulnerable to disinformation, those of high age, low socio-economic status, lower education background are disproportionately vulnerable.[24] To efficiently counter Russia’s hybrid warfare, security policy must protect vulnerable social groups. Without effective security against disinformation, states risk that vulnerable populations may be exploited for the promotion of Russian propaganda.

Intersectional feminist theory addresses how social identity markers interact with vulnerability to security threats. In recognising the security gaps, as outlined above, feminist theory helps design more efficient policy. Feminist constructivist theory builds on the assumption that realities are not ontologically prior, but socially constructed.[25] Specific gender identities are socially constructed through reciprocal discourse between human everyday practices and social institutions[26] — as are identities of race, class, sexuality, ability, religion, and further identity markers.[27] These markers interact to position an individual in a certain place, defining what agency, power, and (dis-)advantages they experience. The intersectional feminist tradition is attentive to this interaction, analysing how individuals are positioned in a society that attributes valence to these characteristics.

Everyday Lives in Security Studies

Acknowledging that social identities emerge through the everyday reproduction of value-laden practices,[28] this article follows an ontology formed by both performatism and social construction. It recognises artistic practices’ functionality in human self-expression, both individually and collectively.[29] Connecting to the political identity-construction, it draws on Welzer’s communicative memory and Anderson’s theory on imagined communities.[30]  This theoretical framework grasps how cultural practices convey feelings of national belonging across generations.

This article attempts to establish a background vision for further policy-oriented research. Further explorations should assess how exactly social interventions need to be shaped to support vulnerable, marginalised groups, using already habituated practices to advance their agency beyond the marginalised position.

THE CASE

The Russia-Ukraine war shapes the political and personal realities for the Lithuanian nation, its population, and for social groups such as children. The following section will zoom in from the macro (political) to the micro (personal), presenting localised perspectives on Lithuanian lived security.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has reshaped European security. Beyond the discursive influence in dominating EU policy debates, tangible effects appear in EU border states. Military spending is a renewed priority for EU member countries’ budgets: All EU countries that are also NATO member states commit to NATO’s required 2%-target; many exceed it.[31] The average spending of EU countries is projected well above 2024’s 1.9% of GDP.[32] In media coverage, the biggest EU member states’ initiatives receive special attention. Coverage of Germany’s investing 2.4% of its GDP in 2025[33] exemplifies a significant shift in spending patterns: “The [procurement order] approvals cap three years of unprecedented defense spending that outpace the previous eight years combined.​”[34] Nevertheless, leaders in defence spending among EU and NATO countries are smaller and receive less attention: The Baltic states commit to the highest relative defense spending among NATO states.[35] This is understandable considering the Baltics’ history of Russian occupation. Moreover, Lithuania borders Kaliningrad, a strategically significant Russian exclave.[36] Responding to Russia’s geopolitical threat and hybrid warfare,[37] Lithuania heavily invests in defence: Projected to dedicate 5.39% of GDP to defense in 2026,[38] Lithuania leads the board of defense spending. Rather than being territorially confined to Ukraine, these spending trends convey that the conflict already impacts Lithuanian national politics.

Geopolitical uncertainty deepens pre-existing uncertainty about the future of Lithuania’s population. In Lithuania, birth rates have declined from 2.56 children per woman (1960) to 1.2 children per woman.[39] Nation-wide, the Net Reproduction Rate (NRR) indicates how many women may reproduce in future generations. Factoring in female mortality, the NRR forecast whether fertility levels are high enough for one generation of women to replace itself with daughters. Lithuania’s NRR decreased from 0.649 in 2020 to 0.533 in 2024.[40] Accordingly, the Lithuanian fertile population produces a significantly lower future fertile population, forecasting that the Lithuanian population will shrink significantly. Indeed, statistics published by Georank calculate a natural population change rate of -0.57%.[41] In rural regions, the demographic change is even stronger: While the reproduction rates are not measured on subnational levels, absolute numbers provide insight into population shrinkage. In the rural county Marijampolė at the border to Kaliningrad, which has been argued to be the Baltics’ strategic weak point,[42] crude birth rates are the third-lowest among Lithuania’s ten counties.[43] Lithuanian fertility alone cannot sustain the country’s persistence, which is relevant to future Lithuanian security.

Through this future-oriented lens, children are at the core of human security both as today’s vulnerable population and as the basis of Lithuania’s future. Younger generations only know Lithuania when it was already part of the EU and at its height of economic growth and security.[44] This experience contrasts with the impact of current military tensions on Lithuanian childhoods. Bunker signage on private homes and kindergartens’ evacuation rehearsals foster fears that geopolitical tensions may escalate into war. Research from international case studies shows that chronic perceived insecurity negatively affects children’s psychological well-being[45] and increases Disability-Adjusted Life Years, reducing national economic productivity.[46] Moreover, children’s exposure to conflict is related to higher crime rates and political instability.[47] Thus, although full-scale conflict is not the current reality for Lithuanians, national insecurity may severely impact the nation’s economy and home security.

Human insecurity becomes evident in the local context of Šakiai, a rarely discussed Lithuanian town. Šakiai is located in the Marijampolė region, whose population continues to shrink (139,019 in 2020 vs 134,011 in 2024).[48] Few children are among the regional population (0-14 years old), comprising 12.9 per cent of Marijampolė’s population compared to 14.1 per cent nationally; the gap widens across years.[49] Officially, Šakiai is known for its environmental sustainability, particularly the Panemuniai national park.[50] Locally, Šakiai is known for its lower standard of living. Youth overwhelmingly move to Kaunas, Lithuania’s second-biggest city, approximately 62 kilometres from Šakiai.[51] Youth’s refuge from rural life creates a city with a reduced scope of cultural, sportive, and social activities. The city is one among many Lithuanian rural towns in decline.

The city’s population also has a local reputation of alcohol abuse.[52] No data is available on alcohol consumption in Šakiai, and the most recent national data was gathered in 2019 without regional distinctions.[53] Said source confirms high levels of hazardous alcohol consumption, high numbers of child exposure to substances like alcohol[54] and other drugs but does not specify the prevalence of childhoods impacted by caregivers’ alcohol consumption, which is a recurring experience of many children at Šakiai’s diaconal institution.[55] The lack of official statistics on alcohol consumption leaves the lived perception unconfirmed (yet significant) in assessing the state of violence and victimisation in the Lithuanian countryside.

The setting for this case study is a childcare institution in Šakiai county,[56] caring for approximately 200 children, youth, and adults with former experiences of violence, mental and physical health impairments or disabilities, and/or low socio-economic status.[57] The institution collaborates closely with international partners, non-governmental and governmental executives across Lithuania, and the local municipality Šakiu Rajono.[58]

This section has zoomed in from Lithuania’s positionality within the EU over its national population to the local town of Šakiai. The macro-to-micro-overview facilitates the following discussion of how social identities shape Lithuania’s past, present and future.

The Temporal Continuity of Human Security in Lithuania

The current state of Lithuanian security must be examined in light of the country’s past and future. Whereas the past is coloured by pride associated with national liberation, the future confronts the struggle to uphold independence, with fundamental implications for Lithuanian youth.

1.1 Past

Lithuania was first mentioned in 1009 and became one of the earliest formal states in the 13th century: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[59] Lithuanians derive considerable pride from their early hegemonic position in Eastern Europe, and modern state order, as Lithuania was the first European country and the second world-wide to adopt a constitution in 1791.[60] In contrast with its early strength, three partitions in the 20th century diminished Lithuania.[61] First losing its territory due to two partitions, then the Soviet Union’s incorporation of Lithuania leading to its loss of its independent status.[62] The Lithuanian Reform Movement Sąjūdis then paved the way to independence.[63] Historian Paula Christie describes the movement as an “unbroken human chain made up of approximately two million men”,[64] among which Lithuanians were the strongest social group.[65] Narratives used to retell this sequence of protests frame it as a heroic struggle, depicting the “nonviolent national culture of the singing revolution” to confront Russian tanks.[66] While this paper does not attempt to provide an encompassing contextualised summary of Lithuanian history, the themes of prideand previoussubordinationappear on the everyday level of children in Šakiai.

1.2 Present

Patriotism drives anti-Russian sentiments, shaping how Lithuanian defense politics manifest on the ground. Anti-Russian sentiments grow and are being projected on ethnically Russian Lithuanian citizens.[67] Ethnic Russians comprise 5 per cent of the general population.[68] One source of controversy is that the Russian Orthodox Church confronts an otherwise largely homogenised identity of Lithuania as a Catholic country. Orthodox-practising Lithuanians are challenged to “Lithuanise”Orthodox education and practices.[69] In other words, Lithuanian patriotism also operates at the religious level. Religion becomes a politically contested practice, in the struggle for a homogenous national (Catholic) identity.

The Orthodox Church exemplifies patriotic discourses around the 2022 escalation of Russia’s war on Ukraine. In order to confirm its disagreement with the Russian Orthodox Church’s endorsing Putin’s war on Ukraine, the Lithuanian Orthodox Church reformed its structure significantly.[70] The Lithuanian Orthodoxy split into two parallel jurisdictions, one under the Patriarchate of Moscow, and one under the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[71] The latter links Russian-critics to the previously existing independent Orthodoxy in Estonia.[72] Drawing back to the Baltic roots of Lithuanian independence, this incorporation into a cross-country organisation within the Baltics shows how closely Lithuanian national independence is intertwined with Baltic resistance.[73]

Furthermore, Lithuanian pride lives through traditional songs. Rock Music became both the venue for protests and a lyrical expression of anti-Soviet resistance.[74] Throughout the Soviet occupation, song festivals were an important meeting point for political dissidents,[75] and music was the core of peaceful protest at the Baltic Way.[76] Music united diverse social groups.[77] Thus, it facilitated a broad and numerous independence movement, the masses of which protected it[78] and made (previously harshly punished) patriotic acts possible, such as hoisting the Lithuanian flag.[79] This social cohesion persists intergenerationally.[80] Today, nationalist rock music supports protests with various agendas, as well as commemorates and celebrates Lithuanian independence.[81] The latter function coincides with the renewed consciousness of the Russian threat to Lithuanian independence.

The case study exemplifies how religion and music convey today’s patriotism. The previous arguments contextualised patriotism within Lithuanian Catholicised identities, and the usage of music to mobilise for patriotic causes. Within this context, the children at Šakiai Diakonija sing patriotic songs at the local music school’s Christmas Concert. A child told me, “I feel less nervous if I sing for my country.”[82] Not only does the choice of songs put patriotism on the Christmas concert’s agenda, but youth also connect the experience of personal empowerment to patriotism, helping them overcome their performance anxiety. Such performances constitute memorable points in childhood, building communicative strategies, confidence, and identities.[83] In this case, a celebration of young talents and Christian traditions becomes a venue where children’s and Lithuania’s development interact, interweaving individual and national identities. Music is already a pivotal connection between past and future, mobilising for an independent Lithuania.

1.3 Future

Given this penetration of children’s everyday activities by geopolitical tensions, the themes of military and music implement two contrasting visions of how children may be prepared for potential conflict. On the one hand, the military theme draws back to a realist emphasis on interstate competition, seeing youth as potential combatants. On the other hand, pursuing the everyday practice of music investigates children’s emotional resilience.

Military and Children

The agenda of social resilience in national policies aligns with a strongly militarised vision. The Lithuanian government has revised military conscription regulations since Russia’s first attack on Crimea,[84] and current discussions again demand broader youth engagement in national security.[85] Among these is the Ministry of Defence’s encompassing schedule for integrated military responses, including civilian resilience-building[86] — yet, with an overwhelming focus on militaristic security.

Involving youth in national security includes combatant training outside the military. Beyond formal conscription, Vice-minister of National Defence Karolis Aleksa highlights alternative training for civilians, such as simulation games as a preparation for war.[87] Aleksa encourages civilian training centres in which youth can learn drone usage, among other conflict-relevant skills: “It is not preparation for war in this brutal sense, but providing possibilities for our kids to use drones.”[88] Yet, underneath a simple skill lies a deeper presumption about how youth should be prepared for conflict. Aleksa argues: “It is about building civilian skills and resilience in a modern security environment.”[89] The connection between civilians, military skills, and resilience illuminates the securitised conception of resilience in a realist perspective. In the Vice-Minister’s view, preparing a population for conflict necessitates youth skilled in operating military-relevant equipment, even without formal training. This paper does not negate that improved education in security-relevant skills is crucial in preparing for war, nor does it criticise low-threshold training for civilians. Rather, this analysis identifies the overwhelming emphasis on and gamification of militaristic skills in the Vice-Minister’s framing and seeks to remind policymakers that non-militaristic skills are a further necessary ingredient to resilience-building.

The framing of drone simulations as gaming is conspicuous considering the connection to children’s everyday leisure activities. Connecting gaming and the military means connecting a hobby and a profession, an interest and a duty, joyous play, and serious violence. Fusing these terms introduces the violence and seriousness that drone training requires into a domain that should be recreational. Furthermore, gaming is a prevalent coping strategy to deal with mental health pressures, evident in the relation between escapism and gaming disorders.[90] If that coping strategy is connected with the conflict, the conflict to escape from mixes with the space to escape to. This link shows how private leisure is in fact strongly interwoven with the political conflict; as resilience programmes permeate leisure time, political strategy necessarily shapes personal spaces. Similarly, media revolving around patriotic narratives[91] also influences youths’ self-perception. One’s duty and pride to serve the country are core themes in everyday discussions with youth in the diaconal childcare institution.[92] Beyond career aspirations connected to the military,[93] observing praise for soldiers fundamentally reconfigures children’s role models. In fact, sociological field research on Lithuanian conscripts shows the increasing prevalence of masculinised identities and argues that this “adversely shapes Lithuanian community wellbeing”.[94]

The increasing militarisation of society surfaces in political programmes, career incentives, and leisure activities. The dawning conflict thus enters youths’ everyday realities and increasingly militarises values and self-conceptions. Complementing strong national (military) protection, policymakers should prioritise children’s mental and emotional health for encompassing resilience-building. Beyond the skills relevant to interstate military confrontation, this article accounts for the real-life impact of dawning conflict on human health, and calls attention to human resilience.

Music and Children

This paper proposes an artistic pathway towards human security programmes, drawing on the historical significance of music for national and individual identities.[95] With an eye on resilience, the following section is informed by practical experience in social care within the case study. It raises the potential of artistic methods to foster children’s sense of agency and thus strengthen children’s resilience to the adverse impact of geopolitical fear.

Insights from social work practices highlight the necessity of encouraging youth’s sense of agency. Youth spend many hours per day playing computer games.[96] Autumn and winter present special challenges in bringing movement into bodies and minds.[97] Children’s and the nation’s favourite sport, basketball,[98] exemplifies that many free-time activities are inaccessible to children due to lack of gym hall capacities and financial funds.[99] Therefore, the children mostly spend their time inside, and a considerable proportion of it in front of digital devices.[100] The overall atmosphere is calm or even lethargic, interrupted by some children’s unused energy bursting out.[101] It is important to mention that many children also have pre-existing emotion regulation issues due to mental health impairments and disabilities.[102] Within this under-stimulating yet tension-prone environment, guided workshops on arts, handcrafts, music, and dance manage to mobilise a significant part of these children.[103] Beyond the joy of the moment, there is high psychological value in such artistic engagements.

Psychologically informed conflict research highlights the value of music in promoting conflict-affected groups’ mental health.[104] A high rate among conflict-affected children develops a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.[105] Children who are already exposed to interpersonal and institutional violence are even more vulnerable — as many of the children in the case study, having sought rescue in the childcare facilities for reasons of poverty or familial violence, or lack of disability-responsive institutional support.[106] Music-based interventions hold high potential for support with these histories, having shown promising success in treating PTSD in adults[107] and promoting a disability-responsive pathway for emotional communication.[108] Conceptual research moreover indicates that music contributes to building emotional regulation and cognitive integration capacities — two core components of resilience pre-trauma-exposure.[109] Targeting resilience-building may reduce severe psychological pathologies. Artistic methods, particularly music, hold high potential to support children in dealing with upcoming conflict — as may or may not materialise at the Lithuanian border to Russia.

Children — the Future of Lithuania?

Children are at the crossroads between belonging home and broadening their horizons, with strong consequences for Lithuania’s perseverance. Lithuania has been a net emigration country throughout its recent history, mainly due to brighter economic prospects internationally,[110] and rural regions such as Marijampolė region are even more strongly affected.[111] Even if emigration to OECD countries slowly decreases and the government has introduced relocation and (re-)integration schemes,[112] emigration sentiments remain high and tie into pre-existing trends of a decreasing national population.

The Lithuanian population’s shrinkage connects to the geopolitical situation through the resistance against and the likelihood of war. Discussing the current state of national security, childcare workers at the Russian border share their perspectives on Lithuanian security: “who will be left in 50 years to come?”, one worker asks.[113] The childcare professional raises the point that demographic change and national security intersect. A senior policy officer puts forward the argument: “Russia would waste their resources, taking Lithuania by war. Putin can just wait and let the demographic change empty out the country until it’s free to take.”[114] These perspectives may be cynical. They ignore realities of international law, where NATO alliance and EU membership should deter a Russian attempt to occupy and annex Lithuanian territory.[115] Further, they disregard Lithuanian’s historical strength.[116] Despite its small population, Lithuania proved its organisational power and resistance in the Baltic Way, a history to look back at proudly.[117] Nevertheless, these perspectives express the fundamental insecurity concerning Lithuanian’s sustainable strength in standing up against a mighty oppressor.

Future insecurity affects children, as does the militarisation of childhoods. The past may provide consolation and pride but cannot guarantee a future with similar success. Within this general frame, the children in Šakiai are situated at the intersection of multiple vulnerabilities (pre-existing trauma, low socio-economic status, disability), rendering them less resilient to upcoming conflict.[118] Connecting the past and present has shown that music is a key venue for Lithuanians to experience and express the agency to resist.[119] This artistic pathway also manages to mobilise youth in difficult circumstances such as those with disabilities.[120] Acknowledging the dire need for active resilience-building, this pathway is worth further consideration.

Conclusion

The article has addressed some lived realities of Lithuania’s past, present and future under the umbrella of Lithuanian independence — and the threats to it as provoked by Russia’s expansionist geopolitics. Beyond a military-reliant state policy, encompassing increased defense spending and militaristic youth involvement, this article has sought to highlight the impact that neighbouring conflict has on the Lithuanian population. Informed by feminist theory, this article directs attention to marginalised perspectives: vulnerable youth in Lithuania’s rural regions bordering Russia. Their perspectives fall short in media discourses that revolve around military spending and strategy. Yet, (youth’s) lived realities are crucial in a normative argument for democratic values and in a pragmatic case for sustainable security.

Knowledge creation in this article was limited by the author’s assessment that without a supervising Ethics Board, no systematic data collection with direct youth participation would be feasible and ethical. The trade-off has been the mediation of youth perspectives from everyday practice, rather than their active narration. The author therefore recommends conducting a systematic follow-up study including interviews, offering the space for nuances within and between individuals’ stories. This article has sought to contextualise and present a case study with highest relevance to EU security debates. While acknowledging that a case study cannot answer comprehensively to global security needs, it contributes a localised voice for situated experiences, which are often underexplored in state-centric security studies.

This case study specifically directed attention to the historical meaning of music, its current value in connection to Lithuania’s defense and children’s personal development. The temporal continuity therein asks to consider an intergenerational framework for past generations’ experiences in future research and simultaneously continue to foreground youth experiences as a crucial venue for long-term and intergenerational security.

Youth’s lived realities in childcare indicate a future pathway for research and policymaking, raising the question: How can artistic empowerment be leveraged for societal resilience-building? With a potential to significantly increase societal resilience to conflict, this question should drive further research on societies affected by rising military tensions. Finding answers may offer valuable input for policymakers to complement national militaristic security with sustainable human security strategy.


Endnotes

[1] Frank A. Stengel, “German ‘Pacifism’ and the Zeitenwende,” Defense and Security Analysis 41, no. 3 (July 3, 2025): 416–418; 426. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2025.2513782; Benjamin Daßler and Moritz Weiss, “Beyond the European Army Illusion: A Prudent Strategy for the Real European Zeitenwende,” Journal of Common Market Studies, August 25, 2025, 8–9, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70029; Mathew George et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025,” SIPRI Fact Sheet (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2026), 1-5, 10-11 , https://doi.org/10.55163/osms3959.

[2] Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7.

[3] Smith and Dawson, “Mearsheimer, Realism, and the Ukraine War.”, 175–200.

[4]John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 4.

[5]Nicholas Smith and Andrii Yuchshenko, “Realism and the Study of EU–Russian Relations,” in The Routledge Handbook of EU–Russia Relations (London: Routledge, 2021), 71–81, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351006262.

[6]John J. Mearsheimer, “Europe’s Bleak Future,” The American Conservative, 2025, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/mearsheimer-europes-bleak-future/.

[7] Paul Poast, “A World of Power and Fear,” Foreign Affairs 101, no. 5 (September/October 2022): 3.

[8] Anna-Laetitia Rauchenwald, “Rearmament in Europe: The Unfolding of a Political-Economic Mechanism,” paper presented at the 30th EuroMemo Annual Conference on Alternative Economic Policy in Europe, Vienna, September 12–14, 2024, 11–12.

[9] Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (June 1, 1995): 221–225, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600847.

[10] Hannes Lacher, “Putting the State in Its Place: The Critique of State-centrism and Its Limits,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 528–531, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210503005217.

[11] James M. Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock, “Psychology and International Relations Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, no. 1 (2001): 68; Alam Saleh, “Broadening the Concept of Security: Identity and Societal Security,” Geopolitics Quarterly 6, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 236, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278669163_Broadening_the_Concept_of_Security_Identity_and_Societal_Security.

[12] Nicholas Ross Smith and Grant Dawson, “Mearsheimer, Realism, and the Ukraine War,” Analyse & Kritik 44, no. 2 (August 24, 2022): 175–200, https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2023.

[13] Ray Silvius, “Eurasianism and Putin’s Embedded Civilizationalism,” in The Eurasian Project and Europe, ed. David Lane and Vladimir Samokhvalov (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 75–88, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472960_5.

[14] Poast. “A World of Power and Fear.”, 2022, 3.

[15] Sandra Whitworth, “Feminism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University Press eBooks, 2008), 394–395, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.001.0001.

[16] Saleh, “Broadening the Concept of Security: Identity and Societal Security.”, 237–241.

[17] Michael Sheehan, International Security: An Analytical Survey (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 43–64.

[18] European Union. “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union.” Official Journal of the European Union C 326 (2012): 13–45. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT.

[19] Alexandra Sarcinschi, “Discussing Hybrid Warfare via Social Psychology: The Case of Disinformation and Propaganda Exploiting Minority Groups,” in International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI – The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment, vol. 1 (Bucharest: Carol I National Defence University Publishing House, 2024), 72–74.

[20] European Parliament, “Metsola at the European Council: This Election Will Be the Test of Our Systems,” press release, March 21, 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/press-room/20240321IPR19532/metsola-at-the-european-council-this-election-will-be-the-test-of-our-systems; European Parliament. “Einmischung von außen: Wie das Parlament die Bedrohung der Demokratie bekämpft.” European Parliament. April 9, 2024. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/de/article/20240404STO20215/einmischung-von-aussen-wie-das-parlament-die-bedrohung-der-demokratie-bekampft.

[21] Michael N. Schmitt, “Foreign Cyber Interference in Elections,” International Law Studies 97 (2021): 740–742, 745, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3816748; Jens David Ohlin, “Election Interference: The Real Harm and the Only Solution,” Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 18-50 (2018), 1–3,  https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3276940.

[22] Celso Cancela Outeda, “Collective Memory and Baltic States: From the Baltic Way to the Age of Hybrid Threats,” Pasado Y Memoria Revista De Historia Contemporánea, no. 31 (July 17, 2025): 108–136, https://doi.org/10.14198/pasado.29340.

[23] Mared Gwyn Jones, “Disinformation Report Misrepresented to Claim Poles Hold Kyiv Responsible for Drone Incursion,” Euronews, September 25, 2025, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/09/24/disinformation-report-misrepresented-to-claim-poles-hold-kyiv-responsible-for-drone-incurs.

[24] Cristina Meini and Martina Rosola, “Vulnerability to Disinformation in Older Age,” Phenomenology and Mind 28 (January 1, 2024): 186–188, https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2802; Hannu Nieminen, “Why Does Disinformation Spread in Liberal Democracies? The Relationship Between Disinformation, Inequality, and the Media,” Javnost – the Public 31, no. 1 (January 2, 2024): 123–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2024.2311019.

[25]Jacqui True, “The Ethics of Feminism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University Press eBooks, 2008), 414–416, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.001.0001.

[26]Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,” Theatre Journal 40, no. 4 (December 1, 1988): 519, https://doi.org/10.2307/3207893.

[27] Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (July 1, 1991): 1241–1300, https://doi.org/10.2307/1229039.

[28] Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory.”

[29] Zeynep Çetin and Pelin Erdem Çevikbaş, “Using Creative Dance for Expressing Emotions in Preschool Children,” Research in Dance Education 21, no. 3 (July 6, 2020): 328–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/14647893.2020.1789087; Sonya E. Munsell and Kimberly E. Bryant Davis, “Dance and Special Education,” Preventing School Failure Alternative Education for Children and Youth 59, no. 3 (December 31, 2014): 129–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/1045988x.2013.859562.

[30] Harald Welzer, “Communicative Memory,” in Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2008), 285–300, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110207262.4.285; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 4.

[31] It should be acknowledged that for states that do not border Russia, this investment also responds to the insecurity of the U.S. supporting European security, and does not solely reflect security measures countering Russian influence. Focusing on the Baltics and Poland, however, the connection is more pronounced due to Russia being a more proximate security threat. Benjamin Daßler and Moritz Weiss, “Beyond the European Army Illusion: A Prudent Strategy for the Real European Zeitenwende,” Journal of Common Market Studies, August 25, 2025, 8–9, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.70029; George et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025”; NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2025),” Press release, 2025, accessed January 4, 2026, 3–4. https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/finance/def-exp-2025-en.pdf.

[32] European Parliamentary Research Service, “EU Member State Defence Expenditure,” Epthinktank, May 7, 2025, https://epthinktank.eu/2025/05/07/eu-member-states-defence-budgets/eu-member-state-defence-expenditure/.

[33] Federal Ministry of Finance (Germany), “Fiscal Foundations for the Coming Years: German Government Adopts 2025 Federal Budget, Benchmark Figures to 2029 and Implementation of the €500bn Investment Package,” press release, June 24, 2025, https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2025/2025-06-24-2-government-draft-2025-federal-budget.html

[34] Linus Höller, “Germany to Spend Almost $60 Billion in Latest Military Funding Package,” Defense News, December 18, 2025, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/12/18/germany-to-spend-almost-60-billion-in-latest-military-funding-package/.

[35] NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2025).”

[36] Ireneusz Topolski, “Military Importance of the Kaliningrad Oblast,” Athenaeum Polskie Studia Politologiczne 83, no. 3 (January 1, 2024): 156–71, https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2024.83.09; FP News Desk, “Russia Could Overrun Lithuanian City in 2 Days Amid US Inaction & Nato Hesitancy, Finds Wargame,” Firstpost, February 6, 2026, https://www.firstpost.com/world/russia-could-overrun-lithuanian-city-in-2-days-amid-us-inaction-nato-hesitancy-finds-wargame-13976829.html.

[37] Eitvydas Bajarūnas, “Understanding the Resilience to Hybrid Threats in the Baltics,” in Democratic Resilience in the Baltics: Resilient Governance and Democratic Stability, ed. David Schultz, Rasa Smaliukiene, and Vidmante Giedraityte, vol. 1 (Springer, 2025), 23–39, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-99286-5_3.

[38] Theodoros Benakis, “Lithuania Has Approved a Record-high 2026 Defence Budget,” European Interest, December 13, 2025, https://www.europeaninterest.eu/lithuania-has-approved-a-record-high-2026-defence-budget/.

[39] Georank, “Lithuania Birth &Amp; Fertility Rate Decline: 1960-2023 Data,” Georank, January 3, 2026, https://georank.org/birth-rate/lithuania.

[40] Valstybės duomenų agentūra, “Population and Social Statistics,” Lietuvos oficialiosios statistikos rengėjai, accessed January 15, 2026, https://osp.stat.gov.lt/statistiniu-rodikliu-analize?indicator=S3R692.

[41] Georank, “Lithuania Birth &Amp; Fertility Rate Decline: 1960-2023 Data.”

[42] FP News Desk, “Russia Could Overrun Lithuanian City in 2 Days Amid US Inaction & Nato Hesitancy, Finds Wargame.”

[43] Valstybės duomenų agentūra, “Population and Social Statistics.”

[44] They are sometimes called the “reindependence generation”.

Živilė Arnašiūtė, “Lithuania’s reverberating Singing Revolution and generational fissures beyond the post-Soviet,” in Baltic Musics beyond the Post-Soviet (University of Tartu Press, 2022), 36, https://doi.org/10.12697/PSBSR5.

[45] Guido Veronese et al., “Human Insecurity and Mental Health Among Young Nigerien IDPs: A Qualitative Exploration of the Role of Quality of Life as a Risk and Protective Factor,” Journal of Human Rights and Social Work 7, no. 1 (January 22, 2022): 46–58, https://doi.org/10.1007/s41134-021-00207-8.

[46] Carlos Bozzoli, Tilman Brück, Tobias Drautzburg, and Sophia Sottsas, Economic Costs of Mass Violent Conflicts: Final Report for the Small Arms Survey, Geneva, Switzerland, Politikberatung kompakt no. 42 (Berlin: DIW Berlin, 2008): 76–80.

[47] Sofie Lilli Stoffel, “Protecting Tomorrow: Assessing Germany’s Foreign Policy Impact on Children and Security in Post-ISIS Iraq” (Save the Children, 2024), accessed December 28, 2025, 12, https://gppi.net/2024/07/29/assessing-germanys-foreign-policy-impact-on-children.

[48] Valstybės duomenų agentūra, “Population and Social Statistics.”

[49] Valstybės duomenų agentūra, “Population and Social Statistics.”

[50] Šakių rajono savivaldybė. Official Website of Šakiai Municipality. Accessed January 15, 2026. https://www.Šakiai.lt/en/.

[51] No numerical data is collected by official authorities. Yet, comprehensive interview research has involved local inhabitants, particularly youth in and from Šakiai. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality given the youth’s vulnerability to familial conflicts and employers’ reactions, and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

[52] Interview with a health professional and social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, December, 2025. [interview 3]

Interviews have been conducted by the author. Anonymity serves to protect employees and youth sharing their experiences from negative repercussions. The same applies to all referenced interviews in this article.

[53] Valstybės duomenų agentūra, “Population and Social Statistics.”

[54] Valstybės duomenų agentūra, “Population and Social Statistics.”

[55] Interview with a health professional and social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, December, 2025. [interview 3]

  Interview with social worker and youth at Šakiai Diakonija, December, 2025. [interview 1]

[56] Šakiai District Municipality, “Šakių Diakonija” document, https://www.sakiai.lt/puslapiai/istaigos-teikiancios-socialines-paslaugas-20210317090356

[57] Interview with a programme director and senior social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, 4 December, 2025. [Interview 5]

[58] Interview with a programme director and senior social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, 4 December, 2025. [Interview 5]

 Šakiai District Municipality, “Šakių Diakonija”

[59] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, “History of Lithuania,” January 15, 2025, accessed January 4, 2026, https://www.urm.lt/en/travel-and-residence/about-lithuania/history-of-lithuania/1339.

[60] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, “History of Lithuania.”

[61] Richard Butterwick-Pawlikowski, Lithuania: A History (London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Hurst & Company, 2025).

[62] Butterwick-Pawlikowski, Lithuania: A History.

[63] The Baltic Way. “The Baltic Way Project”, 2021. https://www.thebalticway.eu/en/history/.

[64] Paula Christie, “The Baltic Chain: A Study of the Organisation Facets of Large-Scale Protest From a Micro-Level Perspective.”, 183.

[65] The Baltic Way. “The Baltic Way Project: History,” 2021. https://www.thebalticway.eu/en/history/.

[66] Guntis Šmidchens, The Power of Song: Nonviolent National Culture in the Baltic Singing Revolution (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014): 307; Karsten Brüggemann, “‘One Day We Will Win Anyway’: The ‘Singing Revolution’ in the Soviet Baltic Republics,” in The Baltic Sea Region: Cultures, Politics, Societies, ed. Mart Kuldkepp and Andres Kasekamp (Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2014): 228.

[67] Natalija Zverko, “Growing Hostility Towards Lithuania’s Russians ‘Alarming and Dangerous’ Effect of Ukraine War,” Lrt.Lt, December 5, 2022, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1834662/growing-hostility-towards-lithuania-s-russians-alarming-and-dangerous-effect-of-ukraine-war.

[68] Valstybės duomenų agentūra, “Population and Social Statistics.”

[69] Monika Frėjutė-Rakauskienė and Andrius Marcinkevičius, “Orthodox Christians in Lithuania,” Journal of Religion in Europe 17, no. 3 (July 5, 2024): 341–67, https://doi.org/10.1163/18748929-bja10106.

[70] Alar Kilp, “Securitization of Orthodoxy in the Baltic States,” in A World Order in Transformation, 2023, 37–42, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1846696/FULLTEXT01.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3JrDl4rjr9aN0VC40bbXIq7PvQ_SkWKX2seYEoCZDau3oVLRIoHPsw6zI_aem_AcUQraFQ5gBi32ZgrnolZTmO21PFz7LFmP621o0SzTzKmrISL2grxvsIj_naWzn7AakoEEHUjBQCxxMCUooeRdll#page=37.

[71] Kilp, “Securitization of Orthodoxy in the Baltic States.”, 38–39.

[72] Kilp, “Securitization of Orthodoxy in the Baltic States.”, 38–39.

[73] This thought of Baltic unity permeates many manifestations of independence. It also resurfaces in the meaning of music for Baltic independence; at concerts for Lithuanian independence, Estonian and Latvian musicians also performed, showing the strong mutual support for and interdependence of respective national independence movements.

[74] Živilė Arnašiūtė, “Lithuania’s reverberating Singing Revolution and generational fissures beyond the post-Soviet,” in Baltic Musics beyond the Post-Soviet (University of Tartu Press, 2022), 27–52, https://doi.org/10.12697/PSBSR5; Martinelli, Dario. “Communicating and Playing ‘Independence’: The Role of Antis in the Lithuanian Singing Revolution.” IRASM 50, no. 1–2 (2019): 297–300.

[75] Paula Christie, “The Baltic Chain: A Study of the Organisation Facets of Large-Scale Protest From a Micro-Level Perspective.”

[76] Šmidchens, The Power of Song: Nonviolent National Culture in the Baltic Singing Revolution, 307.

[77] Christie, “The Baltic Chain: A Study of the Organisation Facets of Large-Scale Protest From a Micro-Level Perspective.”, 205.

[78] Arnašiūtė, “Lithuania’s Reverberating Singing Revolution and Generational Fissures beyond the Post-Soviet.”, 31.

[79] Guntis Šmidchens, “Singing Revolution: Past and Present” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 12, 2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/10/singing-revolution-past-present/; Arnašiūtė, “Lithuania’s Reverberating Singing Revolution and Generational Fissures beyond the Post-Soviet.”, 28–29.

[80] Arnašiūtė, “Lithuania’s Reverberating Singing Revolution and Generational Fissures beyond the Post-Soviet.”, 31.

[81] Arnašiūtė, “Lithuania’s Reverberating Singing Revolution and Generational Fissures beyond the Post-Soviet.”, 31–32; 36–39.

[82] Young man in the child care facility at Šakiai Diakonija, December 16, 2025. [Interview 9]

[83] Margaret S. Barrett, “Musical Narratives: A Study of a Young Child’s Identity Work in and Through Music-making,” Psychology of Music 39, no. 4 (October 27, 2010): 403–407, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305735610373054.

[84] Gerda Kazlauskienė, “The Discourse on the Formation of Permanent Compulsory Initial Military Service in Lithuania,” Regional Formation and Development Studies, March 5, 2024, 50–51, https://doi.org/10.15181/rfds.v42i1.2601.

[85] Konstantin Eggert, “Lithuanian Extends Term of Military Conscription,” Deutsche Welle, July 8, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/lithuanian-extends-term-of-military-conscription/a-69469172.

[86] Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, “Ten Regional Countries Unite to Strengthen Civil Protection and Resilience,” LRV.LT (Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, September 26, 2024), https://vrm.lrv.lt/en/news/ten-regional-countries-unite-to-strengthen-civil-protection-and-resilience/.

LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS VIDAUS REIKALŲ MINISTRAS, Dėl Civilinės saugos stiprinimo ir plėtros programos pažangos priemonės Nr. 07-012-10-04-01/07-013-10-04-01 „Stiprinti pasirengimą valdyti krizes ir ekstremaliąsias situacijas ir šalinti jų padarinius“ aprašo patvirtinimo, https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/99fb8cc4c2a711ed924fd817f8fa798e.

[87] Evi Kiorri, “Lithuania on the Frontline: How a Small EU Country Is Preparing for a Possible War,” Euronews, January 15, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/01/15/lithuania-on-the-frontline-how-a-small-eu-country-is-preparing-for-a-possible-war.

[88] Eggert, “Lithuanian Extends Term of Military Conscription.”

[89] Eggert, “Lithuanian Extends Term of Military Conscription.”

[90] Dana Katz, Patrik Koncz, Borbála Paksi, Zsolt Demetrovics, and Orsolya Király, “The Interplay between Gaming Disorder Symptoms, Escapism, and Depression Symptoms: A Longitudinal Study of Adolescents,” paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Behavioral Addictions, July 7–9, 2025, https://akjournals.com/view/journals/2006/14/supplement1/article-p1.pdf#page=218

[91] Interview with a programme director and senior social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, 16 February, 2026. [Interview 7]

[92] Youth in the child care facility at Šakiai Diakonija, December 2025. [Interview 8].

[93] Young man in the child care facility at Šakiai Diakonija, December 16, 2025. [Interview 9]

[94] Frances Harrison, “Mobilizing Masculinity: Conscription, Gender, and Community Wellbeing in Lithuania,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 23, no. 1 (2022): 23, https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol23/iss1/5.

While this paper does not aspire to judge what side effects might come with patriotic self-constructs, the intersection between gendered, patriotic, and nationalist identities in the wake of societal militarisation shall be investigated further.

[95] Karsten Brüggemann, “‘One Day We Will Win Anyway’: The ‘Singing Revolution’ in the Soviet Baltic Republics,”, 237-242.

[96] Interview with social worker and youth at Šakiai Diakonija, December, 2025. [interview 1]

[97] Interview with a social worker, December 2025. [interview 1]

[98] Dainius Genys, “Kas valdo Lietuvos sporto raidą?” Sporto mokslas 4, no. 78 (2014): 55, https://etalpykla.lituanistika.lt/fedora/objects/LT-LDB-0001:J.04~2014~1497882177127/datastreams/DS.002.0.01.ARTIC/content.

[99] Interview with a social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, December 2025. [interview 1]

[100] Interview with a social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, December 2025. [interview 2]

[101] Interview with a social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, December 2025. [interview 2]

[102] Interview with a health professional and social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, December, 2025. [interview 3]

[103] Interview with youth at Šakiai Diakonija, December, 2025. [interview 4]

[104] Crystal C Wang et al., “Music Interventions for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Systematic Review,” Journal of Mood and Anxiety Disorders 6 (2024): 2–4, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.xjmad.2024.100053.

[105] Michelle Slone and Shiri Mann, “Effects of War, Terrorism and Armed Conflict on Young Children: A Systematic Review,” Child Psychiatry & Human Development 47, no. 6 (2016): 950–56, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10578-016-0626-7.

[106] Interview with a programme director and senior social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, 4 December, 2025. [Interview 5]

[107] Wang et al., “Music Interventions for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Systematic Review.”

[108] Çetin and Çevikbaş, “Using Creative Dance for Expressing Emotions in Preschool Children.”

 Stephanie E. Munsell and Thema E. Bryant-Davis, “Dance and Special Education,” Preventing School Failure: Alternative Education for Children and Youth 59, no. 3 (2014): 129–133, https://doi.org/10.1080/1045988X.2013.859562.

[109] Elodie Fraile et al., “Musical experience prior to traumatic exposure as a resilience factor: a conceptual analysis,” Frontiers in Psychology 14, no. 1220489 (2023): 2–3, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1220489.

[110] Giedrė Blažytė, “Current Trends of Migration in Lithuania,” bpb.de (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, November 25, 2020), accessed January 4, 2026, https://www.bpb.de/themen/migration-integration/regionalprofile/english-version-country-profiles/northerneurope/321582/current-trends-of-migration-in-lithuania/.

[111] Interview with youth at Šakiai Diakonija, December, 2025. [interview 4]

[112] OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2025” (Paris, France, November 3, 2025), 200–204, 288–289, https://doi.org/10.1787/ae26c893-en.

[113] Interview with a social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, December 2025. [interview 6]

[114] Interview with a health professional and social worker at Šakiai Diakonija, December, 2025. [interview 3]

[115] Liudas Zdanavičius and Nortautas Statkus, “Strengthening Resilience of Lithuania in an Era of Great Power Competition: The Case for Total Defence,” Journal on Baltic Security 6, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 47–67, https://doi.org/10.2478/jobs-2020-0009.

[116] Benas Gerdžiūnas and Simas Prašmantas, “German Wargaming Ignores Baltic Forces, Sees Russia Seize Suwalki Gap,” LRT, February 7, 2026, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2830293/german-wargaming-ignores-baltic-forces-sees-russia-seize-suwalki-gap.

[117]Paula Christie, “The Baltic Chain: A Study of the Organisation Facets of Large-Scale Protest From a Micro-level Perspective,” Lithuanian Historical Studies 20, no. 1 (February 20, 2016): 183–211, https://doi.org/10.30965/25386565-02001008.

[118] Interview with a social worker, December 2025. [interview 6]

[119] Karsten Brüggemann, “‘One Day We Will Win Anyway’: The ‘Singing Revolution’ in the Soviet Baltic Republics,”, 237–242; Guntis Šmidchens, “The Power of Song: Nonviolent National Culture in the Baltic Singing Revolution”, 205; Arnašiūtė, “Lithuania’s Reverberating Singing Revolution and Generational Fissures beyond the Post-Soviet.”, 31–32; 36–39.

[120] Munsell and Bryant-Davis, “Dance and Special Education,” 131.

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About the Author:

Luisa Reinhardt is a youth worker with the Lithuanian Diaconical Services. She holds a BSc(Hons) degree in Politics, Psychology, Law and Economics at the University of Amsterdam (NL). Luisa has further studied Latin American Studies in Buenos Aires (AR), Theology in Münster (DE), and Ethical Philosophy in Oxford (UK). Beyond academics, Luisa has trained in a range of dance styles, as well as ensemble and new music at the Conservatory of Lübeck (DE). Informed by both legal-political security studies and artistic methods, Luisa pursues transdisciplinary approaches to researching child protection in conflict.

Luisa is active with Amnesty International Youth and The ONE Campaign, co-leads the German Merit Foundation’s security policy working group, and serves as Executive Assistant to the Women In Foreign Affairs Network.