By Jed Burke, Julia Norsworthy-Edghill, Greta Lin Risgin, and Carina Shalkivski
Abstract: This research documents the lived experiences of Russian and Belarusian migrants in Georgia following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In this project, interview participants record the problems that they have faced, including familial separation, financial and residential instability, politically related anxiety and apathy, and general struggles with assimilation. Such personal research differs from previous studies that focused primarily on the economic effects of this Russian exodus; while prior scholarship identifies the scale of Russia’s “brain drain,” these 29 interviews capture the previously-mentioned personal struggles that aggregate data cannot. The interviews were conducted by the Democracy in Motion (Демократия в Движении) team, in partnership with an Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) in Tbilisi, Georgia, that helped to contact and identify migrant volunteers. The analysis identifies several key characteristics of the average progressive-leaning Russian or Belarusian migrant in exile: a background in Russian opposition groups or other persecuted minorities in Russia, work experience in Information Technology (IT) or a similar highly educated profession, and a lack of hope for the future of their home country. Crucially, the interviews converge on a shared conclusion that most migrants do not expect to return home and are actively constructing lives oriented toward permanent exile. These findings will prove valuable as a consolidated archive of primary sources for future researchers, and the decision by this cohort to relocate has real implications for Russian civil society, the future of the anti-Putin opposition, and Georgian politics. Democracy in Motion’s oral history project was approved by the College of William & Mary’s Institutional Review Board for both 2023 and 2024.
Keywords: Migrants, Instability, Assimilation, Uncertainty, Dissidence, Activism.
Introduction
The former Soviet Republic of Georgia has seen variances in its democratic values and institutions since gaining independence in 1991, but developments arising from the 2004 Rose Revolution have deepened Western ties and established strong democratic ambitions. These ties and values have made Georgia an attractive destination to Russian and Belarusian political dissidents in the wake of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine; hundreds of thousands have migrated south over the past four years. The difficult history between Russia and Georgia has made the existence of these migrants very controversial, especially amidst democratic backsliding and deepening ties to Russia within Georgia’s domestic politics. This project aims to record the lived experiences of these dissident migrants through interviews and to identify any shared challenges or characteristics that they have faced during this turbulent time in history. Overall, this paper argues that these Russian and Belarusian migrants in Georgia faced residential instability, familial separation, and assimilation, resulting in a drain of educated young adults from Russia and Belarus.
Scope
This paper is based on interviews with migrants conducted in the summers of 2023 and 2024. Of the migrants interviewed, only one gave an interview in both summers. The Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) that assisted in connecting researchers to migrants had a majority of Russian migrants and a couple of Belarusians. The migrants interviewed were mainly young, urbanized, financially stable individuals who were attending Georgian language and history classes. To capture the emotional and visual components of each conversation, researchers video-recorded the interviews and later provided transcriptions and subtitles in both English and Russian. Of the 29 total participants, 8 chose to keep their names and faces anonymous in potential published works. To respect these wishes while still keeping track of each interview, anonymous participants will herein be referred to by an initial and the year of their interview (e.g.: X Y (2023)).
This paper will first provide a literature review of migration waves from Russia to Eastern Europe, detail our methodology, then acknowledge potential biases in data collection and the variables of our sample. Finally, this paper will discuss interviewee responses obtained in our interviews.
Literature Review
Since the wave of Russian and Belarusian migration studied in this project is a recent and ongoing phenomenon, existing research on the topic is somewhat understudied. The community of Russian, Eastern European, and Eurasian scholars examining this rapidly evolving migration has identified several key characteristics commonly shared between these migrants. In Margaret Hanson and Gaukhar Baltabayeva’s “Exit as Voice, for the Economically Mobile: Russian Migration to Central Asia & the Caucasus,” the two researchers identify and analyze the economic and personal characteristics shared by many Russian migrants. The majority of the 44 Russians whom Hanson and Baltabayeva interviewed in six cities from February to August 2022 were under 40, wealthy, well-educated, and working in Information Technology (IT).[1] Hanson and Baltabayeva cite a nearly 50% increase in the number of IT workers in Armenia, many of whom worked remotely.[2] Indeed, the ability of IT professionals to work remotely has significantly increased the mobility of white-collar Russian workers, academics, and intellectuals, contributing to the “brain drain” phenomenon identified in their workforce.
Another key characteristic of the recent waves of Russian migration identified by these two researchers is the reversal of the typical pattern of migration from the periphery to the imperial metropole. It is unusual for young, educated Russians to choose to migrate to peripheral regions of the former Soviet Union, such as Armenia and Kazakhstan; historically, the opposite was true.[3] Hanson and Baltabayeva note that, for Russian citizens, there were no “visa or international passport requirements to enter any of the countries,” which may have made it easier for Russians to move to former Soviet republics than elsewhere.[4] Perceived cultural similarities between Russia and the former Soviet states influenced migrants’ decisions. Some of Hanson and Baltabayeva’s interviewees felt at home in Georgia, citing cultural and geographical similarities.[5] The use of the Russian language in the former Soviet bloc also influenced the decision of where to move, as it significantly lowered the barrier to integration in a new country. Migration to countries with few Russian-speaking residents would limit opportunities for permanent or temporary resettlement.
In New Russian Immigration to the EU, Igor Gretskiy analyzes the smaller portion of Russian émigrés who chose to move to the aforementioned European Union (EU) member states. The varied professional backgrounds of the migrants interviewed from October to November 2023 were notable; participants had “very diverse backgrounds, including politicians and businessmen, NGO employees and civil activists, university lecturers and drivers, lawyers and students, as well as [six] IT specialists.”[6] Much like Hanson and Baltabayeva, Gretskiy illustrates the magnitude of professionals leaving Russia.
Gretskiy further emphasizes the wide range of estimates given the scale of recent emigration from Russia. Estimates range from 400 thousand to five million, with most placing the number as somewhere between one and two million.[7] The fact that many of these initial migrants have since returned to Russia further complicates such statistics. Nevertheless, the migrants interviewed in EU nations represent a very small minority of the total number of Russian migrants. Only 178,198 Russian nationals received either long-term or temporary protection residency permits in the EU between 2022 and 2023.[8] This is markedly less than the potential millions that chose nations with more relaxed long-term residency requirements, such as the location of this case study.
Gretskiy’s work also identifies and characterizes the two waves of Russian migration since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, referring to them as the “spring” and “autumn” waves due to their timing in 2022.[9] The first spring wave consisted mainly of civil and political activists as well as IT specialists and other trained professionals, while the autumn wave began immediately after the Kremlin announced “partial mobilization” on September 21, 2022.[10] Politically speaking, Gretskiy argues that the autumn wave was motivated more by fear of the front lines than by opposition to Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, or the war in Ukraine.[11] He further claims that other analyses of this wave of migration suffer from a degree of wishful thinking, causing “researchers to attribute qualities to the new Russian èmigrès that they do not necessarily possess.”[12]
Overall, Gretskiy takes a critical stance concerning the motives of the millions of Russians who have left the country following the start of the war, noting the reluctance amongst many to take collective blame for the invasion of Ukraine. While many of his participants blamed the politically apathetic tensions of Russians for allowing the war to happen, it is notable that, according to his reports, “less than half of the respondents had experience participating in protest actions in Russia, volunteering for non-profit organizations, or donating to political causes.”[13] While many of these respondents profess their opposition to the war, they have a tendency to shift the blame and responsibility to Putin and his circle of oligarchs, without participating in activism in or out of Russia.
Florian Mühlfried’s “Between Hospitality and Hostility: Russian Citizens in Georgia” is a key article for analyzing the complexities of Russian migration to Georgia, focusing on the intersections of identity, geopolitics, and demographics, as well as the hospitality and hostility Russian migrants encounter. While Mühlfried noted that Russian migrants are not homogeneous in their particular backgrounds, socioeconomic status, and perceptions, he identified four distinct categories of Russian migrants in Georgia: political dissidents, Muslim migrants from the North Caucasus, the cosmopolitan middle class, and low-socioeconomic-status Russians.[14]
As Mühlfried states, political dissidents and activists, fleeing Russia, often share ideological similarities with much of Georgian society, which opposes Russian aggression.[15] This group of Russian migrants is also the most studied and researched, while undoubtedly the smallest group.[16] Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, as the first wave of Russians poured into Georgia, many Georgians were quick to call them chauvinists and saw this influx of Russians as not just their former colonizers, but also current occupants of Georgian territories.[17] The Russian dissident category of migrants faces a dilemma: even though they oppose their government and the war in Ukraine outwardly, their very existence in Georgia has provoked distrust and resentment among the Georgian locals due to past and continuous geopolitical conflicts. It is imperative to note that Mühlfried states that Russian political dissidents and activists are the most researched group of Russian migrants.[18] The Democracy in Motion’s collection of interviews reflects this group of migrants who are disproportionately progressive, anti-Kremlin, and pro-West.
Facing discrimination both in Russia and Georgia, Muslim Russian migrants from the North Caucasus in regions such as Chechnya or Dagestan take on a unique identity compared to their Orthodox counterparts, as religious, ethnic, and linguistic minorities.[19] Mühlfried notes that this group of Russian migrants has faced “special treatment” consisting of separate interrogations and detentions from the Georgian border patrol due to their religious beliefs.[20] Although after the resulting demonstrations by Georgian activists, these treatments have subsided.[21] For Muslim North Caucasians, being in Georgia can prompt a reassessment of their identity or connection to Russia. As one Circassian noted, in the past, Circassians believed their future was closely tied to Russia; now they are questioning that relationship.[22] The fracturing of this connection with Russia has led Muslim North Caucasians to share interests with non-Muslim North Caucasians, Russian dissidents, and Georgian political activists.[23] Regardless of political orientation, the presence of Russian and Belarusian migrants in Georgia is still an evolving dynamic.
Cosmopolitan migrants include middle-class individuals, often IT professionals, and remote workers from bigger cities, who are frequently viewed as apolitical and moved out of convenience because of the financial and political sanctions imposed on Russian businesses.[24] The most significant wave of Russians left only after the declaration of partial mobilization in September 2022, with a spike of an estimated 700,000 Russians leaving directly after the announcement.[25] This particular wave of migrants was more heavily scrutinized as their decision to leave was driven by personal impact rather than ideological opposition to the war, thus suggesting they were anti-draft rather than anti-war.
Lastly, according to Mühlfried, the fourth group of Russian migrants is the economically disadvantaged Russian migrants in Georgia who face particular instability.[26] Unlike wealthier Russian groups, such as the cosmopolitans, the less financially secure face hardships and hide their Russian identity to afford to live in Georgia. This fourth group remains undesirable in either country, as they do not bring any economic gain or cultural capital.[27]
Another scholar, Svenja Petersen, author of “From Emperors to Refugees” similarly emphasizes anxiety within Georgians who fear Russification and the deterioration of their national identity and culture.[28] In contrast, while many EU nations have imposed stricter visa regulations on Russian citizens, Georgia continues to maintain a lenient, visa-free regime. Petersen also notes how other forms of Georgian resistance include certain Georgian banks forcing Russians to sign a document that condemns Russia’s occupation of Georgian territories and the war in Ukraine.[29] In other instances, speaking Russian at certain bars and cafes is prohibited, and instead, Georgian and English are encouraged and preferred languages.[30]
Whether it is anti-Russian graffiti on almost every street in Tbilisi, or signs asking for Russians to acknowledge their colonial past, tensions remain high. The situation presents itself as a double-edged sword for Georgia; the ruling Georgian government has cited economic benefit from the continued partnership with Russia, as the influx of Russian migrants into Georgia has generated a rise in economic wealth, with Georgia’s GDP growing more than 10% in 2022.[31]On the other hand, in large cities like Tbilisi, many residents are experiencing high inflation and rising rents and living costs due to increased demand from Russian migrants.[32] Troubled by the unequal economic benefits that hurt the local middle and working classes, many Georgians have criticized their government for prioritizing monetary benefits over the security of its citizens.[33] Petersen emphasizes how the uncontrollable influx of Russian migrants poses a threat to Georgian national security, citing cases of Russian security forces breaching the country and carrying out attacks on pro-Western and anti-Russian political figures that have occurred in countries like the United Kingdom and Germany.[34]
In the midst of continued geopolitical conflicts, additional studies are necessary to examine the long-term integration patterns, economic shifts, and changing nature of Russo-Georgian relations. The literature on Russian migration to Georgia highlights the complexity of the factors shaping migrant experiences, including their identities and the attitudes of local Georgian communities toward them.
The current literature on Belarusian migration scarcely examines the presence of Belarusians in Georgia, who contributed to a sizable share of the initial migration waves. This included 54,147 documented Belarusian entries to the country between March and June of 2022.[35] While previous literature on Russian migrants has established certain categorizations based on identities such as socioeconomic status and political stances, similar categories need to be established for Belarusian migrants.
Methodology
Before traveling to Tbilisi, the Democracy in Motion team met with supporting faculty at the College of William & Mary to build and curate a set of questions for the anticipated participant pool. This series of questions, along with consent forms for interview participants, was created with translations in English, Russian, and Georgian. Equipment was lent by William & Mary’s Earl Gregg Swem Library.
Given the need for human participants in Democracy in Motion’s qualitative research, the team paid close attention to the project’s ethical accountability. The entire research team successfully completed CITI Program training and obtained certification covering research ethics, compliance, and participant safety. This training guided the approach to this research, ensuring a high standard of integrity, respect, and confidentiality in documenting these interviews.
Interviewees were recruited mainly through an NGO partnership. This NGO hosted Georgian-language classes and networking events for immigrants, mainly from Russia, resettling in Georgia. Individuals who agreed to be interviewed by Democracy in Motion were offered the option to remain anonymous due to potential consequences arising from their responses. Of the 29 interviews, six individuals chose to remain anonymous, identifying themselves only by an initial. Most migrants, with whom researchers met around Tbilisi, denied invitations to participate. In 2023, there was a level of distrust among the candidates, migrants were suspicious of each other due to possible connections to Russian intelligence. This sentiment was not as prevalent amongst the candidates from the summer of 2024.
After setting a neutral, local meeting place, the interviewer reviewed the questions and consent forms with the participant. Participants were able to review the confidential versus non-confidential forms. The second meeting entailed setting up a time to gather at the NGO’s offices to conduct the recorded interviews. For participants who decided to remain anonymous, only audio recordings were taken, but later changed to video recordings of the interviewer. This change was made to maintain the qualities that visual media provide, including the facial expressions of at least one party.
The standard set of interview questions was created to facilitate open dialogue and a deeper understanding of the interviewee’s personal migration experience. These questions allowed interviewers to determine each interviewee’s socioeconomic status. Each interview began with questions that directed the conversation toward the interviewee’s demographics, prompting discussion of their education, parents’ employment history/sector, and past cities of residence. Further questions probed the interviewees to flesh out a portrait of their upbringing in the corresponding country of origin.
The generational representation of the interviewees included Millennials and Gen Z migrants. Most of these migrants had older family members who stayed in their home country, while their peers of a similar age had also decided to leave Russia or Belarus. While most family members were supportive of the departure, some parents disagreed with their decision or believed it was unnecessary due to their bias towards consuming Russian media propaganda. Aside from the titles of “friend” or “spouse,” the identities of travel companions were not disclosed. With only one participant in our study relocating with young children, the findings suggest that migration out of Russia and Belarus is skewed toward younger individuals without dependents.
The next phase of the interview centered on the participant’s migration to Georgia. This included questions about motivations for migration, opinions on their departure from relatives, and the status of spouses or children. Understanding that familial relationships would strongly influence their decision to leave their homeland, this line of questioning opened a window into the interviewees’ minds before they left. Interviewers asked further questions about potential issues these individuals may have faced crossing the border into Georgia, including specifics about their travel to Tbilisi.
To understand the effect of the cultural shift participants experienced, the next phase of questioning focused on life in Georgia: preconceived notions, expectations, and lived experiences. These questions mostly focused on general difficulties, the ability to financially support life abroad, the source of employment, and potential surprises in resettlement. Interviewees typically elaborated on their personal professional struggles, especially those who operated their own businesses in Georgia. Financial difficulties arose from limited access to banking services back home; however, over the course of a year, access to international funds became less of a challenge for the interviewees.
In the final phase of the interview, participants were asked the most challenging question: “What are your plans for the future?” Each interviewee was asked whether they planned to remain in Georgia in the long or short term, whether they ever planned or wanted to return to Russia or Belarus, and their general plans for the future. This line of questioning furthered the research team’s understanding of each individual’s outlook on their respective future.
Bias in Data Collection
As a fundamentally sociological research project, we must recognize our role as outside researchers in shaping the research methodology and outcomes. Examining factors such as the identities of both interviewers and interviewees, and the dynamics of possible affinities and subconscious bias, is essential to interpreting the results and drawing conclusions.
Many interviewees’ roles as political activists or members of marginalized groups powerfully shaped their responses. The national identities of our interviewers, Americans, Georgians, Ukrainians, Armenians, and Russians, shaped how Russian and Belarusian migrants formulated their answers. Moreover, interviewer nationality, ethnicity, and gender were potent sources of implicit bias in participants’ responses.
Variables in Sample Group
The difficulty of migration to Georgia varied heavily by the date of departure. The magnitude of migrants who entered Georgia following the partial military mobilization in September 2022 was illustrated by the car lines that formed at the Verkhny Lars (Zemo Larsi)-Kazbegi border, the sole land crossing between Georgia and Russia.[36] This access point to Georgia from Russia was vital due to the 2019 air travel ban. However, in May of 2023, the Georgian flagship airline, Georgian Airways, resumed direct flights to Russia from Tbilisi International Airport.[37] This made it significantly easier for Russian citizens to migrate south. Incidentally, this decision was met with sanctions from Ukraine on Georgian Airways and several of its executives.[38] Nevertheless, this change in state policy led to a significant increase in back-and-forth travel amongst the local Russian population in Georgia, as well as an increase in the use of Tbilisi as a connection hub for continued emigration from Russia.
The interviewees’ occupations varied, but they all had sufficient capital to relocate without risking prolonged unemployment. A significant portion of the participants worked in the IT sector, supported by the aforementioned literature. Many of these IT professionals still worked for Russian companies, continuing a degree of economic dependence on their homeland. However, especially in the 2024 cohort, an increasing number of participants worked as entrepreneurs, with professions as diverse as teaching English, freelance animation, hosting traveling quizzes, and remote sex therapy.[39] Some participants worked on-site in cafes and bars, or even opened their own small businesses in Tbilisi. The number of these Russian-owned small businesses in Georgia increased significantly following the full-scale invasion. In February of 2024, Eurasia Daily Monitor reported that 26,000 Russian-owned small businesses were registered in Georgia over the past two years, a pattern that was evident on the streets of Tbilisi.[40] This phenomenon also heightened tensions between local Georgians and new Russians in the country, as property taxes and rents rose in tandem with the influx. Many of these small businesses were also disproportionately frequented by Russian-speaking residents of Tbilisi, further alienating migrants from locals.[41]
Aside from Dmitri (2024)[42] and Zurab (2024),[43] who specifically mentioned that they were born and raised in rural areas in Siberia and Karachay-Cherkessia, respectively, all of our interview participants had migrated from urban metropoles in Russia or Belarus, mostly Moscow. Many mentioned being born in other Russian cities or towns but later moving to Moscow for work or school, such as KG (2023) from Rostov, Eugene (2023) from Sochi, and G (2024) from Omsk.[44] This coincides with the disproportionately highly educated and relatively wealthy nature of Russian émigrés, as the Moscow region is often considered the most economically developed part of Russia. Both Belarusian participants V (2024) and Aliaksandr (2024) came from Minsk, echoing these urbanized tendencies.[45] Notably, only two participants, Aleksandr (2023) and Zurab (2024), identified as non-Russian ethnic minorities—the Yakut and Abazin peoples, respectively.[46] An additional two migrants, Aliaksandr (2024) and Farid (2024), were born in different post-Soviet states—Georgia and Azerbaijan, respectively—but had moved to Belarus or Russia at a very young age.[47]
Aside from the two participants Sergei (2024) and Dmitri (2023) who wished to remain in Georgia permanently, the remaining 27 interviewees had no concrete plans for where they would live in the future.[48] Few in the 2024 cohort expressed a desire to return to Russia bar significant political changes, as repeatedly expressed by Sasha (2024).[49] The notion that Russia lacked a viable future was shared by 90% of participants, who often stated that they had lost the optimism they once had in “the beautiful Russia of the future”, as sarcastically echoed by Yulia (2024).[50] The majority of all participants said they would go back to Russia to visit friends and family, but would never return permanently.[51] Additionally, many in the 2024 cohort of interviewees, including A (2024); Valeria (2024); and Danya (2024), expressed concerns regarding Georgia’s political future in the wake of ongoing protests.[52] During the summer of 2024, these protests arose in opposition to the controversial Foreign Agent Law and the Georgian government’s brutal crackdown on political dissidents. The Foreign Agent Law would require organizations operating in Georgia that received foreign funding to register as “foreign agents,” severely restricting the functionality of civil service organizations.[53] A similar law with the same name was passed in Russia in 2012, effectively suppressing opposition voices. Whether or not this would influence their decision to move to another country remained to be seen, but some participants, namely Sasha (2024) and Dmitri (2024), did express openness to the idea of leaving Georgia.[54] Others, such as K (2024), stated that they would like to remain in Georgia permanently if they could.[55] In response to migrants planning to settle permanently in the country, Democracy in Motion’s partner NGO hosted classes on applying for permanent resident status.
Discussion
The primary push factor for each individual’s decision to emigrate was often their opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Most interviewees’ identities, including political affiliation or sexual orientation, were dissident to the current Russian state, specifically the ultra-nationalist and conservative nature of the Putin regime. The underlying, or sometimes overtly stated, reason for departure was fear of the potential consequences of existing in such a hostile state. The increasing repression in Russia, especially since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, was a heavily weighted factor in each person’s decision to leave. Another factor we noted throughout our interviews was that some participants, such as Egor (2024), had ties to Ukraine, with one or more family members living there before or during the full-scale invasion.[56] However, it should be noted that this specific reasoning is unique to our interview pool. Most participants in the project identified themselves as political activists or members of marginalized communities, such as ethnic or sexual minorities. However, this sect of the migrant population was significantly outnumbered by their compatriots. From observations and encounters, most Russian-speaking migrants in Tbilisi did not participate in political activism, language classes, or interviews. The interview series does not document the majority narrative for this significant Russian or Belarusian population in Georgia. Numerous non-participant migrants expressed no interest in going on record or discussing the ongoing war.
Economic struggle was also a push factor for migration. Sanctions from the United States and Europe have severely hurt the Russian and Belarusian economies. While this was not the most significant push factor addressed by our interviewees, some respondents such as Sasha (2024) noted that migrants in Georgia departed to avoid the economic impact of Western sanctions.[57] This population of migrants received an especially negative reception from Georgians, and they were often referred to as “war tourists.” This is due to Russian and Belarusian migration being driven by convenience rather than moral qualms. Georgians were more likely to be disdainful of this specific motivation for migration, especially given its strenuous impact on the local economy. Although the influx of Russian migrants initially boosted Georgia’s GDP, it also caused inflation and rent hikes that had a direct negative impact on Georgian individuals.[58] In a survey from the Caucasus Research Resource Center following the full-scale invasion, only 4% of responders said they believed the influx of Russian migrants had a positive impact on Georgia[59] and 69% supported implementing a visa regime on these migrants.[60]
As indicated by researchers’ personal experiences and the aforementioned literary sources, Tbilisi exhibits particularly strong anti-Russian sentiments. This is illustrated by the prevalent graffiti throughout Tbilisi in support of Ukraine, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the EU, but also through Russophobic graffiti. Outside of Tbilisi, sentiments vary substantially. Some regions, such as the city of Batumi on the Black Sea, exhibit less overt hostility and greater openness to Russian migrants.
Many Georgians refused to speak Russian, refused service to Russian speakers, or interrogated Russian speakers about their political views. Russophobia has been most evident on the streets of Tbilisi, with many Georgians, such as anecdotal contributors to Kucera’s article, arguing that the Russians should have stayed in their own country to overthrow Putin and that they bear responsibility for not doing so before the war.[61] Another commonly held sentiment by Georgians was that Russian migrants were only pretending to oppose the war and were, in actuality, unable to escape the deep-rooted history of Russian imperialism. At the core of this sentiment is the belief that, even among dissident migrant groups, Russian imperialism remains.[62] While Georgian Dream and its allies argue that dissident Russians are beneficial to the country and deserve to be granted safe haven, the influx of migrants is often viewed as a threat to Georgia’s sovereignty and future self-determination by those more aligned with Georgian opposition parties.[63] Ultimately, the current discussion surrounding Russians in Georgia is the product of both contemporary geopolitical tensions and longstanding historical conflicts.
Georgia’s status as a destination for expatriation is driven by numerous pull factors. The geographical convenience of Georgia on the southern border of Russia, in addition to its agreeable climate, culture, and cuisine, were all mentioned as desirable qualities for resettlement, such as Farid (2024) who referred to these aspects of living in Georgia as a “fairy tale.”[64] Georgia was historically a popular tourist destination in the Soviet Union and remains so today. This perception of a Caucasus nation bled into many interview discussions, as the conversation turned to the enjoyment of the sunny weather, the highly acclaimed wine and food, and famous Georgian hospitality. While hospitality is important to Georgian culture, it is not synonymous with sympathy for these migrants. Although the general view of Georgia was overwhelmingly positive, some interviewees such as Sergei (2024) expressed negative opinions of the nation as well regarding the current political atmosphere and the Foreign Agent Law.[65] This aligned with the political views of many interviewees such as A (2024), who, after leaving such a hostile regime as Russia, was acutely aware of similar developments in the Georgian government.[66] The summer 2024 interviews were filmed prior to the Parliamentary elections in October of the same year. Several interviewees, such as the aforementioned Yulia (2024) and Valeria (2024), discussed these elections and their trepidation at a potential Georgian Dream win.[67] Georgian Dream is widely considered increasingly Russia-leaning and runs on a populist platform. They have held a majority in Parliament since 2012. Fulfilling these fears, the Georgian Dream party emerged victorious in the last 2024 elections. The effect this has had on project participants is unknown to our researchers.
Besides geographical convenience, the sizable Russian-speaking population in Tbilisi and low barriers to entry were additional pull factors for migration to Georgia. As many interviewees were recruited through Georgian language classes, it was evident that, although life in Tbilisi was possible, speaking only Russian remained an obstacle to assimilation. In a notable response, an interviewee, Aliaksandr (2024), discussed the repeated social interaction of being ethnically Georgian but unable to respond in the local language.[68] The difficulty of linguistic assimilation plagued many of our interviewees, who often stated that Georgian, a Kartvelian language, was the most challenging part of integrating into society.[69]
Conclusion
The lived experiences collected in these 29 interviews demonstrate that Russian and Belarusian migrants to Georgia were driven by personal and political reasons to relocate. Due to uncertainty about their countries of origin, participants experienced residential instability as they determined their future residency. These migrants left family and community behind and chose to move to a country with a shared history. A so-called “fifth wave” of Russian emigration has already been identified following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which differs from earlier, primarily economically motivated migrations during the 1990s. The education levels of the people who left Russia and Belarus following 2022 will leave a lasting impact that continues to unfold. The records collected in this project serve to preserve this moment in history as accurately as possible for future scholars to analyze. It is imperative to recognize that our pool of interviewees can be categorized as dissidents and are disproportionately anti-war and anti-Kremlin compared to the majority of Russian and Belarusian migrants in Georgia. The records collected in these interviews will still provide vital primary source accounts of the motivations and lived experiences of this activist/political dissident class of Russian migrants. The Democracy in Motion interview series was transcribed and subtitled in both English and Russian, and is available in the William & Mary Swem Library Digital Collections.
Endnotes
[1] Margaret Hanson and Gaukhar Baltabayeva, “Exit as Voice, for the Economically Mobile: Russian Migration to Central Asia & the Caucasus,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 50, no. 9 (September 2024): 15, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2024.2406359
[2] Masha Borak, “Fleeing Putin, Russian Tech Workers Find a Home in Armenia,” Rest of World, July 20, 2022, https://restofworld.org/2022/russian-tech-workers-armenia/.
[3] Hanson and Baltabayeva, “Exit as Voice, for the Economically Mobile: Russian Migration to Central Asia & the Caucasus,”4.
[4] Hanson and Baltabayeva, “Exit as Voice, for the Economically Mobile: Russian Migration to Central Asia & the Caucasus,”7.
[5] Hanson and Baltabayeva, “Exit as Voice, for the Economically Mobile: Russian Migration to Central Asia & the Caucasus,”3.
[6] Igor Gretskiy, New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland (Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security ICDS, 2024), 3.
[7] Gretskiy, New Russian Immigration to the EU, 4.
[8] Gretskiy, New Russian Immigration to the EU, 8.
[9] Gretskiy, New Russian Immigration to the EU, 8.
[10] Gretskiy, New Russian Immigration to the EU, 9.
[11] Gretskiy, New Russian Immigration to the EU, 9.
[12] Gretskiy, New Russian Immigration to the EU, 1.
[13] Gretskiy, New Russian Immigration to the EU, 19.
[14] Florian Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility: Russian Citizens in Georgia,” Anthropology Today 39, no. 3 (May 2023): 20, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8322.12815.
[15] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 19.
[16] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 19.
[17] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 18.
[18] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 19.
[19] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 19.
[20] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 19.
[21] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 19.
[22] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 20.
[23] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 20.
[24] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 20.
[25] “About 700,000 People Have Left Russia in Two Weeks of Mobilisation,” Ukrainska Pravda, October 4, 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/10/4/7370341/.
[26] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 20.
[27] Mühlfried, “Between Hospitality and Hostility,” 20.
[28] Svenja Petersen, “From Emperors to Refugees,” New Eastern Europe no. 4 (July 14, 2022): 114, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/07/14/from-emperors-to-refugees-russian-emigration-to-armenia-and-georgia/.
[29] Petersen, “From Emperors to Refugees,” 114.
[30] Petersen, “From Emperors to Refugees,” 114.
[31] Joshua Kucera, “‘Ruzzki Not Welcome’: The Russian Exiles Getting a Hostile Reception in Georgia,” The Guardian, August 8, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/08/ruzzki-not-welcome-the-russian-exiles-getting-a-hostile-reception-in-georgia.
[32] Kucera, “‘Ruzzki Not Welcome.’”
[33] Kucera, “‘Ruzzki Not Welcome.’”
[34] Petersen, “From Emperors to Refugees,” 115.
[35] Tea Zarnadze, “The Impacts and Consequences of the War in Ukraine on Georgia Due to the Large
Influx of Migrants from Russia,” 17.
[36] Corky Siemaszko, “Russians Fearing Conscription Flood across Border to Georgia and Mongolia,” NBCNews.com, September 27, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russians-fearing-conscription-flood-border-georgia-mongolia-rcna49487.
[37] Jonathan E. Hendry, “Ukraine Adds Georgian Airways to Sanctions heightened tensions between local Georgians and new Russians in the country, as property taxes and rents rose in tandem with the List After Russia Return,” Simple Flying, July 7, 2023, https://simpleflying.com/ukraine-adds-georgian-airways-sanction-list
[38] Jonathan E. Hendry, “Ukraine Adds Georgian Airways to Sanctions heightened tensions between local Georgians and new Russians in the country, as property taxes and rents rose in tandem with the List After Russia Return,” Simple Flying, July 7, 2023, https://simpleflying.com/ukraine-adds-georgian-airways-sanction-list/.
[39] Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, 2023-2024.
[40] Giorgi Menabde, “Russians Open Record Number of Businesses in Georgia Amid War in Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 21, no.24 (February 15, 2024), https://jamestown.org/program/russians-open-record-number-businesses-in-georgia-amid-war-in-ukraine/.
[41] Shaun Walker, “‘They Don’t Know How They Are Viewed Here’: Russians in Georgia Revive Old Tension,” The Guardian, May 2, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/02/they-dont-know-how-they-are-viewed-here-russians-in-georgia-revive-old-tension.
[42] Dmitri Shigin, interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, June 21, 2024.
[43] Zurab Akhmedovich, interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 12, 2024.
[44] KG (anonymous), interview by Kathryn Webb, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, August 2, 2024; Eugene, interview by Kathryn Webb, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 20, 2024; and G (anonymous), interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, June 12, 2024.
[45] V (anonymous), interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, June 26, 2024; and Aliaksandr Khalilau, interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 23, 2024.
[46] Aleksandr, interview by Kathryn Webb, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 26, 2023; and Zurab Akhmedovich, interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 12, 2024.
[47] Aliaksandr Khalilau, interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 23, 2024; and Farid Kuliev, interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 12, 2024.
[48] Sergei Shirinskiy, interview by Gerald Burke, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, June 19, 2024; and Dmitri, interview by Julia Norsworthy, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 18, 2023.
[49] Sasha, interview by Carina Shalkivskiy, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 20, 2024.
[50] Yulia, interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 16, 2024.
[51] Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, 2023-2024.
[52] A (anonymous), interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 26, 2024; Valeria Miroshnichenko, interview by Lana Altunashvili, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 18, 2024; and Danya, interview by Lana Altunashvili, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 23, 2024.
[53] Marc Goedemans, “What Georgia’s Foreign Agent Law Means for Its Democracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 21, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-georgias-foreign-agent-law-means-its-democracy.
[54] Sasha, interview; and Dmitri Shigin, interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, June 21, 2024
[55] K (anonymous), interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 25, 2024.
[56] Egor Druzhko, interview by Carina Shalkivskiy, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, August 7, 2024.
[57] Sasha, interview.
[58] Nina Gabritchidze, “Russian Influx Boosts Georgian Economy, but Not Everyone is Feeling the Boom,” Eurasianet, November 17, 2022, https://eurasianet.org/russian-influx-boosts-georgian-economy-but-not-everyone-is-feeling-the-boom.
[59] The Caucasus Research Resource Centers, Caucasus Barometer 2022: “Russian Migrants in Georgia Opinion Poll” (CRRC Georgia, 2022), https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/nd2022ge/IMPRSSCIT/.
[60] The Caucasus Research Resource Centers, Caucasus Barometer 2022: “Should Georgia Introduce a Visa Regime for Russian Citizens Opinion Poll” (CRRC Georgia, 2022), https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/nd2022ge/RUVISRG/.
[61] Kucera, “‘Ruzzki Not Welcome.’”
[62] Kucera, “‘Ruzzki Not Welcome.’”
[63] Kornely Kakachia, Salome Minesashvili, Salome Kandelaki, and Bidzina Lebanidze, “Contested Securitisation of Migration in the Post-Soviet Space: The Case of Russian Migrants in Georgia,” The International Spectator 60, no. 2 (2025): 120–21. doi:10.1080/03932729.2025.2482593.
[64] Farid Kuliev, interview.
[65] Sergei Shirinskiy, interview.
[66] A (anonymous), interview.
[67] Yulia, interview; and Valeria Miroshnichenko, interview.
[68] Aliaksandr Khalilau, interview.
[69] Aliaksandr Khalilau, interview.
References
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Akhmedovich, Zurab. Interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 12, 2024.
Borak, Masha. “Fleeing Putin, Russian Tech Workers Find a Home in Armenia.” Rest of World, July 20, 2022. https://restofworld.org/2022/russian-tech-workers-armenia/.
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Druzhko, Egor. interview by Carina Shalkivskiy, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, August 7, 2024.
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Gabritchidze, Nina. “Russian Influx Boosts Georgian Economy, but Not Everyone is Feeling the Boom.” Eurasianet, November 17, 2022. https://eurasianet.org/russian-influx-boosts-georgian-economy-but-not-everyone-is-feeling-the-boom.
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Gretskiy, Igor. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland. International Centre for Defence and Security ICDS, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep64369.
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Hendry, Jonathan E. “Ukraine Adds Georgian Airways to Sanctions List After Russia Return.” Simple Flying, July 7, 2023. https://simpleflying.com/ukraine-adds-georgian-airways-sanction-list/.
K (anonymous). Interview by Sofia Simonian, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 25, 2024.
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Kucera, Joshua. “‘Ruzzki Not Welcome’: The Russian Exiles Getting a Hostile Reception in Georgia.” The Guardian, August 8, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/08/ruzzki-not-welcome-the-russian-exiles-getting-a-hostile-reception-in-georgia.
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Miroshnichenko, Valeria. Interview by Lana Altunashvili, Democracy in Motion, College of William & Mary Swem Digital Collections, July 18, 2024.
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Acknowledgments: We extend our gratitude to our interviewees, who generously shared their thoughts and experiences for this project. This research would not have been possible without their participation. Regarding the contentious and sensitive nature of the topics covered in the interviews, we recognize the courage it takes to reflect on one’s journey, particularly when describing relocation, displacement, political uncertainty, and adaptation to a new country. We want to thank our partners at our local NGO in Tbilisi, who have supported us, connected us to participants, and provided us with a space to conduct our interviews. Lastly, we would like to express our gratitude to the William & Mary community for its support. We thank Professor Dan Maliniak for his guidance and mentorship in facilitating our research. We thank Professors Alexander Prokhorov and Elena Prokhorova for their support in translating and subtitling our interviews. We also thank the International and Political Affairs of the Caucasus Lab and the Russian Oral History Project for transcribing, translating, and subtitling these interviews. Finally, we thank the Global Research Institute, the Charles Center, and the Office of Career Development at William & Mary for their financial support of this research project, which enabled our research and travel.
About the Authors:
Democracy in Motion is a subgroup of the International and Political Affairs of the Caucasus (IPAC) research lab at William & Mary. The authors are 2025 graduates of William & Mary.
Jed Burke has a B.A in International Relations and Global Studies, and is currently working as a Peace Corps volunteer teaching English in Gradsko, North Macedonia. He maintains his academic interests in the history and culture of Eurasia and the former Soviet sphere, especially in linguistics, literature, and film studies.
Julia Norsworthy-Edghill has a B.A. in History and Global Studies, and is currently working as an assistant teacher prior to attending law school to work on child advocacy internationally. She studied the Russian language and Eurasian history due to her familial connection and also knows Spanish and American Sign Language.
Greta Lin Risgin has a B.S. in Data Science and Global Studies and is currently earning her M.A. in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies from the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Her professional interests are in data governance and digital development in Russia and Central Asia.
Carina Shalkivski has a B.A. in International Relations and is currently working with American Councils for International Education on international development and student exchange programs across Eurasian countries. Her professional interests focus on Ukraine, examining the war and broader regional security issues through her fluency in Russian and Ukrainian.