Considering France’s Approach to Arms Control since the Cold War: Nonproliferation, Test Bans, and Disarmament

Nuclear Capable French Aircraft Carrier Charles de Gaulle (right) and American Aircraft Carrier USS Enterprise (left) in the Mediterranean Sea. May 16, 2001. Photo by Airman Doug Pearlman. No changes made. Public Domain. View license here.

By Matthew Chasmar

Abstract: Since acquiring nuclear weapons in 1960, France has viewed its nuclear deterrent as the ultimate safeguard of its vital interests. Given this doctrine, France has traditionally been skeptical of international initiatives in the areas of nuclear arms control and disarmament, which seek to control or roll back the nuclear age. Prominent examples of this skepticism include France’s initial opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Partial Test Ban Treaty, two prominent nuclear arms control agreements.

The end of the Cold War posed an existential crisis for France’s nuclear arsenal. Overall, French nuclear doctrine and policy emerged from this crisis with few changes. However, during this time the French approach to arms control and disarmament shifted rapidly. Notably, France ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, became a champion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and unilaterally reduced the size of its nuclear force.

However, France has exhibited continued reticence towards initiatives pursuing further nuclear disarmament, such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This demonstrates the ongoing paramountcy of defence-related concerns in France’s approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. Indeed, current events — notably the retrenchment of arms control, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and U.S. equivocation on NATO, seem to suggest that France’s openness to disarmament is unlikely to continue, as the nuclear arsenal becomes more important to protecting France’s vital interests.

Keywords: France, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Arms Control, Nonproliferation.

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On February 13, 1960, France conducted its first successful nuclear test, with the Gerboise Bleue test at Reggane in Algeria.^[1] For the past 74 years, France has expanded and maintained the Force de Frappe — its nuclear deterrent — which it continues to regard as vital to its security and national interest more broadly.^[2] The nuclear age since Gerboise Bleue has also been characterized by the development of international efforts to control the use, development, and spread of nuclear weapons. This is the realm of international arms control and disarmament. Arms control aims to control nuclear weapons by constraining state actions in the nuclear realm. Disarmament aims to roll back the nuclear age altogether, by reducing or ultimately abolishing nuclear stockpiles.^[3]

Given traditional French skepticism to arms control and disarmament, I will explore the extent to which France’s approach to nuclear arms control has changed since the end of the Cold War. I will argue that since the Cold War, France has become far more open to arms control and disarmament, while still regarding the Force de Frappe as the ultimate safeguard of its vital interests.

To ground this argument, I will explore how France’s position in the nuclear arms control areas of nonproliferation and test bans, as well as in nuclear disarmament, have changed since the end of the Cold War. Changes in these areas have arisen less due to a sympathy for the ideals of these efforts, but rather due to changing strategic, technical, and economic factors that have allowed France to participate in arms control and disarmament initiatives without sacrificing the credibility of its deterrent. I will then discuss the implications that this holds for the French approach to arms control and disarmament considering current trends, namely the retrenchment of global arms control, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the Trump Administration’s policies towards European security.

A Brief Summary of French Nuclear Doctrine and Policy

Before discussing France’s approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament, it is important to first understand how France approaches the Force de Frappe, and what that means to French policy and politics. France acquired nuclear weapons at a turbulent time in that nation’s history. In 1958, facing the stresses of a bloody war of decolonization in Algeria, France’s Fourth Republic collapsed, and the Fifth Republic took its place. Charles De Gaulle — the first President of the Fifth Republic and the architect of its constitution — was determined to remake France in accordance with his own vision for the country.^[4] Though De Gaulle had not made the original decision to develop a French deterrent, he pursued this effort with enthusiasm.

International relations scholar Philip H. Gordon proposes 6 possible justifications for France’s acquisition of nuclear weapons: status, influence, independence, national security, technological gains, and strong domestic leadership.^[5] As the political scientist Corentin Brustlein writes, many of these motivations — namely status, influence, independence, and security — remain salient to this day.^[6] Indeed, the continued salience of these motivations is crucial to understanding the evolution of France’s approach to arms control and disarmament.

The development of the nuclear bomb brought genuine security benefits for France. During the Second World War, France was militarily defeated and occupied for over four years. France likewise faced invasions in the First World War and the Franco-Prussian War. These events loomed large in the minds of French policymakers. A nuclear deterrent served to ensure that similar invasions would never happen again, being “a way of turning national soil into sanctuary.”^[7]

A national deterrent also ensured that the security benefits of the bomb were not dependent on allies — crucial to De Gaulle’s vision of an influential and independent French foreign policy. To French leaders, the Dunkirk evacuation in 1940, defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and the Suez Crisis of 1956 all stood for the same lesson: France’s allies could not be relied upon. De Gaulle particularly believed that no nation could depend on allies to defend it against nuclear threats, rendering American security commitments to Western Europe unreliable.^[8] As De Gaulle himself wrote, “A great state which does not possess [nuclear weapons] [. . .] does not command its own destiny.”^[9]

Finally, much has been written about France’s desire for nuclear weapons as a status symbol. As Gordon has outlined, “[France] had known war (and frustration) for nearly two decades, and it had left a sour taste in their mouths.” France’s occupation during the Second World War, along with its defeats in Indochina, Suez, and Algeria, led to a growing sentiment that France was no longer a great power.^[10] France wished to regain this status, and saw entry into the nuclear club as a way to do so.^[11] With nuclear weapons, France would once again be one of “les Grands.”^[12]

In accordance with its motivations for nuclear status, France has developed a “strictly defensive” doctrine in which the Force de Frappe will only be used if French “vital interests” are threatened.^[13] These interests are left deliberately vague, but are thought to encompass at least the national territory plus its vicinity.^[14] In accordance with its defensive posture, France has adopted a tous azimuts perspective — the Force de Frappe is not directed against a particular adversary but is intended to deter threats to vital interests emanating from any state.^[15] This doctrine relies on the idea of “deterrence of the strong by the weak” (dissuasion du faible au fort), leveraging what General Pierre-Marie Gallois called the “equalizing power of the atom” (pouvoir égalisateur de l’atome).^[16] Due to the incredibly destructive nature of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, France can threaten a potential adversary with unbearable costs (a nuclear strike inflicting casualties approximately equivalent to the French population), with only a relatively small nuclear arsenal. The technical credibility of this “equalizing power” crystallized in the mid-to-late 1970s, when France developed a second-strike capability based around thermonuclear bombs and ballistic missile submarines.^[17]

The importance of the Force de Frappe in France’s defence and foreign policy is institutionally entrenched by two unique facets of the French political system. The first is what has been termed the “nuclear monarchy.”^[18] Only the President of France has the authority to use nuclear weapons — an authority neatly described by President François Mitterrand in 1983 when he declared, “la dissuasion, c’est moi.”^[19] Nuclear decision-making is strongly centralized in the Presidency, and has become even more centralised since 1958. Here, it is executed by two institutions vital to France’s nuclear policy: the president’s private military staff, and the Defence Council.^[20] The political scientist Bruno Tetrais estimates that only approximately 20 people oversee French nuclear policy, with even the Defence Minister and Ministry of Defence having only a minimal role in nuclear affairs.^[21] As intended by De Gaulle, Parliament has only limited capacity to challenge defense policy, and nuclear policy especially.^[22]

The second is what is referred to as the “French nuclear exception” — enduring political and public support for the Force de Frappe.^[23] No major French political party or politician opposes the Force de Frappe, and there has never been a significant anti-nuclear movement in France.^[24] Tetrais describes this exception as having truly crystallised in 1981, when President Mitterrand — a socialist and staunch critic of De Gaulle’s policies — nevertheless maintained De Gaulle’s centralised approach to nuclear decision-making during his Presidency.^[25]

When the Cold War ended, the French deterrent experienced an existential crisis — what General Lucien Poirier called a “crisis of its foundations” (crise de fondements).^[26] Despite the nominally tous azimuts nature of France’s nuclear policy, France had adopted a deterrent posture influenced by the Cold War, seeing its nuclear weapons as part of NATO’s deterrent against the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, this status was confirmed by that alliance in the 1974 Ottawa Declaration. Thus, the disappearance of the Soviet Union — formerly France’s main adversary — raised the spectre of the Force de Frappe’s irrelevance.^[27]

Nonetheless, the French deterrent has persisted, with only minor changes. As per Tetrais, the Force de Frappe remains a sort of life insurance for France, regardless of the state of the international system. Keeping the deterrent ensures France would be prepared should a new major threat to Europe emerge anywhere in the world. It further prevents any regional power from blackmailing France with the threat of weapons of mass destruction. These rationales inform the preservation and ongoing modernization of France’s nuclear arsenal.^[28] Today, the idea of the Force de Frappe as the ultimate safeguard of France’s vital interests remains paramount. France currently has an arsenal of approximately 290 warheads,^[29] deployable by land- and sea- based aircraft, or by submarine-launched ballistic missiles.^[30] Under the current Presidency of Emmanuel Macron, France has taken steps to modernize its deterrent, pursuing next-generation aircraft, ships, submarines, missiles, and warheads.^[31] France’s approach to nuclear weapons has changed since the Cold War. This is evident from the transformation in France’s approach to arms control and disarmament, as will be explored further throughout this paper.

Nonproliferation: The NPT and Beyond

The first domain of arms control where an evolution in France’s approach is seen is the area of nuclear nonproliferation, especially regarding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since 1991, the French position on nonproliferation has changed dramatically, with France becoming a strong supporter of nonproliferation efforts.^[32]

In the early days of French nuclear thought, nonproliferation had yet to emerge as an established norm. Some architects of the French deterrent, like General Gallois, saw no harm in nuclear proliferation, believing it could promote stability in the international system — with France itself being a prime example of this effect.^[33] France did not initially take a strong stance against proliferation, seeking to promote its nuclear industry abroad. For example, during the 1970s France undertook nuclear cooperation with Iran and Iraq.^[34] Accordingly, France resisted international pressure towards nonproliferation, including the NPT, which seeks to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Under this agreement, non-nuclear states pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states pledge to pursue nuclear disarmament. As it had developed nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967, France is considered a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT.^[35] However, France refused to participate in the agreement, arguing that the NPT only assisted superpower interests and restricted the global competitiveness of the French nuclear industry.

This is not to say that France was a rogue actor in the nuclear nonproliferation regime throughout the Cold War. In 1968, France declared that it would abide by the principles of the NPT, though it continued to refuse to join the agreement. Further, in 1970 France expanded its export controls on nuclear technologies.^[36]

However, a significant change in France’s approach to nonproliferation did not take place until 3 June 1991, when President Mitterrand presented an arms control and disarmament plan to the United Nations. This framework included an announcement that France would accede to the NPT. France joined the treaty the following year.^[37] Soon afterwards, at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, France supported the indefinite extension of the NPT.^[38] Political scientists Florent Pouponneau and Frédéric Mérand regard this shift as one in which France, previously resistant to the constraints of nonproliferation, came to view it as a benefit to their national interest.^[39] This emerges in large part from concern about the risks that nuclear proliferation posed to French security, in particular the possible danger of new nuclear actors.

Revelations about the advanced state of Iraq’s nuclear program following the 1991 Gulf War shocked French policymakers, especially as Iraq had been an NPT signatory. The dissolution of the USSR, meanwhile, raised questions about the security of that country’s vast nuclear arsenal. French leaders were further concerned by other potential new members of the nuclear club, such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan.^[40]

Beyond its heightened commitment to the NPT, France has also expanded its participation in non-NPT nonproliferation efforts. Even during the Cold War, France opposed the proliferation of weapons or technologies that could undermine the credibility of the French deterrent. For example, France has traditionally protested the development of missile defence technologies, in part because the development of effective missile defences by the USSR would have undermined the credibility of the Force de Frappe. For this reason, France strongly supported the ABM Treaty and was critical of the United States’ (U.S.) Strategic Defense Initiative, fearing it would spark an arms race in missile defence.^[41]

After the Cold War, France has become involved in opposing regional proliferation. One way in which it has done so is in participating in international agreements to create regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NFWZs) in different areas of the Earth. France has signed and ratified the Tlateoco Treaty, signed the Ratotonga and Pelindaba Treaties, and has engaged in negotiations regarding the Bangkok Treaty.^[42] These treaties create NFWZs in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, and Southeast Asia, respectively.^[43]

France has been especially active in efforts to restrain the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. France has come to regard the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons as one of the greatest threats to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.^[44] Indeed, at certain points in time France has taken a tougher stance towards Iran’s nuclear program than has the U.S.,^[45] especially following the 2002 closure of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. France was active in EU+3 negotiations seeking Iranian cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and backed all UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran for its nuclear ambitions.^[46] More recently, France participated in negotiations leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the multilateral agreement aiming to restrain Iran’s nuclear program, and was party to the finalized agreement.^[47]

In short, France’s approach to nuclear nonproliferation evolved significantly after the Cold War, and represents just one of several areas in which the French position has shifted to greater openness towards international agreements. Yet it is vital to note that concerns about preserving the effectiveness of the Force de Frappe still played a vital role in changing the French position towards nonproliferation.

Test Bans: From PTBT to CTBT

A second domain of arms control where France’s position changed at the end of the Cold War is its approach to nuclear test bans. As with nonproliferation, France initially resisted international attempts to restrict its nuclear testing efforts. However, this traditional reticence shifted after the Cold War, with the 1990s once again being a seminal time for France’s approach to this area. Indeed, France has emerged as a strong supporter of the international test ban regime — a far cry from its previous position.

Nuclear testing, by its very nature, is immensely environmentally destructive. For example, France’s own nuclear tests in the Sahara Desert have left environmental damage which persists to this day.^[48] Thus, limiting nuclear tests emerged as one of the first priorities of the international arms control regime. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) entered into force in 1963. This Treaty bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, under water, or in any other location where radioactive fallout would affect the territory of another state.^[49] Though the PTBT was signed and ratified by numerous states, France refused to participate in this agreement.^[50]

During this time, France continued its programme of nuclear testing. A total of 17 tests (including Gerboise Bleue) were performed in Algeria between February 1960 and February 1966. Of these, 4 were atmospheric tests.^[51] Following 1966, testing moved to the Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls, both part of the overseas territory of French Polynesia, as by this time Algeria had gained independence.^[52] France would go on to perform 193 nuclear tests in the South Pacific between September 1966 and January 1996. This would include 46 atmospheric tests between the two atolls.^[53] France’s last atmospheric nuclear test took place in 1974 — over a decade after the PTBT entered into force.^[54]

Despite this position, France later emerged as a significant supporter of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This treaty bans all nuclear testing, and establishes an international monitoring system to ensure compliance.^[55] During negotiations for the CTBT in 1996, France became the first of the NPT nuclear powers to support the “zero option” for the CTBT, taking the position that the treaty should prohibit all nuclear tests, regardless of yield.^[56] In 1998, France — along with the UK — became one of the first nuclear-weapon states to ratify the CTBT.^[57]

However, even during this time, preserving the effectiveness of the Force de Frappe came first. In 1992, France had unilaterally declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. In 1995, President Jacques Chirac lifted this moratorium, announcing plans for six underground nuclear tests in the South Pacific.^[58] These tests were conducted over the fall and winter of 1995-1996.^[59] The testing program was met with widespread condemnation. In a rare departure from the “nuclear exception,” the decision to resume testing was unpopular within France itself.^[60] The international reaction was similarly condemnatory, with Pacific states in proximity to the testing sites being among the most strident critics of this decision.^[61] In particular, conducting new tests was seen by many as a violation of the nuclear powers’ promise to show restraint in their testing programs before the entry into force of the CTBT.^[62]

However, from the French perspective, support for the CTBT and the new testing were inextricably linked. In 1992, France had begun a nuclear simulation program to meet the need previously served by real-world nuclear testing. However, French scientists wanted more data on the real-world behaviour of thermonuclear weapons, to be confident in their simulations. It was for this reason that the new tests were conducted.^[63] Following the conclusion of these tests, France has continued to maintain its strong support for the international test ban regime. France subsequently permanently dismantled its nuclear testing and fissile material production sites, eliminating its ability to conduct future nuclear tests or produce bombs for those tests.^[64] Today, France would be unable to conduct a nuclear test without support from its allies.^[65]

France has also continued to advocate for the CTBT, which has not yet entered into force. Though the treaty has 187 signatories and 178 ratifications, it still requires the ratifications of 8 key nuclear states, including the U.S.^[66] France has remained a strong supporter of the CTBT, and has continually called on the remaining holdouts to ratify the treaty. France has similarly advocated for all states taking the steps it made in terms of dismantling test sites and fissile material production facilities.^[67] This represents the continued maintenance of a position far more supportive of nuclear test bans than during the Cold War, once again demonstrating a significant change in the French approach to arms control.

Nuclear Disarmament: Still Putting Vital Interests First

A third domain where the French position has evolved since the Cold War is nuclear disarmament. However, since the end of the Cold War, France has not embraced disarmament to the same extent as nonproliferation or test bans, given its skepticism that a nuclear free world would further French security interests.

France never amassed a vast nuclear stockpile on the scale of the superpowers. However, the size of the French arsenal did increase over time, reaching its peak at 540 warheads in 1991-1992.^[68] Following the Cold War, in a departure from previous actions, France took numerous steps towards unilateral nuclear disarmament. Between 1990 and 2008, France reduced its nuclear arsenal by almost 50%, to less than 300 warheads. This was accompanied by cuts to France’s nuclear delivery methods. France opted not to replace 30 Mirage IV-P medium-range bombers and reduced its number of ballistic missile submarines from six to four. It further eliminated all its land-based missiles at the Plateau d’Albion,^[69] going so far as to dismantle the launch facilities permanently.^[70] As previously mentioned, France also dismantled its fissile material production sites and nuclear testing facilities.^[71]

Despite these steps towards disarmament, France has continued to resist attempts to reduce nuclear stockpiles further or abolish nuclear weapons entirely. In April 2009, then-President of the U.S. Barack Obama gave a speech in Prague, endorsing “global zero” — the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, with abolition as an overt goal — as a tenet of American foreign policy.^[72] Disarmament has been promoted by other Western nuclear powers, notably the United Kingdom.^[73] France, however, has been critical of nuclear abolition.

Clarity on the French position can be gleaned from France’s approach to disarmament in the NPT context. Article VI of that treaty pledges all nuclear states to pursue disarmament. The article reads, “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”^[74]

Since acceding to the NPT in 1992,^[75] France has participated in NPT Review Conferences that have taken place in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015.^[76] At these conferences, France has advanced an interpretation of Article VI which emphasises the nature of “general and complete disarmament.” Indeed, France consistently argues that nuclear disarmament only makes sense in the context of steps towards disarmament by both nuclear and non-nuclear states. France further argues that its support for biological, chemical, and conventional disarmament is evidence of its commitment to Article VI.^[77]

This interpretation stems from the nature of French nuclear policy, which sees the Force de Frappe protecting France’s vital interests from any threat — not just nuclear ones. As such the abolition of nuclear weapons in a world that is heavily conventionally armed is seen as diminishing France’s ability to defend itself. In addition, France sees itself as already being a good actor in the global nuclear sphere, especially after its unilateral disarmament actions during the 1990s. For this reason, France is reluctant to make further reductions to its nuclear capabilities without concessions from those states with far larger arsenals and far more aggressive nuclear postures than France itself takes.^[78] Consistent with France’s focus on “general and complete disarmament,” France has endorsed initiatives that do not implicate a reduction in nuclear warheads. Since 1997, France has supported the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), advocating for negotiations on the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.^[79] The FMCT would prohibit the production of fissile material.^[80] As France has already unilaterally given up the capacity to produce fissile material, the FMCT would not require any changes to French nuclear practice.^[81] France has also called for limits on nuclear delivery systems, proposed negotiations to ban short- and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles and called for all states to implement the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.^[82] France has also been a supporter of chemical and biological disarmament.^[83] For example, the country acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1984 and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.^[84]

Yet France remains unconvinced that a world without nuclear weapons is one in which France is safer. In January 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force. The goal of this treaty is nuclear abolition, and accordingly contains a number of provisions to prohibit nuclear weapons entirely.^[85] France (along with all other nuclear states) has refused to sign the TPNW, arguing that this treaty is “unsuited to the international security context, which is marked by renewed threats of the use of force, Russian military rearmament, regional tensions and proliferation crises.”^[86] This once again shows the preponderance of security concerns in France’s approach to disarmament — an approach that will not change unless France believes that nuclear abolition will protect its vital interests.

Conclusion and Current Trends

To conclude, since the Cold War, France’s approach to nuclear arms control has changed significantly. Where once France was an outlier from the international nonproliferation and test ban agendas, the country has emerged as a strong supporter of efforts in these areas beginning in the 1990s. Yet as shown by France’s approach to nuclear disarmament, despite becoming more open to efforts to restrict or roll back nuclear arsenals, France’s primary concern remains the defense of its vital interests — a defence for which the Force de Frappe is still seen as vital.

This security-first approach to arms control and disarmament suggests that France’s post-Cold War shift to greater openness in these areas is unlikely to last, especially in the face of current trends in the international system. The first of these trends is the retrenchment of international arms control efforts in Europe and the Middle East. In 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed sanctions on Iran. Despite European efforts to preserve the deal without American participation, efforts to revive the JCPOA have been unsuccessful, and Iran has resumed nuclear activities prohibited under the deal.^[87] France has condemned these activities, which heighten the non-proliferation risk posed by the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.^[88]

In 2019, the U.S. also withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, accusing Russia of violating the agreement. This treaty between the U.S. and Russia banned nuclear-armed, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. It was the first agreement to eliminate an entire category of weapons from the two countries’ nuclear arsenals.^[89] Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has further curtailed its participation in the international arms control regime, as illustrated by its de-ratification of the CTBT.^[90]

The second issue is Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has exacerbated security concerns in Europe. This invasion, which has claimed more lives than any conflict in Europe since the Second World War, has stretched into its third year.^[91] Throughout this conflict, Russia has threatened to use nuclear weapons. In May 2024, after President Macron floated the idea of deploying European troops to Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened Western countries with nuclear weapons during his annual national address.^[92]

The third trend shaping France’s approach to nuclear policy is the shifts in U.S. policy in the second Trump Administration. Since returning to the Presidency in January 2025, Donald Trump has clashed with the U.S.’ European allies on defence issues, and in his approach to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. President Trump and his officials are pushing NATO members to spend more on defence, calling for the alliance’s defence spending target to be increased from two to five percent.^[93] The U.S. has also held talks with Russia about ending the invasion without any European participation.^[94]

If the U.S.’ long-standing commitment to the nuclear defence of Europe is thrown into doubt, the Force de Frappe would become more important not only for French security, but to the security of Europe as a whole. As the only nuclear-armed member of the European Union, any initiative for European states to take greater responsibility for their nuclear defence will almost certainly involve France.^[95]

In February 2020, President Macron first discussed a “European dimension” to France’s vital interests and called for dialogue with France’s European allies on the role of France’s nuclear arsenal in European collective security.^[96] As the threat from Russia grows, and under pressure from the U.S., this idea has taken on greater urgency. On 21 February 2025, the presumptive next Chancellor of Germany, Friedrich Merz, called for greater European nuclear cooperation. Days later, The Telegraph reported that France could deploy nuclear-armed aircraft to Germany, as a means of extending its deterrent.^[97]

Formally extending a French nuclear security guarantee to the European Union faces no shortage of barriers.^[98] Whether the Force de Frappe one day becomes the safeguard of Europe’s vital interests or not, the effect of these trends will be to place greater emphasis on the role that France’s nuclear deterrent plays in that country’s security. This is an emphasis that may very well dampen France’s participation in arms control and disarmament efforts yet again.

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Endnotes

[1] “France Joins the Club.” Accessed March 31, 2024. https://www.atomicarchive.com/history/cold-war/page-11.html.

[2] The official designation for the Force de Frappe is force nucléaire stratégique.

[3] Freedman, Lawrence. ‘Nuclear Disarmament: From a Popular Movement to an Elite Project, and Back Again?’ in George Perkovich & James M. Acton (eds), Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 143.

[4] Emmanuel Destenay, “Debate: Why France Needs the Fifth Republic,” The Conversation, September 24, 2023, http://theconversation.com/debate-why-france-needs-the-fifth-republic-212636.

[5] Gordon, Philip H., ‘Charles De Gaulle and the Nuclear Revolution’, in John Gaddis, and others (eds), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945. (Oxford, 1999; online edn, Oxford Academic, 16 Nov. 2004), 229. [Gordon]

[6] Brustlein, Corentin. ‘France: The evolution of a nuclear exception,’ in Harsh V. Pant, and others (eds), Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 117. [Brustlein]

[7] Brustlein,117.

[8] Brustlein, 117.

[9] Gordon, 231.

[10] Gordon, 233.

[11] Brustlein,118.

[12] Gordon, 229.

[13] Kristensen, Hans M., Korda, Matt & Johns, Eliana. “French nuclear weapons, 2023.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 4, 272. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2223088. [Kristensen]

[14] Brustlein,119.

[15] Brustlein, 121.

[16] Brustlein, 118-119.

[17] Brustlein, 119.

[18] Tetrais, Bruno. “The Last to Disarm?” The Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 2 (2007): 257. doi:10.1080/10736700701379344. [Tetrais]

[19] Center for Strategic & International Studies, U.S.-European Nonproliferation Perspectives: A Transatlantic Conversation. Washington, April 2009. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/csis/0016759/f_0016759_14462.pdf, 6. [CSIS]

[20] Tetrais, 257.

[21] Tetrais, 258.

[22] Tetrais, 259.

[23] CSIS, 11.

[24] Tetrais, 261.

[25] Tetrais, 260.

[26] Brustlein, 120.

[27] Brustlein, 120.

[28] Tetrais, 252.

[29] Kristensen, 272.

[30] Kristensen, 273.

[31] Kristensen, 274-277.

[32] Brustlein, 124.

[33]  Brustlein, 124.

[34] Pouponneau, Florent, and Frédéric Mérand. “Diplomatic Practices, Domestic Fields, and the International System: Explaining France’s Shift on Nuclear Nonproliferation.” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2017): 2. [Pouponneau & Mérand].

[35] “NPT,” The Nuclear Threat Initiative (blog), accessed March 31, 2024, https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/.

[36] Brustlein, 122.

[37] “Désarmement nucléaire.” Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères. Accessed 31 March 2024. https://www.francetnp.gouv.fr/the-npt?lang=fr. [Désarmement nucléaire]

[38] Rauf, Tariq & Johnson, Rebecca, “After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime,” The Nonproliferation Review 3, no. 1 (December 1995): 3, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709508436604.

[39] Pouponneau & Mérand, 11.

[40] Brustlein, 122

[41] Kolodziej, Edward A., ‘British-French Nuclearization and European Denuclearization: Implications for U.S. Policy.’ In Philippe G. Le Prestre, and others (eds), French Security Policy in a Disarming World: Domestic Challenges and International Constraints. (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 117.

[42] CSIS, 10

[43] “Overview of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones,” United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, accessed March 31, 2024, https://www.un.org/nwfz/content/overview-nuclear-weapon-free-zones.

[44] Brustlein, 124.

[45] Pouponneau & Mérand, 2.

[46] Brustlein, 124

[47]  “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 1, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal#chapter-title-0-2. [Council on Foreign Relations].

[48] Lamine Chikhi, “French Nuclear Tests in Algeria Leave Toxic Legacy,” Reuters, March 4, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSJOE6230HA/.

[49] “Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT),” The Nuclear Threat Initiative (blog), accessed March 31, 2024, https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-banning-nuclear-test-atmosphere-outer-space-and-under-water-partial-test-ban-treaty-ptbt/.

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[51] Norris, Robert S. “French and Chinese Nuclear Weapon Testing,” Security Dialogue 27, no. 1 (1996): 40, https://web.archive.org/web/20130124025211/http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_01009601a_006.pdf [Norris]

[52] Norris, 41.

[53] Norris, 40.

[54]  Jon Henley, “France Has Underestimated Impact of Nuclear Tests in French Polynesia, Research Finds,” The Guardian, March 9, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/09/france-has-underestimated-impact-of-nuclear-tests-in-french-polynesia-research-finds.

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[57] Brustlein, 122.

[58] Brustlein.

[59] CSIS, 9

[60] MacKay, Don. “Nuclear Testing: New Zealand and France in the International Court of Justice,” Fordham International Law Journal 19, no. 5 (1995), 1857. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1483&context=ilj. [MacKay]

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[63] Brustlein, 122.

[64] Tetrais, 254

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[68] Kristensen, 272.

[69] CSIS, 9.

[70] Brustlein, 122.

[71] CSIS, 13.

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[75]  .Désarmement nucléaire.

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[78] Brustlein, 124.

[79] CSIS, 10

[80] “FMCT,” The Nuclear Threat Initiative (blog), accessed March 31, 2024, https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/.

[81] CSIS, 10.

[82] CSIS,14.

[83] CSIS, 16

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[87] Council on Foreign Relations.

[88] “Iran / JCPoA – Joint statement by the spokespeople for the Foreign Ministries of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (15 June 2024),” Ministère de L’Europe et des Affairs Étrangères, accessed March 1, 2025, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/iran-jcpoa-joint-statement-by-the-spokespeople-for-the-foreign-ministries-of.

[89] Claire Mills, “Demise of the Intermediate-Rante Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,” House of Commons Library, September 17, 2019, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8634/.

[90] Mathias Hammer, “The Collapse of Global Arms Control,” TIME, November 13, 2023, https://time.com/6334258/putin-nuclear-arms-control/.

[91] Steven Pifer, “Russia-Ukraine after three years of large-scale war,” Brookings, February 19, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russia-ukraine-after-three-years-of-large-scale-war/.

[92] Mansur Mirovalev, “After Macron Touted Troops to Ukraine, Putin Warns West of Nuclear War Risk,” Al Jazeera, March 1, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/1/how-real-is-putins-threat-to-nuke-the-west.

[93] Laura Kayali, Jacopo Barigazzi, Jack Detsch and Joshua Posaner, “Trump’s uphill battle to make NATO allies hit his mega defense spending target,” Politico, February 13, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-nato-allies-defense-spending/.

[94] Olena Goncharova, “EU leaders to discuss special envoy for Ukraine peace talks, Bloomberg reports,” The Kyiv Independent, February 28, 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/eu-leaders-to-discuss-special-envoy-for-ukraine-peace-talks/.

[95] Laura Kayali, Thorsten Jungholt and Philipp Fritz, “Europe Is Quietly Debating a Nuclear Future Without the US,” Politico, July 4, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/04/europe-us-nuclear-weapons-00166070/.

[96] Astrid Chevreuil, “France’s Nuclear Offer to Europe,” CSIS, October 23, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/frances-nuclear-offer-europe.

[97] James Rothwell, James Crisp, Memphis Barker and Colin Freeman, “French nuclear shield could extend across Europe,” The Telegraph, February 24, 2025, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/02/24/france-to-offer-nuclear-shield-for-europe/.

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