Between Ideology and Survival: Albanian Foreign Policy under Hoxha

Enver Hoxha. 1985. No changes made. Public domain. Photo by Petri Kumi. View license here.

By Joseph Beaudry

Abstract: Albania’s Cold War foreign policy under Enver Hoxha offers a unique case study of a small nation navigating the bipolar global order. Unlike many states that aligned with superpowers based primarily on pragmatic considerations, such as economic and military aid, Albania’s foreign policy decisions were driven by a complex interplay of ideological rigidity and survival. This paper examines Albania’s shifting alliances—first with the Soviet Union, then with China, and finally, its retreat into isolation—to explore the motivations and consequences of these decisions. Initially, Albania aligned with the Soviet Union to counter Yugoslav influence and secure economic support. However, Hoxha’s staunch Stalinism led to a break with Moscow following Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization policies. This ideological divergence prompted Hoxha to seek partnership with Maoist China, resulting in a brief but transformative relationship. When China adopted a more pragmatic international stance, Albania rejected this shift, ultimately choosing autarky over compromise. The paper argues that while Hoxha’s ideological inflexibility often undermined Albania’s economic stability, it was central to his strategy for maintaining national independence and regime security. This ideological consistency also earned Albania symbolic significance on the global stage, influencing factions within the broader communist movement. This analysis challenges traditional realist interpretations of Cold War alliances by emphasizing the role of ideology in shaping Albania’s foreign policy trajectory. By contextualizing Albania’s unique position in the Cold War, the paper underscores the complex interplay between ideology, geopolitics, and survival in small-state diplomacy.

Keywords: Albania, Cold War, Communism, Alliances, Isolationism

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One of the most notable aspects of the Cold War was its bipolarity. For a variety of reasons — some ideological and some pragmatic — countries sought alliances with the United States or the Soviet Union. While some countries were given more support than others based on their perceived level of strategic value, the main benefit to the recipient country was usually economic and military aid, while donor countries looked to expand their spheres of influence and sway local policy decisions. ^[1] One of the most notable aspects of the Cold War was its bipolarity. For a variety of reasons Barring drastic political changes, countries would often remain in these alliances for the long term. Albania, a small Balkan nation led by ardent communist Enver Hoxha, took a different approach to Cold War foreign policy. Hoxha was always looking for ways to keep Albania independent, a difficult feat for a country that was surrounded by powerful neighbours like Greece and Italy. He sought alliances as a way of deterring invasion, although aid was an important consideration as well. However, ideology was always Hoxha’s primary consideration, and it led him to make several abrupt policy changes over the course of his time in power.^[2] His falling out with the Soviet Union over Nikita Khruschev’s rejection of Stalin’s legacy led to an alliance with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), followed by isolation and Albania’s turn to autarky.^[3] This paper seeks to explain the reasoning behind a foreign policy that seems illogical and disjointed in hindsight. It will also argue that this strategy was mainly pursued to ensure the survival of Albania as an independent state under Hoxha’s Stalinist system. Albania’s unique foreign policy gave it an outsize influence on global politics and made it one of the Cold War’s most interesting case studies.

Historical Context

Albania’s foreign policy decisions under Hoxha cannot be understood in isolation from its history. In 1912, the Balkan Wars brought hundreds of years of Ottoman rule to an end, leaving a power vacuum that was taken advantage of during the First World War.^[4] Different parts of this small country were occupied by neighbours Austria-Hungary, Greece, and Italy, and its civilians suffered greatly at the hands of the occupiers. Many starved to death, while others were massacred by the invading armies.^[5] At the conclusion of the war, a government led by a tribal chief named Ahmed Zogu managed to drive the remaining Italian troops from Albania. This victory provided him with great political legitimacy, and he spent the following years consolidating his power. In January 1925, a democratically-elected constituent assembly, which had recently written the country’s new constitution, elected Zogu president.  On November 27, 1926, Zogu signed the Tirana Pact with Italy, bringing additional aid and greatly increasing Italian influence in Albania. In 1928, with Italian support, Ahmed Zogu proclaimed himself King Zog I. For 11 years, Zog ruled with absolute power in a period marked by relative stability. He faced little internal opposition and held nearly absolute power.^[6] All the while, Albanian independence continued to erode in Italy’s favour. Zog was reliant on Italian money for his vast modernization projects, and the new Italian government became increasingly impatient with his resistance to Italian domination. By 1939, Italy’s fascist Prime Minister Benito Mussolini had different plans for Albania, and the decision was made to invade. On 7 April 1939, tens of thousands of Italian troops entered Albania with aerial and naval support. Greatly outnumbered and subverted by their Italian trainers, the 8,000 strong Albanian army put up little resistance. Despite their disorganization, the Italian invaders quickly took over the entirety of the country. King Zog was promptly deposed and forced to flee to Greece on 12 April.[7]

Italy would control Albania through a puppet government until 1943. Mussolini planned on colonizing Albania with ethnic Italian settlers, but the locals were treated relatively well, and Albanians were not considered to be racially inferior. They also attempted to gain legitimacy by supporting Albanian irredentist claims on Kosovo, which increased their support among some segments of the population. The occupation brought some economic opportunity as well. The Italians began large infrastructure projects using local labour, helping to reduce the high rate of unemployment that had existed prior to the invasion. However, Italy had no real interest in developing the Albanian economy in the long-term, preferring to focus on military infrastructure and other vanity projects that brought little benefit to the local population.^[8] Over time the administration became progressively more ineffective, and resistance from disparate monarchist, nationalist, and communist groups grew. Eventually, armed partisans began attacks on Italian targets, including an assassination attempt on King Victor Emmanuel III during an official visit in May 1941. With British support, the partisans became increasingly powerful. By the summer of 1942, Italian forces had lost control of the countryside, and a year later the occupation was in disarray. By this point the communists had grown in influence, benefitting greatly from Yugoslav assistance. They controlled several parts of the country and continued attacking increasingly uneasy Italian troops.

At the same time, Enver Hoxha, Albania’s future leader, was slowly making his way up the communist ranks. While many people involved in the early days of the Communist Party of Albania suggest that Hoxha was on the periphery of the movement, he had good relationships with many of the party’s most important figures. His limited involvement meant that he had not been involved in opportunistic infighting like other, more prominent party members. He used this to his advantage and was a devoted Party member, although he was relatively little-known and was not seen as a likely leadership candidate. While the Albanian resistance did weaken Italy’s grip on the country, losses elsewhere were the greatest factor that forced  Italy’s withdrawal. The invasion of Sicily by the Allied powers in July 1943 led to Italy’s surrender in September, leading Germany to occupy Albania in Italy’s place. Germany’s occupation was more successful than Italy’s in many respects, in part because they chose to occupy only strategically important areas, like ports, rather than attempting to control the whole country. They also managed to get some influential Albanians, like former prime minister Mehdi Frashëri, involved in their puppet government. Nonetheless, mistakes were made as well. By paying little attention to the countryside and its poorer residents, the Germans allowed the partisans to grow in strength. This was compounded by Italy’s defeat, which made resupply from the British more straightforward. While the German collaborationist government enjoyed a relatively high level of legitimacy, it could not secure adequate resources for the Albanian population. By April 1944, much of Albania was suffering from a lack of food, shelter, and medical care. Germany’s defeats elsewhere were making the occupation untenable, and in October-November 1944, the capital Tirana fell to Hoxha’s communist partisans.^[9]

Albania and the Soviet Union

The beginning of Hoxha’s rule centred around rebuilding Albania along communist lines. The destruction of many of the country’s traditional ruling structures during the occupation made his task easier. In addition, his most significant domestic enemies, the anti-communist Balli Kombëtar (BK), had lost credibility. Many BK members had collaborated with the German occupation, making the group as a whole deeply unpopular.^[10] Despite favourable political conditions, the economy remained an issue, and Hoxha had to turn to his ally Yugoslavia for help. In 1941, Josip Tito’s Yugoslavia had helped form the Communist Party of Albania. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia sent two delegates, Miladin Popović and Dušan Mugoša, to help unite Albania’s various communist factions. These factions were often based on regional affiliations, and personal differences had prevented the party from uniting. Yugoslavia knew that a united communist movement in Albania would make the group a stronger fighting force, and Hoxha became leader precisely because he was an outsider that was not affiliated with a specific faction.^[11] While Hoxha was grateful for the role the Yugoslavs played in his rise to power, tensions rose between the two countries following the end of the Second World War.^[12] This was partly due to disagreements over the status of Kosovo, which was part of Yugoslavia but seen by Hoxha and many other ethnic Albanians as an integral part of their historic lands.^[13] As the years passed, Tito’s plans for Albania began to change. He fell out of favour with Stalin, widening the rift between Yugoslavia and the USSR and presenting Hoxha with a new opportunity.^[14] When Tito proposed that Albania join Yugoslavia, Hoxha turned to the Soviets, who quickly provided massive loans and technical assistance.^[15] Until Stalin’s death in March 1953, the Soviet Union was Albania’s main benefactor. The relationship was mutually beneficial. The Soviets gained influence in the Balkans to combat Yugoslavia’s growing influence, while the Albanians received badly needed economic aid.^[16] Most importantly for Hoxha, the Soviets guaranteed the survival of his regime and his country’s independence. Under Soviet protection, Hoxha was able to pursue his Stalinist domestic policies without fear of Yugoslav intervention.

Unfortunately for Hoxha, Stalin’s death was the beginning of a new era for the Soviet Union. Hoxha was very fond of Stalin on a personal level, and the two met many times despite Stalin’s lack of interest in Albania.^[17]Aside from their friendship, Hoxha admired Stalin’s ideology as well, and he looked to model Albania after the USSR. When Khruschev’s de-Stalinization policies led to the Soviets removing Stalinist leaders in Bulgaria and Hungary, Hoxha was determined to avoid the same fate^[18]. He managed to do so by ruthlessly eliminating those who seemed to oppose his leadership. Purges had long been a tool for Hoxha, but the risk of Soviet infiltration created a new threat.^[19] There was also concern that a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia could threaten Albanian independence.^[20] Despite all of this, the status-quo alliance between Albania and the USSR held until 1960. That year, Hoxha’s second foreign policy about-face took place: he denounced the Soviets, fed up with what he saw as meddling in Albanian affairs, especially regarding Khrushchev’s insistence on the importance of agriculture in contrast to Hoxha’s focus on heavy industries. One year later, the Soviets promptly cancelled their economic agreements with Albania and cut off diplomatic relations.^[21] In turn, Hoxha’s army seized the joint Albanian-Soviet submarine base at Vlorë, along with several Soviet submarines.^[22]

Albania and China

Following Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’, in which the new Soviet leader made a break with the cult of personality under Stalin, Hoxha began to accuse Khrushchev of revisionism, and perceived supporters of the new Soviet line in Albania were removed from their positions or eliminated.^[23] Hoxha needed to find a new benefactor, and once again he was able to take advantage of a feud between the Soviet Union and another communist country. The Sino-Soviet split had recently taken place, and China seemed the perfect candidate to fill the void left by the USSR because both had reason to be angry with the Soviets due to a shared, strong, anti-revisionist Marxist-Leninist ideology.^[24] China benefited from the relationship as well, as they finally found a European partner that would increase their legitimacy in the fight for leadership of the communist world. Albania provided support to China in international fora and fought to transfer China’s United Nations membership, which had previously been held by the Republic of China government exiled in Taiwan, to the PRC.^[25] While China was not willing to provide as much economic assistance as the Soviet Union, massive amounts of aid arrived in Albania over the course of the partnership. This included loans, cash donations, and the construction of metallurgic and power plants, among other things.^[26] With China’s support, Albania was able to mitigate the negative economic and diplomatic effects of the Soviet departure. Crucially for Enver Hoxha, China also guaranteed Albania’s continuing independence by deterring potential enemies from intervening. By this time, Hoxha feared a Soviet invasion more than annexation by Yugoslavia. The USSR was not willing to attack a Chinese ally to topple an unfriendly country, nor was Yugoslavia to retake claimed territory.

The partnership remained strong for some time, but leadership changes in China in the mid 1970s marked the beginning of the end of the Sino-Albanian friendship.^[27] Hoxha derided Deng Xiaoping’s new Three World Theory, which Deng had presented to the United Nations General Assembly in April 1974. Hoxha called the idea revisionist and claimed that it contradicted Leninist theory.^[28] The Three World Theory divided the world into three parts.^[29] The First World consisted of the United States and the USSR, and the Second World was made up of their developed allies. And, most importantly, the Third World, which comprised developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. According to the theory, China was part of the Third World, creating a wedge between itself and Albania. After Hoxha’s denunciation of the theory, China’s economic aid began to wane.^[30] In 1975, two-thirds of Albanian imports came from China, and it was the destination for one-fifth of Albanian exports. Consequently, investment growth dropped as well, falling by 0.8% per year between 1980 and 1985. Over time, Albania’s gross domestic product (GDP) was greatly affected as well. Annual GDP growth averaged 5% in the 1970s and had declined to about 1% by the 1980s.^[31]

With that, Albania’s descent into isolation began. It became the only European country which refused to sign the Helsinki Accords in 1975,^[32] and the Albanian deputy prime minister Adil Çarçani told China of his country’s intention to “rely only on our own forces.”^[33] Boriçi’s article suggests that Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 played a part in the falling out as well, in addition to the rapprochement between the U.S. and the PRC. The divorce came to a conclusion on July 7, 1978 with a note from the Chinese announcing the halt of all forms of assistance to Albania. Once again, Hoxha’s ideological inflexibility ended an alliance that his country relied upon — which had originally emerged from a political split between two communist countries that Hoxha was able to take full advantage of. China would prove to be the last foreign ally of communist Albania, and the alliance had a profound impact on the country.^[34]. The partnership was also very important in Chinese history, having marked the beginning of its attempts to project power around the world and assume leadership of the socialist world.

Albania After Hoxha

Until the fall of communism in 1991, Albania was one of the world’s most isolated nations. With the withdrawal of Chinese support, the Albanian economy suffered greatly. According to a 1992 paper published by the International Monetary Fund, large construction projects were cancelled, and the agricultural and heavy industrial sectors were particularly affected. The paper also suggests that the loss of access to Chinese farming equipment slowed the pace of mechanization, leading to a decline in Albanian crop production relative to other Eastern European nations. Analysis in the paper notes that Albanian industrial output declined as well, as heavy industry was especially reliant on Chinese technical assistance.^[35] On top of these economic issues, Enver Hoxha’s health began to fail. He became increasingly paranoid, and purges against his opponents continued even as he suffered from serious heart problems.^[36] When Hoxha died at the age of 76 on April 11, 1985, the country was plunged into several days of mourning. Many Albanians had the only leader they ever knew—one who kept their country independent despite constant attempts to subjugate it. His death began a period of uncertainty. Although Hoxha had named his successor, former Deputy Prime Minister Adil Çarçani, nobody knew how he would lead the country. Çarçani’s governance style was less oppressive, and the country began the slow process of liberalization.^[37] Albania’s first democratic elections took place on March 15, 1991, and Albania began to emerge from its isolation.^[38] The economy was liberalized, and the new government began to forge relationships with Western countries, most significantly the United States.^[39]

Analysis

These three major periods of Albanian foreign policy — Soviet, Chinese, and isolationist — were all driven by some combination of ideology and a strong desire for survival. Hoxha looked for allies amid his country’s difficult geopolitical circumstances. He had originally sided with the Soviet Union to avoid annexation by Yugoslavia. Ideological considerations were at play as well, and the alliance with the Soviet Union came to an end as a result of de-Stalinization. While Yugoslavia was no longer interested in annexing Albania, Hoxha was not aware of this. Hoxha may have been clouded by his rivalry with Tito and Yugoslavia, but there is little doubt that Albania’s split with the Soviet Union was driven primarily by the latter’s denunciation of Stalin and his legacy, as well as fears that Hoxha would be removed from power for his refusal to play along.

With all of this in mind, I would argue that ideology was the primary factor in Hoxha’s foreign policy decision making. International relations frameworks like realism discount ideology as a real consideration, and in most circumstances, this argument is sound. Realism stipulates that foreign policy decisions are made primarily for reasons of survival, with other factors playing a limited role. Ideology is often used as a justification for ties between states, but survival is the underlying reason in many of these cases. On the whole, Hoxha took foreign policy decisions that were meant to keep Albania independent, thus helping to keep his regime in power. However, he also made decisions that harmed his country’s economy. In his first split, he rejected continued cooperation with the Soviets on ideological grounds. This resulted in Albania losing out on huge aid packages, mainly in the form of loans and technology sharing. While he was able to form a new partnership with China, it provided fewer material benefits to Albania, especially in its initial stages. When he chose to end the partnership with China, he once again cut ties with a patron on ideological grounds. The loss of Chinese support was even more detrimental, and its immediate consequences were a serious setback to the Albanian economy. Especially in this last case, Hoxha made a decision based on ideology that had direct consequences for his regime. While he knew that he could stamp out a rebellion, he also knew that his ideological inflexibility would create more risks for the regime. Interestingly, this “purity” gained him many admirers in the West, especially among Maoists, who were disillusioned with both the USSR’s de-Stalinization and China’s new Three Worlds Theory.^[40] To them, Hoxha was the only true anti-revisionist, a communist leader who refused to deviate from the original tenets of Marxism-Leninism. In fact, some of the parties influenced by Hoxha’s ideological mode of governance still exist today.^[41] With these reasons in mind, the realist rejection of ideology as a factor in foreign policy cannot be applied to Albania’s case. Ideology was the main driver in Albania’s Cold War foreign policy decision making.

Conclusion

Despite the hardships Albania faced during Hoxha’s time in power, the country has successfully transitioned to democracy. There have been some serious hurdles along the way — most notably the civil unrest of 1997, which was brought about by the collapse of massive pyramid schemes designed to take advantage of the newly-capitalist country’s lack of financial literacy.^[42] But there is little doubt that Albanians today enjoy a far higher standard of living than they did during the Cold War, even as the imprint of Hoxha’s rule remains.^[43]

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Endnotes

^[1] Engerman, ‘Development Politics and the Cold War’.

^[2] Artisien, ‘Albania in the Post-Hoxha Era’.

^[3] Szalontai, ‘Weathering the Storm, Toppled by the Storm’.

^[4] Fischer and Schmitt, ‘Arnavutluk to Albania: The Triumph of Albanianism, 1912–1924’.

^[5] Kryeziu, ‘Albanians in Confrontation with the Challenges of World War I’.

^[6] Fischer, ‘Interwar Albania’.

^[7] Tase, ‘Italy and Albania’. Tase, Peter. ‘Italy and Albania: The Political and Economic Alliance and the Italian Invasion of 1939’. Academicus International Scientific Journal III, no. 06 (2012): 62–70.

^[8] Fischer, ‘Italian Policy in Albania, 1894-1943’.

^[9] Fischer and Schmitt, ‘The Second World War and the Establishment of the Communist Regime’.

^[10] Fischer and Schmitt.

^[11] Fevziu and Elsie, ‘The Founding of the Communist Party’.

^[12] Marku, ‘Shifting Alliances’.

^[13] Vukadinovic, ‘The Shift in Yugoslav-Albanian Relations’.

^[14] Perović, ‘The Tito-Stalin Split’.

^[15] Vucinich, ‘The Albanian-Soviet Rift’.

^[16] Marku, ‘Shifting Alliances’.

^[17] Fevziu and Elsie, ‘Stalin and the Soviets’, 2016.

^[18] Riches and Palmowski, ‘Chervenkov, Vulko’; , ‘10. The Collapse of the Rákosi Cult’.

^[19] Kaloçi, ‘Black List of Enver Hoxha’.

^[20] Fevziu and Elsie, ‘Stalin and the Soviets’, 2016.

^[21] Pilaca and Nako, ‘Splitting Apart’.

^[22] Fischer and Schmitt, ‘Albania’s Stalinist Dictatorship, 1944–1989’.

^[23] Marku, ‘Communist Relations in Crisis’.

^[24] Kreka and Bezeraj, ‘From Communist Allies to Pragmatics Partners’.

^[25] Musabelliu, ‘China-Albania Ties Going Strong at 75’.

^[26] Marku, ‘China and Albania’.

^[27] Boriçi, ‘The Decline of the Albanian–Chinese Relations 1971-1978’.

^[28] Hoxha, ‘The Theory and Practice of the Revolution’.

^[29] Yee, ‘The Three World Theory and Post-Mao China’s Global Strategy’.

^[30] Boriçi, ‘The Decline of the Albanian–Chinese Relations 1971-1978’.

^[31] Johnston et al., ‘Albania’.

^[32] Warrick, ‘Albania Promises to Honor Helsinki Accords – UPI Archives’.

^[33] Boriçi, ‘The Decline of the Albanian–Chinese Relations 1971-1978’.

^[34] Evans, ‘Cold War Bedfellows’.

^[35] Johnston et al., ‘Albania’.

^[36] Abrahams, ‘1. Hoxha’s Heart’.

^[37] Partos, ‘Obituary’.

^[38] Abrahams, ‘2. Fences Fall’.

^[39] Abrahams, ‘9. The Fall’.

^[40] Smith, ‘Enver Hoxha Was Ruler For 40 Years in Albania’.

^[41] ‘ICMLPO’.

^[42] Lane, ‘Albania, March 1997’.

^[43] Abrahams, ‘Epilogue’.

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