By Amir Nassar
Introduction
Parallel to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the intense war that followed, there is an ongoing religious-jurisdictional cold war between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Moscow (also known as the Moscow Patriarchate) and the Orthodox Church(es) in Ukraine (OCU). In this context, a dispute over the Ukrainian State-owned grounds of an Orthodox historic monastery, because of alleged loyalty to the Russian Orthodox Church and by extension Russia, could be a part of a larger crackdown on “Ukraine religious organizations affiliated with centers of influence in the Russian Federation.”[i]
The rift between the ROC and Ukrainian Churches, but also between the ROC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, has been widening for decades. In the 1990s, the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized the exiled Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, which the Moscow Patriarchate refused to acknowledge and subsequently withdrew from pan-Orthodox organizations in which the Estonian Church was also a part of.[ii] In 2019, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, supported by the synod, or council, of the Patriarchate, recognized the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, headed by Metropolitan Epiphanius I of Kiyv and all Ukraine.[iii] In the Eastern Orthodox Church, the 14 independent Orthodox churches, in communion with each other, consider the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople as primus inter pares (or first among equals) and the one with the authority to grant the autocephalous status to new churches.[iv] This authority has been frequently disputed by the ROC, which has been trying to assume the Ecumenical role since as early as the 17th century, including during the Soviet period.[v] The autocephalous status of a church simply means a church has self-government, and was historically granted during a country’s “nation-building process.”[vi] The possibility of this status being conferred on Ukraine deepened the tensions not only between the Patriarchate in Moscow and the Church in Ukraine, but also between Moscow and other churches and Patriarchates.[vii] The autocephalous status in itself is not a doctrinal problem in the Eastern Orthodox Church, because the “polycentric” nature of the Eastern Orthodox Church means many churches are similarly independent, but the fixation on the rhetoric of historical unity between the two churches is the reason for Moscow’s negative reaction to the recognition of the OCU’s autocephalacy and in general for the prolongation and intensification of the religious-political conflict between Russia and Ukraine.[viii]
The tensions far precede Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s 2019 granting of autocephaly to the OCU. The loyalty of the ROC, and particularly its current leader, Patriarch Kirill, to Putin and the Russian Federation has been a longstanding one: in 2012, the Patriarch called Putin’s election a “‘Miracle of God’,” and he endorsed the 2022 “‘peacekeeping operation’” in Ukraine because of the war’s “‘metaphysical significance’,” underlining the religious-jurisdictional conflict also at play in the war.[ix]
Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill. View license here.
Therefore, I ask how does the Russian government frame the Orthodox Church in its approach to Ukraine since the latter’s independence?
The rhetoric of ‘Holy historic unity,’ through the Orthodox Church, is a geopolitical tool masking Russia’s neocolonialist ambitions in Ukrainian lands. This article contributes to Mihail Suslov’s argument that the longing for such ‘historic unity’ of “‘Sviataia Rus’’” (‘Holy Russia’) is nothing more than a “geopolitical utopia,” as he puts it, which in fact serves to foster Russian neocolonial ambitions in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.[x] After introducing the history of Orthodoxy in Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe, a brief description of the rift between the Church in Ukraine and in Russia follows. It will be argued that, considering Suslov’s argument, the ROC’s rhetoric surrounding Ukraine as ‘Moscow’s canonical land’ is only a reality exploited for geopolitical, theopolitical, and neocolonialist aims. The ROC and the three Orthodox churches in Ukraine, namely the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), are briefly brought into the discussion of the future of the church as an institution in Ukraine, to possibly show the precarious place the church finds itself in today.
Russian Orthodoxy and Eastern Europe
Cradle of Russian Orthodoxy
In her analysis of the religious nationalism that Russia adopted in the post-Soviet era, historian Mara Kozelsky describes how Ukraine, particularly Kyiv and Crimea, came to be seen and revered as the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy, but also the cradle of the Russian Empire and modern state. The Chronicle of Nestor, medival Kyivan chronicles recorded in detail by monks, compiled in approximately the 12th century, recounts Prince Volodymyr’s conversion to Greek Christianity, also known as Eastern Orthodoxy, from paganism in 988, in a small town in Crimea and the conversion of his kingdom in Kyiv and the spread of Christianity from there.[i] According to Ukrainian historians, this Chronicle is a “uniquely Ukrainian experience” and not Russian, “which … did not exist [then]”; on the other side, Russian historians see “the origins of the Russian state” springing out of the Chronicle and other chronicles of ancient and medieval Kyiv.[ii] By contrast, Makarius Bulgakov, the Metropolitan of Moscow (1879-1882), described the medieval event as “‘the most important event in the history of all Russian lands’ [emphasis added],” in terms of both affairs of state and of religion; this was a change from the earlier Russian historian N.M. Karamzin who had noted that that although Prince Volodymyr’s conversion to Orthodoxy consituted an important event, because he put Russians on the “‘path of the true faith’,” this was distinct from his prominent role and legacy in the “‘affairs of state.’”[iii] Nineteenth-century Russians also identified numerous religious figures and saints associated with Crimea and Kyiv, given that, for them, they “played foundational roles in Russia’s religious national identity.”[iv] The Apostle Saint Andrew the First-Called’s mission and ministry in ancient Scythia was associated with modern-day southern Ukraine, particularly southern Crimea, and the proto-Slav populations on these lands were identified as the ancestors of modern Russians.[v]
St Basil’s Cathedral with the Kremlin, and Red Square. View license here.
These idenitifactions give the ROC authority over other churches, since they link the Church and the territory to Jesus Christ and his Apostles directly, evident in the efforts of Patriarch Aleksii II, Patriarch Kirill’s predecessor, to “[encourage] Russian pilgrims to travel” to the Holy places in Ukraine, particularly Crimea.[vi] Not only that, but contemporary Russians, especially President Putin and Patriarch Kirill, stress the conversion of Prince Volodymyr to Greek Orthodoxy, and the other historical events, as the “source” that transformed the Kyivan Rus’ empire “into a unique country-civilization,” and the modern Russian state is its direct descendant.[vii] In his patriarchal visit to Ukraine in 2009, Patriarch Kirill highlighted Ukraine as “‘the mother of all Rus’” and the place where “the Russian nation was baptised and Russian Orthodoxy conceived.”[viii]
This religious nationalism associated with events purportedly taking place in Kyiv and Crimea as early as the first century not only gave Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church legitimacy in claiming Ukraine as part of ‘Holy Russia’, and also claiming the historic homelands of the Muslim Tatars. In addition, the ROC can claim “primacy over the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople,” because of its alleged first-century links, through the Apostle Saint Andrew, which the Ecumenical Patriarch lacks.[ix] In other words, the historical links that Russian historians, clergy, and scholars draw upon from the first to the tenth centuries represented Ukraine as the birthplace of both the Orthodox Church and of the Russian state, fueling religious nationalism, an integral part of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that ultimately turned into full-scale war.
Growing apart
Following the Euromaidan Protests of 2013-2014, a rift started to appear, with the Ukrainian state and the OCU on one side, and the Russian state and ROC on the other. Seven religious, cultural, and geopolitical factors can explain the Church in Ukraine’s break away from the ROC, other than the usage of the ROC as Russian soft power. Political factors include: increased agency of the Ukrainian state in deciding national identity, continued Russian meddling in Ukrainian state affairs – and Church affairs as well – Ukraine’s increasing pro-European outlook and foreign policy, and Russia’s eastward policies of increased partnerships with China, Iran, and former USSR territories and anti-European/Western stances.[i] Religious/canonical factors revolve around the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople’s pushback against the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Ukrainians’ realization that their interests could be realized by or affiliated with other Orthodox churches, particularly the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the need to reform the global Eastern Orthodox Church’s administration away from ancient and medieval administrational systems, the 2016 Pan-Orthodox Council’s partial failure to agree on many Church matters, including autocephaly, because of ROC’s last minute withdrawal, and President Poroshenko’s efforts to facilitate the church’s autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarch.[ii]
Thus, the historical ever-growing separation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine from the Russian Orthodox Church has been exacerbated by geopolitical factors but also by religious and canonical factors. Like the Russian Federation’s meddling in Ukraine and other former Soviet states, the ROC’s work in Ukraine was seen by many, laymen and clergy alike, as interference in Ukrainian Orthodox affairs.[iii] Collectively, these factors point to a growing dissatisfaction with the Orthodox Church and constitute reasons for growing calls for independence from the ROC. Thus, an autocephalous church in Ukraine would mean total independence from Russian interference in both church and state affairs, in a global Orthodox communion that is changing, allowing for a growing number of autocephalous churches in the Orthodox communion, which these factors helped envisage.
‘Holy Russia’
According to Mihail Suslov, Patriarch Kirill and other church officials conceived of “‘Sviataia Rus’’” as being “located on the ‘canonical territory’ of the ROC” and a “territory of exclusive jurisdiction of ROC,” with the term ‘canonical territory’ referring to the modern-day countries of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.[i] Patriarch Kirill specifically emphasizes the territories of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and sometimes Moldova and Kazakhstan, in his concept of ‘Holy Russia,’ which he used from the very beginning of his patriarchal tenure – first appearing in “his programmatic enthronization speech” in 2009.[ii]
Suslov concludes that the ‘Holy Russia’ concept that Patriarch Kirill led and promoted since day one of his patriarchate, is a “geopolitical utopia,” which has several neocolonialist connotations, while simultaneously being framed to supposedly “stop [western] colonial practices [on culture and religion].”[iii] A geopolitical utopia in the sense that “highlight[s] [the ideas’] ability to ‘estrange’ reality” while striving to “break through the […] dominant mythology.”[iv] In that sense, it is a utopia only for its supporters, while being a geopolitical dystopia for many of its opponents, as the current war shows. Baar, Solik, Baarova, and Graf conclude that Russian church leaders, led by Patriarch Kirill, mirrors the mistakes of the Russian state led by President Putin: both still see Ukraine as a “temporarily rebellious province that must be subjugated by force to follow [both] Russian geopolitics and theopolitics.”[v] These neocolonialist tendencies are expressed towards the canonical ROC lands by conducting “the ‘internal re-colonization’ of the Russian population by ‘re-churchizing’ it,” but also by “claim[ing] to be the cultural center of the Western civilization.”[vi] Geopolotics has spilt over into church affairs. In the same way anti-Western rhetoric fuels Russian politics, the Moscow Patriarchate accused the Patriarchate of Constantinople of collaborating with the West, namely the United States, in support of Ukraine’s quest for “ecclesiastical independence” to undermine Moscow and the Church.[vii]
Ultimately, this imagined geopolitical utopia is fueled by theopolitical ends; the concept of ‘Holy Russia’ strives to unite politically divided and sovereign states into a union of shared values, centered around Orthodox Christian morality and scripture, irrespective of ethnicity and physical borders, and intends for Russia to become the “Third Rome” at the head of a religious world, and implied spiritual empire, in line with the first two Romes (Ancient Rome and Constantinople).[viii] It could be argued that, while the concept of ‘Holy Russia’ is refuting the ‘Third Rome’ narrative, ultimately both have the same ends; in essence, they are claiming a world beyond Russia’s borders, both political and canonical, reinforced by Patriarch Kirill’s claims that the narrative isn’t about “geopolitical hegemony” but about Russia becoming a “Christian spiritual center.”[ix] As Patriarch Kirill declared in 2014, “‘Russia belongs to a civilisation that is larger than the Russian Federation. We call this civilisation the Russian world. This is not the world of the Russian Federation or the Russian Empire. The Russian world begins at the baptismal font of Kyiv’.” ‘Russian’ thus in a way becomes a synonym of ‘Christian,’ where Orthodox Christian morality becomes supreme, while Russia itself becomes the Ecumenical See, the center of global Orthodox Christianity and spirituality, instead of Constantinople.[x]
Holy Russia and Spiritual Colonization
The concept of ‘Holy Russia,’ and the Russian World concept, or Russkiy Mir, entail neocolonialist inclinations on spiritual and cultural aspects in once-Russian-imperial and post-Soviet spaces, namely Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The Russkiy Mir concept is a project that unifies the post-Soviet space into a “civilizational community,” building on the “‘common origin’” from the Kievan Rus’ historical memory, centered around the Russian language, the Russian culture, and the Orthodox faith, values, and heritage.[i] As Suslov puts it, the ‘Holy Russia’ concept exists “where territorially bounded notion of ‘canonical territory’ and culturally bounded notion of the ‘Russian world’ overlap.”[ii] As Natalia Naydenova elaborates, ‘Holy Russia’ strives “‘to gather’” the scattered Russkiy Mir all over the world, argued to be mainly the post-Imperial and-post-Soviet space, and unite them into a “‘national culture based on the spiritual and moral values of the Orthodox faith’,” away from the corruptible values of “‘globalization and secularization’.”[iii]
For Patriach Kirill and the proponents of the above-mentioned concepts, the post-Soviet space is divided politically but shares the same spiritual, historical, and cultural heritage, and thus, naturally should be unified on the basis of the ROC’s canonical jurisdiction, to best conserve and preserve Russkiy Mir and ‘Holy Russia.’[iv] This is evident in Patriarch Kirill’s speech in the third Russian World Assembly in 2009, where he argued that the borders separating Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and the Russian diaspora are “‘a sin against historical truth’,” and thus the Orthodox faithful in Eastern Europe are “united as ‘children of the Russian Orthodox Church’.”[v] Even more explicitly, President Putin’s speech at the celebrations of the 1025th anniversary of the baptism of Kyivan Rus’ in 2013 shows the imaginary unity between the three countries when he says “‘Orthodoxy has become a spiritual buttress for the Russian state and for our national consciousness, uniting Russia, Ukraine and Belarus through strong bonds of brotherhood’.”[vi] In addition, the celebrations shows the “spiritual colonisation of Ukraine” in the symbolic designation of Patriarch Kirill as the head of the committee and the ROC’s assumed role as unifier of global Orthodoxy by inviting the heads of the 15 Orthodox Churches.[vii] The ROC and the Russian Federation have positioned themselves as the guardians not only of ‘Holy Russia,’ but also of Orthodoxy itself, meant “‘to guarantee the spiritual cleanliness of the holy places’” in these countries, particularly Ukraine.[viii] As the heirs of ‘Holy Russia’ they present themselves as being tasked with preserving the lands – specifically the canonical lands, which they present as separate from the sovereign political lands – the historical legacies, and the spiritual and cultural heritage of these countries.
Ukraine was and still is at the forefront of this ideological re-interpretation of the post-Imperial, post-Soviet world. As the place of the baptism of Prince Volodymyr, Ukraine is “sacred in three interconnected ways.”[ix] First, Ukraine is seen, by clergymen and political leaders, as the birthplace of “Russian Orthodoxy, [Russian] statehood and religious enlightenment.”[x] Ukraine is thought of as the place where the Russian Empire originated, as well as the birthplace of modern Russia; thus, and all such civilizational and historical heritage has been passed on to Moscow.[xi] Second, Ukraine is argued to be the “spiritual center of ‘Holy Russia’,” although it is Moscow’s geographical periphery.[xii] In fact, despite being on the Russian World’s geographical periphery and Moscow being its geographical centre, Ukraine and Crimea have been considered the “heart of Russian spiritual and political landscapes” since the first half of the nineteenth century.[xiii] Third, Ukraine, being the ROC’s spiritual centre, is considered a prime place for ascetism, devotion, and spirituality, comparable to Jerusalem.[xiv] With its numerous monasteries, holy mountains, and sacred sites, especially the Monastery of the Caves in Kyiv and the baptismal font of St Volodymyr in Crimea, Ukraine has become, for Patriarch Kirill and many devout Russian Orthodox, where “asceticism and selfless devotion” are observed, and in which, Russian tsars and leaders have built an “elaborate network of shrines.”[xv]
Because of this overemphasized notion of Ukraine as the centre of ‘Holy united Russia’ and the ancient birthplace of the modern Russian state and of the ROC in Russian propagandistic rhetoric, preserving it in the Russian sphere of influence became a priority. Patriarch Kirill’s vision of the ‘Holy Russia’ is based on the idea of shared Christian morality, values and ideals, and thus emphasizing integration through the church and the strengthening of its teachings.[xvi] In other words, Kirill and the ROC believe ‘Holy Russia’ and the Russian World concept warrant a spiritual colonization and further integration into the ROC, which will supposedly preserve these above-mentioned sacred places and the spiritual and cultural heritage. This spiritual colonization will not only impinge on political borders and politics but will further absorb the holy Belarusian and Ukrainian landmarks into Russia’s sphere of influence, because they are in need of “‘re-churchizing’,” since schismatics and dissidents, such as those calling for the autocephaly of the OCU, took over these holy places.[xvii] They say bringing the Ukrainian and Belarusian people into the orbit of the ROC would allow it to control and preserve its most sacred and holy places. However, one could argue that these ‘re-churchizing’ efforts are in reality pretexts for leaders who want more power – whether political or canonical, most evident in the dispute over spiritual leadership of the Orthodox Church. The Moscow Patriarchate considers itself the rightful leader of the global Orthodox Church by virtue of being the largest Orthodox Church by number of adherents, and has subsequently tried to undermine the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s unofficial leadership of global Orthodoxy.[xviii] Ukraine becoming an autocephalous Church would cut “one-third of ROC parishes” and thus undermine the ROC’s ability to compete with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[xix]
Canonical Inter-relations and Church Geopoliticization
Patriarch Kirill’s first pastoral visit to Ukraine in summer 2009, which he framed in the ‘Holy Russia’ rhetoric and his “grand vision of the ‘Russian World’,” was part of a larger geopolitical context which featured Patriarch Kirill, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, former Patriarch Aleksi II, and the then-President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko.[i] In 2008, prior to Patriarch Kirill’s first visit to Ukraine, his predecessor Patriarch Aleksi visited Ukraine on the occasion of the 1020th anniversary of Prince Volodymyr’s baptism, to which Patriarch Bartholomew was also invited.[ii] This invitation was geopolitically significant as many supporters of Ukraine’s autocephalous church wanted the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople to declare the OCU’s autocephaly, “marking a second baptism of Rus’,” including President Yushchenko, who personally and “ceremoniously […] picked up” the Ecumenical Patriarch from the airport.[iii] This geopolitical maneuver was part of President Yushchenko’s tactics to win the support of the Ecumenical Patriarch for the OCU’s independence, although Patriarch Bartholomew only went to Ukraine as part of a solemn “pastoral visit” and to meet Patriarch Aleksi to discuss the situation of Ukraine.[iv] By contrast, Patriarch Aleksi’s visit did aim “to shore up Ukrainian support for Russia and the ROC,” making it more evidently political.[v] A few months later, Patriarch Kirill’s visit, which he also insisted was pastoral in nature, was themed around “the role of religion in contemporary life and the unification and strengthening of the ROC throughout the world,” part of which he called a “‘pilgrimage’ to the ‘mother of all Rus’,” ending in Kyiv, or “‘our common Jerusalem’,” as he called the city.[vi] In hindsight, after Patriarch Kirill’s blessing of the unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine waged fourteen years after the visit, which he called ‘a holy war,’ this rhetoric represents a fragment of a larger geopolitical context in which President Putin and Patriarch Kirill appear to want this sacred site under direct Russian control, rather than simply part of a symbolic union. And thus, this grand vision’s alleged political independence might have been just a charade, because, in retrospect, the current war uses this rhetoric, while completely destroying the political independence of Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine since 2014, namely the conflict in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea, was seen distinctly by different churches, because of the divergent geopolitical positions they support or are affiliated with. For instance, while publicly declaring loyalty to Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) saw the war as “‘first and foremost an internal issue of Ukraine’,” i.e. a “‘civil war’,” which then brings into question the UOC-MP’s loyalty to Ukraine.[vii] On the other hand, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) sees the war as Russian and foreign aggression against Ukrainian sovereignty, a stance it takes in hopes of “[confirming] the patriotic nature of [its] church in the eyes of the general public,” and also undermining to UOC-MP.[viii] The UOC-MP’s leaders assertion that the separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine are “genuine social movement[s],” not merely pawns in the disposal of external powers, whose right to self-determination should be respected, made it seen as a church controlled by the ROC and the Russian state.[ix] The UOC-KP discussed separatism through the rhetoric of a ‘victim Ukraine,’ in which direct foreign aggression or foreign interference pushes “‘Ukrainian citizens [to] fight against Ukrainians’.” Secessionists, therefore, are depicted as a façade for Russian interference, a successful stance in undermining its competitor, the UOC-MP, and in increasing Ukrainian support for the UOC-KP.[x] Both the UOC-MP and the UOC-KP have their own geopolitical interests and agendas in the larger theopolitical context in Ukraine, and thus are bound to act by them.
The geopoliticization of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church was part of a larger context: changing Ukrainian national security concerns due to Russian aggression, and international calls for pluralization by Russia and the ROC. For Ukraine, especially under President Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019), the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was framed as a “necessary condition for defeating the military aggression of Russia in East Ukraine and as a final blow to [Russian] foreign policy ambitions.” The ‘Holy Russia’ concept of reuniting the canonical lands of the ROC should be considered as Russian territorial claims, which constitute a direct threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and statehood.[xi] In hindsight, President Poroshenko appears to have been proven correct in these considerations. For Russia and the Moscow Patriarchate, the claims against Ukrainian autocephaly were framed in anti-pluralistic ambitions, in the context of calling for religious pluralism, since they saw the OCU’s actions as “unwarranted hegemonic ambitions of one particular Orthodox church,” in line with Russia’s desire for the development of a multipolar world in the international geopolotical arena, “as an alternative to the hegemony of one country or bloc,” namely the United States and the West.[xii] Russia and the ROC even accused the US State Department of concocting the idea of Ukrainian autocephaly with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople as a way to break up the Orthodox presence in Europe, splitting the Russian people from the Ukrainian people, and thus not only “‘[attacking] Orthodox Christianity’” and weakening Russian influence, but also allegedly limiting religious freedoms in Ukraine.[xiii]
The Future of the Church in Ukraine
The conflict between the ROC and the Russian state on one side and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian state on the other, which turned into full-scale invasion and war, has left the Orthodox Church hanging in the balance, and its future in Ukraine uncertain. Andrii Krawchuk, who studied public and church officials’ response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, found that many affiliated with Moscow did try to distance themselves from the ROC, but he still concludes that the outcome of the war, as well as the future conduct of the ROC itself, will determine the future of the church in Ukraine.[i] This is because the ROC has alienated itself from the world and from other Orthodox Churches. The autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) will prosper, and the ROC will become “a black sheep,” if Ukraine recovers its former territories, or ‘wins’ the war, though it will still be protected in the EU under religious freedom laws.[ii] Alternatively, in the case that Russia gains more territory, the ROC will prosper alongside an extremely diminished UOC, and any other “‘schisms’” will be either suppressed or absorbed into the ROC.[iii] As we have seen in recent months, the tensions between loyalty to the Ukrainian state and canonical solidarity with the Moscow Patriarchate have resulted in the eviction of the Ukrainian Orthodox monks from the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, despite their continued insistence on their independence from the Moscow Patriarchate and their loyalty to Ukraine.[iv] Therefore it can be argued that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, not only the UOC-MP, is also hanging in the balance despite continuous efforts to ‘prove’ their loyalty to Ukraine rather than the aggressor state. Along this line of analysis, it can be argued that the affiliation demonstrated between Moscow and the Russian Orthodox church will ultimately decide the future of the Church in Ukraine regardless of the outcome of the present war. The example of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra disputes, in which the church was undermined before any resolution to the war occurred, testifies to this challenge.
Meeting with Metropolitan Epiphanius, head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. View license here.
Conclusion
Historically, parts of Ukraine were part of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, dominated by Russia, and canonically, Ukraine is (or rather was) part of Russian Orthodox territories, but these historical facts are mobilized as tools for neocolonialist aspirations, both in Orthodox Church and geopolitical affairs.
Russian historians, clergy, and scholars identified Ukraine, particularly Kyiv and Crimea, as the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy and of the modern state.[v] They justified their claims and the war waged against Ukraine by relying upon medieval texts establishing Prince Volodymyr’s acceptance of Christianity and converting his people, and describing the travels of other historic religious figures in modern-day Ukraine. Yet many factors facilitated the calls for autocephaly and independence of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine from the ROC, including Russian meddling in post-Soviet state affairs, the ROC’s domination of the Orthodox Church’s affairs in Ukraine, Russia’s growing eastward policies, Ukraine’s increasingly pro-European foreign policy outlook, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s re-emergence as viable leadership option instead of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The ROC and the Russian Federation positioned themselves as the heirs of ‘Holy Russia’ and guardians of the ‘Russian World,’ tasked with preserving the canonical lands, the historical, spiritual and cultural heritage of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Allowing Ukraine’s Orthodox Church autocephaly would mean cutting Russia’s spheres of influence and outreach, and thus power, by one-third. In this context, even Patriarch Kirill’s visit to Ukraine in 2009 was drenched in geopolitical controversies. Division and controversy have only grown since the start of the war on Ukraine in 2014, as Ukraine has increasingly geopoliticized the OCU’s autocephaly claims, alleging their importance as part of Ukrainian national security. The future institutional Orthodoxy in Ukraine is currently uncertain due to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Only at the end of the war will we know which branch of the church will survive, depending on which side ‘wins’ and what happens to the reputation of the Moscow Patriarchate, which is currently tarnished in Ukraine and around the world as a result of its support of the full-scale invasion.
[i] Andrii Krawchuck, “Narrating the War Theologically: Does Russian Orthodoxy Have a Future in Ukraine?” Canadian Slavonic Papers 64, no. 2-3 (2022): 185-186. https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2022.2107836
[ii] Krawchuck, “Narrating the War Theologically: Does Russian Orthodoxy Have a Future in Ukraine?”, 185.
[iii] Krawchuck, “Narrating the War Theologically: Does Russian Orthodoxy Have a Future in Ukraine?”, 185-186.
[iv] Hanna Arhirova,“Tensions on the rise at revered Kyiv monastery complex.”
[v] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 222-224.
[i] Tonoyan and Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009,” 259, 261-262.
[ii] Tonoyan and Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009,” 256.
[iii] Tonoyan and Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009,” 256.
[iv] Tonoyan and Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009,” 256.
[v] Tonoyan and Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009,” 257.
[vi] Tonoyan and Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009,” 257.
[vii] Denys Shestopalets, “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, The State and The Russian-Ukrainian Crisis, 2014-2018,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 20, no. 1 (2019): 47. https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2018.1554482.
[viii] Shestopalets, “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,” 51-52.
[ix] Shestopalets, “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,” 49.
[x] Shestopalets, “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,” 51-53.
[xi] Denys Shestopalets, “Religious Freedom, Conspiracies, and Faith: The Geopolitics of Ukrainian Autocephaly,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 18, no. 3 (2020): 28. https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2020.1795441.
[xii] Shestopalets, “Religious Freedom, Conspiracies, and Faith: The Geopolitics of Ukrainian Autocephaly,” 29.
[xiii] This is purely Russia and the ROC’s arguments, which with the benefit of hindsight are problematic to say the least, because they also constitute the reasoning for the present war on Ukraine. See Shestopalets, “Religious Freedom, Conspiracies, and Faith: The Geopolitics of Ukrainian Autocephaly,” 29-30.
[i] Michał Wawrzonek, “Ukraine in the ‘Gray Zone’: Between the ‘Russkiy Mir’ and Europe,” East European Politics and Societies 28, no. 4 (2014): 760-761.
[ii] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 86-87.
[iii] Naydenova, “Holy Rus: (Re)Construction of Russia’s Civilizational Identity,” 41-42.
[iv] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 230-231.
[v] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 230-231.
[vi] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 232.
[vii] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 232.
[viii] Joan E.Taylor, Christians and the holy places : the myth of Jewish-Christian Origins (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press; 1993) quoted in Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 226.
[ix] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 96.
[x] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination of the Russian Orthodox Church: a Case Study of Patriarch Kirill,” 96; Naydenova, “Holy Rus: (Re)Construction of Russia’s Civilizational Identity,” 42-43.
[xi] Naydenova, “Holy Rus: (Re)Construction of Russia’s Civilizational Identity,” 42.
[xii] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 96.
[xiii] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 223.
[xiv] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 95-96.
[xv] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 223, 227; Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 95-96.
[xvi] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 87-88.
[xvii] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 97.
[xviii] Pankhurst, “History, Ecclesiology, Canonicity, and Power,” 160.
[xix] Pankhurst, “History, Ecclesiology, Canonicity, and Power,” 163-164.
[i] In these lands, Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev explained, other confessions were permissible, but any missions “should be considered hostile proselytism if not overt imperialistic hegemony.” See Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination, 86.
[ii] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 84-85.
[iii] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 97.
[iv] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 84
[v] ‘Theopolitics’ here refers to a religious aspect of geopolitics. See Baar et al., “Theopolitics of the Orthodox World,” Religions 13, no. 2 (2022): 129-130.
[vi] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 97.
[vii] Baar et al., “Theopolitics of the Orthodox World,” 128.
[viii] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 87-89.
[ix] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 89.
[x] See Baar et al., “Theopolitics of the Orthodox World,” 120, 129.
[i] Jerry G Pankhurst, “History, Ecclesiology, Canonicity, and Power: Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxy after the Euromaidan,” Religion During the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict, ed. E.A. Clark and D. Vovk (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 161-162. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429288463-10.
[ii] Pankhurst, “History, Ecclesiology, Canonicity, and Power” 163-164, 174.
[iii] Pankhurst, “History, Ecclesiology, Canonicity, and Power,” 162.
[i] Mara Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 14, no. 3 (2014): 221-222. https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2014.957635.
[ii] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 222.
[iii] Metropolitan Makarii was also known as Makarii Bulgakov. He was Metropolitan of Moscow, from 1879 until his death in 1882. See Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 223.
[iv] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 223.
[v] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 223-224.
[vi] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 229.
[vii] Natalia Naydenova, “Holy Rus: (Re)Construction of Russia’s Civilizational Identity,” Slavonica 21, no. 1–2 (2016): 42.
[viii] Lydia S. Tonoyan and Daniel P. Payne, “The Visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in 2009 and Its Significance in Ukraine’s Political and Religious Life,” Religion, State & Society 38, no. 3 (2010): 257. https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2010.499283.
[ix] Kozelsky, “Religion and the Crisis in Ukraine,” 224.
[i] Hanna Arhirova, “Tensions on the rise at revered Kyiv monastery complex,” Associated Press, March 26, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/kyiv-pechersk-lavra-ukraine-orthodox-russia-war-83bf9f104242469e367cf1d6ab16887c
[ii] Lucian N. Leustean and Vsevolod Samokhvalov, “The Ukrainian National Church, Religious Diplomacy, and the Conflict in Donbas,” Journal of Orthodox Christian Studies 2, no. 2 (2019): 211.
[iii] Daren Butler and Bulent Usta, “Ecumenical Patriarch signs decree granting Ukraine church independence,” Reuters, January 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-church-idUSKCN1OZ0AO
[iv] Leustean and Samokhvalov, “The Ukrainian National Church, Religious Diplomacy, and the Conflict in Donbas,” 200.
[v] Vladimír Baar, Martin Solík, Barbara Baarová, and Jan Graf, “Theopolitics of the Orthodox World—Autocephaly of the Orthodox Churches as a Political, Not Theological Problem,” Religions 13, no. 2 (2022): 120-122.
[vi] Leustean and Samokhvalov, “The Ukrainian National Church, Religious Diplomacy, and the Conflict in Donbas,” 200.
[vii] Leustean and Samokhvalov, “The Ukrainian National Church, Religious Diplomacy, and the Conflict in Donbas,” 216-219.
[viii] Baar et al., “Theopolitics of the Orthodox World,” 116.
[ix] Niko Vorobyov, “Patriarch Kirill: Putin ally faces backlash after ‘blessing’ war,” AlJazeera, March 28, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/28/patriarch-kirill-putin-ally-faces-backlash
[x] Suslov, “The Utopia of ‘Holy Russia’ in Today’s Geopolitical Imagination,” 83-84