By Thomas Law
NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO . . . We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia.
So read the declaration following the April 2008 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter, NATO) Summit in Bucharest. These platitudes were devoid of meaningful detail, rendering them not only geopolitically meaningless but also counterproductive. There were no accompanying concrete proposals, no meaningful pathways spelled out, and no prerequisite criteria to meet. All that was offered was “a period of intensive engagement […] at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding,” with a first assessment to be published in December.[1]
Just four months later, Russian forces exploited ongoing tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a flimsy justification to occupy a fifth of Georgia’s internationally recognized territory. NATO’s vague offer of future membership, without a timeframe or meaningful intervening support, provided an incentive for Russia to invade.[2] It was a similar story in 2014, when Russia invaded another imperfect but identifiably democratic former Soviet Republic – Ukraine, after the Euromaidan Revolution. The protests followed President Viktor Yanukovych’s abandonment of the European Union Association Agreement under Russian pressure. The instability and “strategic ambiguity” that followed his ousting was exploited by the Kremlin as an excuse to send their ‘little green men’ to seize Crimea and foment trouble and ‘separatism’ in the Donbas.[3]
Unmarked soldiers in Crimea, March 2014. Photo: Ilya Varlamov/Wikimedia Commons. No changes were made. View license here.
Despite this blatant militaristic aggression in Europe, it provoked very little counter-response from Western states that had championed the democratic progress and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia. The response by Europeans and the North American states – weak rebuttals, minimal sanctions, and heel-dragging on military support – has not deterred Russia from intensifying its activities. On the contrary, this appeasement encouraged further Russian aggression, including actions against existing European Union (hereafter, EU) and NATO members. This has included, but is by no means limited to, cyber attacks, “weaponizing immigration” and a chemical weapons attack in the UK that killed a British citizen.[4] Nevertheless, Russia’s reinvigorated revisionism has had the greatest impact on the aforementioned aspiring states – Georgia and, above all, Ukraine. In concert with a historically skittish, non-committal stance by NATO and the EU that failed to provide meaningful pan-societal incentives for reform, I contend that this has had a stalling effect on democratic consolidation. Most directly, Russia’s militarism has placed large territories under Moscow’s direct or indirect control, therefore making it impossible for them to comply with the “essential prerequisites to democratization” of territorial integrity and secure borders.[5] Elsewhere in temporarily unoccupied territory, it has necessitated a societal adjustment and clampdown in the name of national security that is not conducive to healthy civil developments and flourishing democratic freedoms.[6] Democracy is more than the holding of periodic free and fair elections, incorporating judicial independence, a free media, meaningful legislative scrutiny, robust anti-corruption and anti-oligarchic regimes, freedom of assembly, a healthy and active civil society, and general freedom of choice in politics and life.[7]
This article opens with an analysis of the 33 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the remarkable progress made by Ukraine and Georgia in democratizing their societies. They overcame the legacies of decades of communist repression and centuries of imperialist rule to establish functioning democracies that, even if characterized as ‘hybrid regimes’, have demonstrated a remarkable ability to evolve in a democratic direction.[8] Whilst both countries had experienced remarkably similar histories and developments, I then look into Georgia’s recent democratic backsliding. The progress made on democratization was achieved not due to, but in spite of the EU and NATO’s geopolitical stance, and is now going into reverse in Georgia, and at risk of doing so in Ukraine. The failure to offer meaningful, detailed, conditional plans for reforms that would secure membership has left these countries in limbo, vulnerable to both an external Russian threat and internal anti-democratic tendencies. I then contend that Georgia offers a warning as to what could befall Ukraine if it fails to advance its Euro-Atlantic aspiration (or rather, if NATO and the EU fail to accommodate Ukrainian efforts). The West, and indeed the Ukrainians, should learn from the Georgian experience, whilst not giving up on Tbilisi’s democratic hopes of realising its European dream.
There is an acute dilemma when it comes to interactions with these “grey zone” democracies: on the one hand, the requirement to uphold democratic standards can act as an incentive for further development, on the other – the risk of alienating these countries and leaving them vulnerable to further Russian influence and democratic backsliding.[9] There is also a wider Russia’s strategic threat to consider. Despite these considerations to maintain, I contend that membership is not only possible, perhaps on a ‘West German’ basis, but urgent. Russia’s ongoing aggression should not be used as an excuse, but rather should necessitate faster accession talks to not only guarantee peace and prosperity, but to avoid undermining domestic democratic progress.
Joint press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. June 5, 2019. Photo: NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation/Flickr. No changes were made. View license here.
History Boys:
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, there was much scepticism regarding the former Republics’ ability to transition into market economies and democratic societies. Indeed, they were viewed as possible sources of instability, nuclear in the case of Ukraine, and ethnic with Georgia and its South Abkhazian and Ossetian questions.[10] Despite this, there was noticeable democratic progress, if not quite at the same pace as other former communist states. A pivot away from decades of subjugation by Moscow manifested itself with a desire to ‘turn to Europe’, officially embracing concepts like democracy whilst collaborating closer with institutions that could offer peace (NATO) and prosperity (the EU).[11]
From Communism to the Continent
This was not a smooth process. Whilst talking about democracy and liberty, the leaders of the 1990s, the majority of whom cut their teeth in Soviet politics, were far more autocratic than often acknowledged in the West. The ‘colour’ revolutions (the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine), however, were “visibly recognized in the West as a major democratic advance” by ousting Presidents Eduard Shevardnadze and that “obdurate anti-democrat” Leonid Kuchma.[12] This process of democratic progress was accompanied by increasing pro-European and Euro-Atlantic sentiment, often as a rebuttal to pervasive Russian influence.[13] Georgian protestors, ostensibly seeking democratic reforms and the removal of an autocratic president, took to the streets waving EU, United States (hereafter, US) and NATO flags in a clear rebuttal to closer association with Russia. In the years following, a popular vote showed more than 70 percent of the population wanted to join NATO.[14] Ukraine experienced similar events, with protestors expressing pro-European views in 2004 during anti-Kuchma demonstrations, and even more so in 2014, whereover a hundred protestors “sacrificed their lives for the dream of Europe.”[15]
Euromaidan in Kyiv, November 27, 2013. Photo: Evgeny Feldman/Wikimedia Commons. No changes were made. View license here.
These developments were primarily locally driven, with wide-scale mobilization of society against authoritarian leaders.[16] Funding and support from Non-Governmental Organizations (hereafter, NGOs) was important, but its impact is often overstated – including by none other than President Vladimir Putin in his monolithic, adversarial worldview.[17] Ascribing too much importance to external funding and support for civil society groups diminishes the local agency and pro-democratic spirit prevailing since the fall of the Soviet Union. It ignores the fact that “substantive democracy stems from the grassroots” or else it is merely “a paternalistic form of governance.”[18] It overexaggerates the role of the EU and the fact that these states “were well on their way to democracy” before the EU’s incentives for political liberalization.[19] The habit of overlooking such local perspectives to shoehorn these countries’ democratic developments as but a minor subset in the grander story of relations with Russia leads to ignorance of their perspectives. As a result of this approach, any talk of accession went on the backburner following the Colour Revolutions, with EU-Ukrainian cooperation slowing in the late 2000s and Georgia’s calls for a NATO Membership Action Plan rebutted following the 2008 invasion.
The modern day ‘Non’
At the time that both countries underwent significant democratic progress, the EU in particular was keen to distance itself from offering future membership. It had an important mediatory role during the Orange Revolution, but the main actor most trusted by Kyiv turned out to be President Aleksander Kwasniewski of Poland, not an official EU figure.[20] The EU was driven by a desire for a stable and peaceful outcome, and indeed one that focused too much on Russian sensitivities. The fear of escalating tensions with Moscow was at the forefront of the Euro-Atlantic agenda. The prospect of Ukrainian and Georgian membership in these organizations was minimized, and in many cases ridiculed. To give one example from 2003, Romano Prodi, the then-European Commission Chair suggested that “Ukraine was as plausible a candidate for EU membership as New Zealand” and grouped the country in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy alongside Morocco and Tunisia – countries considered geographically unqualified for EU entry.[21]
Ukraine and Georgia have never been perfect democracies, and for a long time flirted with autocracy. They have shown signs of democratic evolution, thriving civil societies, and institution building, despite never truly being appreciated or cultivated by Western states. Neither the US nor the EU were particularly active when it came to promoting democracy in Ukraine and Georgia, with neither using political conditionality to pressure incumbent leaders, instead relying on funding and low-level cooperation agreements.[22] Democratization also cannot be viewed in isolation from wider society and the challenges it faces; Western intransigence to the growing Russian threat and unwillingness to extend sufficient economic and security support meant that the laborious process of reform became of secondary importance, sacrificed in the name of national security, or ignored in the absence of hope for meaningful change and acceptance into the Euro-Atlantic club.
This historic failure to countenance Ukrainian and Georgian membership provided the conditions to undermine democratic progress made to date. Without long-term external guarantees, with the potential for Russia to act as a destabilizing force, any short-term progress could never be certain to affect long-lasting, permanent societal change. The preoccupation in Washington and European capitals was on strategic balance with Russia, or indeed self-interested concerns about budgets and pooled support rather than the aspiration of the Ukrainian and Georgian people.
In the end, this proved to be a strategic mistake; the 2008 NATO declaration, whilst failing to provide meaningful security guarantees, incentivized Russian expansion by refuelling the paranoia about Western encirclement and enabling the invasions due to the lack of short-term protection on offer. Following President Yanukovych’s election in 2010, Ukraine saw a decrease in democratic freedoms, including the harassment of the opposition and independent media, as well as the political prosecution of former Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko.[23] Yanukovych’s rule would ultimately oversee the end of Ukraine’s post-Soviet modus operandi of balancing the West and Russia, the “multivector foreign policy” first utilized by Kuchma. Yanukovych’s original plans to withdraw from the prospective EU Association Agreement would have ended any ability for Ukraine to ‘balance’ with the West. The resulting Maidan Revolution, toppling of Yanukovych, annexation of Crimea, war in Donbas, and finally the 2022 full-scale invasion, have ensured that any ties with Russia have been severed for the foreseeable future.[24]
Protests against war in Ukraine, February 27, 2022. Photo: Amaury Laporte/Wikimedia Commons. No changes made. View license here.
The Ongoing Appeal
Naturally, the continued Russian threat has heightened the appeal of NATO and the EU, and their Euro-Atlantic notions of democracy. An October 2022 poll found that 83 percent of Ukrainians want to join NATO.[25] Despite ongoing threats and occupation, Ukraine achieved meaningful democratic progress, scoring 5.9 (on a 0-10 scale) in the 2019 Economist Democracy Index, up from 5.42 in 2014.[26] To put it in more qualitative terms, it is a “centrist democracy with a division of powers” and a “rapidly modernizing and politically literate civil society.” [27]
Such enthusiasm, without countervailing reciprocation from the objects of their desire, in an increasingly securitized society, can only carry progress so far. There have been understandable setbacks since the invasion, and obvious thorny issues about legitimacy and the renewal of popular mandates considering the effect of martial law (barring elections that would have been scheduled for 2024). Although Ukraine’s most recent Economist democracy rating fell to 5.42, the lowest since first publication in 2006, this is in large part explained by the practicalities of war and martial law – the need to centralize power and decision-making, the restriction on judicial and legislative reform necessitated by the constitution under war, the impossibility of publishing and broadcasting parliamentary sessions owing to safety concerns, and the fact that all main channels broadcast from the same government-run United News Telemarathon.[28] There is a risk that failure by the EU and NATO to advance membership talks could see democratic stagnation or even regression. This is no idle threat, nor one that will dissipate once the war ends. Mayor of Kyiv Vitali Klitschko said the country was becoming increasingly autocratic under President Zelenskyy whilst those daily television broadcasts have become a “marathon of propaganda” according to the Zaborona editor.[29] The EU itself highlighted reduced access to pluralistic media and the need to ensure post-war structures for media regulation, “including the long-term outlook of the public broadcaster and independence of the national regulator.”[30] Indeed, one only needs to look to Georgia to see how years in the waiting room can negatively impact democratic development.
Georgian Dream, or nightmare?
For decades, Georgia has been in geopolitical purgatory. Despite continued and strong displays of Euro-Atlantic aspirations, NATO and the EU have failed to make meaningful overtures welcoming Georgian progression domestically and in its foreign policy choices. When it comes to Ukraine, these institutions, as well as domestic actors, must be wary of repeating the same mistakes that have allowed for a recent undoing of Georgia’s democratic progress.
Both Georgia and Ukraine experienced a post-Soviet desire to ‘turn to Europe’, but the former’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations have historically been far stronger. Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, ratified in 1995, calls on constitutional bodies to take all measures possible “to ensure the full integration” of Georgia into the EU and NATO.[31]Georgia formally applied to join NATO in 2006 and the EU in the weeks following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine nailed its colours to the mast far later, only officially applying in February 2022. Both Georgia and Ukraine have undergone analogous if not exact democratization and accession projections for NATO and the EU, and each have lessons for the other and offer possible predilections for the future. Ukraine shows the risks to Georgia of failure to resolve low-lying conflicts with Russia and the possibility of a full-scale invasion years down the line. As regards democracy, Georgia’s recent regression is a cautionary tale of what can happen if foreign policy objectives are not reciprocated.
Post-Rose Predicament
The democratic progress in Georgia continued for some time after the Rose Revolution, with the country going from an Economist scoring of 4.62 following Russia’s 2008 invasion to 5.93 in 2017.[32] That journey was not smooth, and was characterized by a number of infringements on democracy. The post-revolution reform process ended up concentrating power in the hands of the executive in a move that was given insufficient scrutiny by the legislature, the wider public, and Georgia’s western allies. TV programs critical to the government were either removed or watered down, resulting in the country’s media becoming less free and pluralistic overall.[33]
Rose Revolution Georgia, Tbilisi 2003. Photo: Zaraza/Wikimedia Commons. No changes were made. View license here.
Nonetheless, significant overall progress could be observed, but after years in the waiting room, in the absence of an external motivation for political unity and hope that institution-building would advance membership talks, recent Georgian politics has been characterized by drama and uncertainty. Protests in 2019 calling for electoral reform and the resignation of key political figures were repressed, and the 2020 parliamentary elections were marred by allegations of fraud that led to opposition parties boycotting and renouncing their seats, and the arrest of Nika Melia, chair of the opposition United National Movement (UNM) party. More mass protests were seen in 2023 in response to the government’s planned Russian-style “foreign agents” law (subsequently retracted from parliamentary hearings) that threatened to take the country on a more authoritarian path.[34]
Recent years of rule by the Georgian Dream party, particularly under former Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili have seen widespread democratic backsliding that has gone hand in hand with a closer alignment with illiberal political modes (that have more in common with domestic politics in Türkiye, Hungary, and Russia) and a diminution of practical steps being taken to achieve Euro-Atlantic ambitions. The ruling party even attempted to impeach President Salome Zurabishvili for travelling to Europe without prime ministerial approval (ironically to drum up support for Georgian membership of NATO and the EU). It has extended control of the judiciary and cultural institutions, expanded control over the security forces and media, committed electoral malpractice, failed to crack down on oligarchism, corruption, and overzealous policing, as well as imprisoned former President Mikhail Saakashvili over alleged corruption.[35] Georgian Dream’s founder and primary funder, billionaire oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who will make his return to Georgian politics in 2024, amassed his fortunes in Russia.[36] Amidst ongoing Russian occupation and moves to expand its military presence in illegally occupied Abkhazia, Georgian politics and society have undergone a worrying deterioration of previously established democratic norms.[37] A new Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, was appointed in February 2024 following Gharibashvili’s unexpected resignation, and he is expected to continue this trend of growing authoritarian moves at home with criticisms of the West.[38]
Many of the conditionalities attached by the EU and NATO have only served to polarize debate and push much of Georgian Dream’s target audience away from Euro-Atlantic ideals. The party appears to have followed the Viktor Orbán/Recep Tayyip Erdoğan playbook in inserting wedge issues into the political discourse, including around LGBT+ rights.[39] To expand on this as a case study, these were prerequisites of deeper EU integration as outlined in the Association Agreement, and an anti-discrimination bill was passed by the Georgian parliament in 2014. It, in effect, led the government to pick between “civilized Europe” or in a Russian direction “where it is possible to expel people whom you dislike from a city” in the words of then-speaker Davit Usupashvili.[40] Linking these issues of foreign policy and national identity with such issues risks further undermining support for closer Euro-Atlantic ties, leaving space for Russia and Russia-linked (if not Russia-supporting) political forces to capitalize on.
International Relations
This is not a case of Georgian Dream being in thrall to the Kremlin, nor of Russian interference subverting a pro-European population into a vassal state. Instead, it represents an Orbán-style turn to ‘illiberal democracy’ that by definition shifts it further away from the conventions and practicalities of the very Euro-Atlantic institutions it purportedly wishes to join, and closer to an autocratic type of governance. Its increasingly anti-democratic bent at home, domestic policies similar to Russia’s, and alignment with Moscow’s interests are being tied up with a diminishing zeal for NATO and EU membership. NATO and the EU must take some blame for allowing this shift to happen, and in some instances pushing Georgia in such a direction.
This ‘push’ is evident from NATO/EU’s failure to offer security guarantees, dismissing local efforts at civil society improvement, and dragging their feet on membership talks. By the time Georgia had ratified and implemented the EU Association Agreement (“the basis for implementation of the accession process”) the EU was preoccupied with the exit of one of its largest members and financial contributors, the United Kingdom.[41] In 2018 French President Emmanuel Macron refused to even countenance beginning negotiations with any applicant state.[42] When Georgia applied in 2022, whilst Moldova and Ukraine (comprising the frontrunning ‘accession trio’) that were granted immediate candidate status, Georgia was instead presented with twelve priorities to tackle, and only granted candidate status in December 2023 (at the same time the EU announced it would begin accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine). NATO has been no better: Georgia’s attempts to draw closer have been “hitting the glass door” in the words of parliamentarian Shalva Papuashvili, whilst Kornely Kakachia, Director of the Georgian Institute of Politics, said that the lack of concrete time frame has led to “NATO fatigue.”[43]
When push came to shove and Georgia faced Russian military aggression (and ongoing threats), “the West failed to provide sufficient support.”[44] Under such circumstances, it is understandable that much of the population has been willing to countenance a party that has not been unequivocally anti-Russian, and to overlook some of its more anti-democratic tendencies. The question of when pragmatism with Russia becomes coziness of its status and mode of governance is key to understanding the interplay of Georgia’s domestic and foreign politics. Georgia has abided by Western sanctions but has not imposed sanctions of its own. It resumed direct flights to Russia in May 2023 and has visa-free entry for Russians.[45] Georgian Dream seeks to portray itself as a ‘Party of Peace’ that would prevent the country from being “dragged into the war”, in contrast to the UNM-led opposition portrayed as a ‘war party’.[46] In the aftermath of the Rose Revolution, having attempted to blur the lines between party and state to heighten the “threat of one-party hegemony,” President Saakashvili would paint those opposed to him as “pro-Russian.”[47] Now Georgian Dream is exploiting ongoing geopolitical tensions to paint the opposition as pro-war, and anyone against the current leadership as a threat to national security.
Even in 2015, during Garibashvili’s first stint as Prime Minister, he greeted the opening of a NATO training centre in Georgia by stipulating that it “is in no way directed against Russia,” attempting to justify this by claiming that: “We are called upon to maintain a pragmatic approach in our relations with Russia.”[48] The fact that he blamed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on NATO spoke volumes of his strategic thinking and the party’s turn to Moscow under the influence of its billionaire benefactor, Bidzina Ivanishvili.[49] Amidst inflationary pressures, in no small part caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as hundreds of thousands of newly arrived Russians, 55 percent of surveyed Georgians want to maintain or increase economic activity with Russia.[50]
Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, meeting with Irakli Garibashvili, Prime Minister of Georgia, December 15, 2021. Photo: NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Flickr. No changes were made. View license here.
Looking to the Future
Yet, that same poll found that a similar number wanted closer economic ties with the EU, that figure doubling since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Georgia’s population is not necessarily abandoning its Euro-Atlantic aspirations because of clamours for peaceful coexistence with Russia. Instead, failure to better implement democratic values and failure by NATO and the EU to better incentivize and nurture such development has allowed the space for an increasingly autocratic party to ‘illiberalize’ Georgian society and politics. This by default pushes it closer to Moscow’s world view, making it susceptible to the Kremlin’s influence and talking points. This is not to say that Georgia is ‘lost’, but rather that Western powers must learn lessons from their strategic mistakes these past decades.
The Georgian experience demonstrates the potential for democratic backsliding if the West fails to provide meaningful economic and security guarantees, both in the present day through military and economic assistance and cooperation, but also in the future. Failure to provide a realistic prospect of accession to bodies that would guarantee security and (greater) prosperity created the domestically unstable conditions that allowed for a more authoritarian party like Georgian Dream to ascend to power. It is paramount that these mistakes are not compounded further in Georgia, pushing it even further away, but also that they are not repeated in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Lessons
Ukraine has to date suffered hundreds of thousands of civilian and military casualties, countless war crimes, billions of dollars worth of damage, and attempts at eradication of nationhood. This ensures that there is little to no prospect of a politician succeeding by parroting even the equivocal takes of Georgian Dream vis-à-vis Russia. As with Tbilisi, the threat is not that a future Ukrainian government chooses to align with Moscow outright, but rather that Kyiv sees an unwilling and insufficiently assistive NATO and EU, with consequent democratic backsliding that enables the rise of forces more aligned with the illiberal political worldview of Orbán, Erdoğan, and Putin.
Ukraine and Georgia’s accession into NATO and the EU would be difficult today even without Russia’s wars. A certain degree of ‘expansion fatigue’ has afflicted European nations, whilst both countries have particular issues beyond their democratic credentials that would create all manner of difficult (but not insurmountable) political headaches: Ukrainian agriculture in the case of the EU, and Georgia’s poorly equipped and outdated armed forces in the case of NATO. However, Russia’s ongoing threat makes the situation all the more urgent, requiring a realistic but detailed timeline and plan that offers hope and incentive for societal reform, with the ultimate prize of eventual acceptance into Euro-Atlantic structures. If Georgia’s recent backsliding shows the consequences of not doing so, how can meaningful hope of accession be used as an incentive for improvement, whilst not undermining key standards and requirements around basic democratic and security tenets? There are different points of contention being raised by various existing members to act as a contemporary block on accession, but these can be overcome by political will and interpretation, firm messaging on conditionality, and deft statesmanship.
NATO Necessity
With NATO, it is not, or at least should not be, the insufficiently democratic nature of these countries’ societies that prevents accession. Ever since NATO’s foundation in 1949, it has had a history of welcoming less than fully democratic member states: founding member Portugal was a dictatorship until the 1970s, whilst Türkiye has undergone three coups d’état (and one “postmodern” coup”) since joining in 1952. The increasingly autocratic nature of Erdoğan’s rule means that the country scores even lower on the Economist Democracy Index today than both Georgia and Ukraine.[51] Given that NATO and its members’ leaders have consistently championed the generally democratic nature of these countries, satisfying such criteria should not be something that existing members should be overly exercised about. Justifying NATO’s reluctance to offer membership by the basis of insufficient democracy would only serve to further alienate Ukrainian democratization efforts. Militarily, Ukraine has also demonstrated its capabilities in defending itself against Russia. That should go a long way to reassuring Member States about Ukraine’s capability to align with the preexisting NATO standards, as well as its fighting capabilities and overall ability to contribute militarily to the alliance, and not act as a drain on collective resources.
Liberation of Vysokopillia (Kherson region of Ukraine) by the Ukrainian Army, September 27, 2022. Photo: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine/Wikimedia Commons. No changes were made. View license here.
It is instead the strategic complexities of Russian occupation and active hostilities that are primarily driving reluctance by some NATO members to expedite the membership application process to welcome a warring country. Following the 2023 summit in Vilnius, the leaders’ communiqué ultimately reflected those fears, prompting President Zelenskyy to note that there was “no readiness” by members to invite Ukraine to join, or indeed to offer a timeframe.[52]There have been suggestions that, short of NATO membership, Ukraine should be offered a series of bilateral security guarantees, or be sufficiently armed to act as a ‘porcupine’ that would make it militarily impossible for Russia to ingest.[53] But the Ukrainians, and several other Central and Eastern European states, have made it clear that only NATO membership would guarantee meaningful security.[54] Recent bilateral agreements, such as that between the UK and Ukraine, are helpful but insufficient to deter Russia or change the nature of the current war.[55] Of course, there is a strategic need to consider how any actions may be perceived by Russia, as well as the need to safeguard against further escalation. This should, however, not come at the expense of Ukraine’s wishes for closer Euro-Atlantic integration. Failure to progress membership talks will ultimately harm not only wider security in the region, but also Ukraine’s chances of successfully emerging as an independent country, let alone as a thriving democratic society.
The West German Model
The conventional standpoint is that states cannot join when they are either in conflict or have active territorial disputes, for fear of other members being dragged into war. Doing so, however, overlooks a long history of creative ambiguity, best exemplified by the ‘West German model’. Six years after its and NATO’s foundation, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was admitted into the Western security alliance. This provoked much consternation in Moscow, but little by way of practical action. With allied forces stationed in West Germany, the Soviet Union could not militarily prevent accession without risking a wider conflict. West Germany always maintained territorial claims over both ‘Germanies’; even so, the decision to create the Federal Republic, sans control of claimed eastern territories, integrate into NATO and co-found the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) meant that hopes of German reunification were, by accepting the de facto reality of Moscow-aligned rule in the East, dashed in the short- to medium-term. It was a conscious choice by West Germany’s first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, to ‘sacrifice’ hopes of a unified Germany and instead consolidate and guarantee West German democracy, security, and prosperity with the eventual goal of reunification.[56]
A similar model has been suggested for Georgia.[57] It has never given up its territorial claims to Abkhazia and South Ossetia but, like 1950s West Germany, is not in a position to militarily force the issue; more to the point, NATO members were not willing to provide sufficient support to do so.[58] In this scenario, there must be an acceptance, if not official diplomatic recognition, of the facts on the ground – and it must not be used as an excuse by Western powers to prevaricate on NATO membership. In 2019, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held that if NATO accepted Georgian membership that only extended as far as its controlled territory, then Russia “will not start a war.” [59] He added that it would “undermine our relations with NATO” but of course the entire raison d’être of NATO is to navigate relations with a prickly Russia.
This model could equally be applicable to Ukraine. That is complicated by ongoing conflict and the fact that, unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia’s territorial ambitions are ambiguous. According to Moscow’s sham referenda in September 2022, the four provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia are all now officially part of the Russian Federation, despite the fact that the cities of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are controlled by Ukraine. Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations being invoked to justify the ‘special military operation’ also leads to some nerves in Western capitals about embracing Ukraine too closely. Unlike Georgia, Putin’s warped history views Russians and Ukrainians as ‘brotherly people’, and he fears a free, democratic Ukraine acting as an inspiration for those in Russian society desiring such an outcome.[60]
When the war ends, Ukraine will need security guarantees. “Russia already sees Ukraine as a ‘de facto’ NATO member” anyway, according to Kennedy School fellow Kevin Ryan, and a post-war scenario short of NATO guarantees will not create the stability for economic growth and democratic development.[61] Insufficient security guarantees short of NATO membership harms the very functioning of Ukrainian society. In a state of perpetual tension with its Eastern neighbour and frozen out of the West, it may succumb to populist forces with an authoritarian bent similar to the Georgian Dream. War conditions have necessitated a temporary diminution of democratic rights, and a war-weary society could be susceptible to anti-democratic forces.
Reaching for the Stars
Regarding the EU, there has been some progress made, and indications are present that Brussels has learned lessons. It upgraded Ukraine to an official candidate, and, in December 2023, the European Council agreed to open accession negotiations. This was only ratified thanks to the creative art of negotiations that saw Hungary’s Viktor Orbán leave the room for ‘coffee’ during the unanimity-requiring vote.[62] That does, however, reflect the strength of feeling from the rest of the European leaders and the lengths they are now willing to go to in order to draw Ukraine in closer. Yet, the Orbán challenge remains a thorn that Ukraine and the rest of the EU will have to face up to in the coming years, as well as an indication of the risks for the EU if it is to lapse.
The EU has two main issues to overcome: the first will be to navigate complaints from members unrelated to Ukrainian democracy about the country’s potential accession. Hungary is not the only member whose concerns need assuaging, but issues around agriculture, economic disparities and subsequent financial support, and migration are not insurmountable. Nonetheless, it is Orbán’s deeply held opposition to Ukraine that poses the greatest challenge: he called Ukraine “one of the most corrupt countries in the world” (despite Hungary’s own corruption problem), referred to Russia’s invasion in Putinesque terms as a ‘military operation’, and consistently raises ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine and supposed marginalization as points of contention.[63] Whilst acquiescing in December 2023, Orbán called the decision “completely senseless, irrational and wrong” and has threatened to veto further advancements in the coming years.[64] To prove this is no idle threat, he blocked €50 billion in funding the next day. The EU, to its credit, has begun looking at workarounds to the Hungarian blockage, including a €20 billion package that would circumvent its own rules on unanimity.[65] The EU must make full use of its legal powers, the weight of the majority of its members, official and unofficial channels, and more of the creative thinking that has been deployed in recent years to safeguard legitimate Ukrainian membership aspirations.
The second is providing enough realistic incentive to accentuate democratic progress. This means that the process cannot be lapse, and in doing so acquiesce to institutional and societal set-ups that would allow for democratic backsliding in the future. The trouble that Hungary consistently causes the EU has heightened sensitivities around the risk of democratic backsliding of new members. Nor, however, should the admissions process be so overwhelmingly rigorous and legalistically onerous as to make Ukraine’s entry impossible. There is a middle ground in which negotiations give the EU more leverage over domestic reform, but this will only be the case if it is willing to use the full weight of its bargaining position, whilst never wavering from its goal of accession, stressing the goal of domestic democratic consolidation being undertaken as a partnership. There is also the option of unlocking the benefits of EU membership in a piecemeal manner, with closer cooperation granted in stages on condition of democratic improvements. These would show the benefits of progressing democratization and EU association, minimizing the risks of derailment through bundling all the benefits as a binary ‘in/out’ package, but also providing leverage to rescind certain benefits in response to any backsliding.
Euro-Atlantic aspirations have not yet perished
The aforementioned options are merely hypotheticals as to how the current internal obstacles to NATO and EU enlargement can be overcome. What matters more in the short term for Ukrainian democracy is the indication from the EU and NATO that consolidated democratization efforts will be rewarded through the genuine prospect of eventual membership. The price of failure to square this tricky situation, where members have concerns about being dragged into a wider conflict with Russia via the admittance of another less-than-fully democratic member, means that Ukraine’s aspirations could be denied indefinitely. That could drive political elites into a more ‘Georgian’ mindset (in the realm of contemporary political elites, at least), one of dual tolerance of Russia’s active presence in the neighbourhood and increasing authoritarianism.
Unless there is a drastic deterioration on the battlefield, Ukraine will not slide into some form of vassal state. buses, occupation, physical and psychological damage means such an outcome cannot eventuate. Instead, the risk from NATO and the EU’s failure to make progress on Ukrainian membership aspiration comes in the form of some local version of Orbánization or Erdoğan-like rule. By definition, authoritarian-nationalist rulers have very little time for warm ties with other states, but the nature of such regimes inevitably links their thinking closer to that of Moscow and Budapest than Brussels and Washington. Under such a government, the West risks ‘losing’ these countries geopolitically but also abandoning the civil society reformers, democratic advocates, and Euro-Atlanticist aspirations. Throwing these populations under the bus of realpolitik would be a contradiction of the supposedly universalist nature of Western democratic values being fought for, undermining the intellectual foundations of Euro-Atlantic solidarity.
Where next?
In May 2023, NATO Secretary General Jen Stoltenberg held that “It is important that Georgia lives up to the democratic values we all believe in.”[66] Following the Vilnius summit a few months later, the joint communiqué said Member States would only “extend an invitation to Ukraine” when certain “democratic and security sector reforms” were complete.[67] If these statements are anything to go by, it appears that NATO’s prevarication is once again repeating the mistakes of yesteryear, by affording Russia a strategic opportunity to expose lukewarm Western security guarantees and further destabilize societies in its ‘sphere of interest’.
Finding the balancing act will not be easy; Georgia shows the pitfalls of delaying talks without a timeframe, but its subsequent experience with demagoguery, along with Hungary and Türkiye, demonstrates the need to maintain rigorous accession standards. With Ukraine, conditionality and its security predicament provide the groundwork to incentivize domestic reforms, but also shows the importance of not making accession burdens too high. Change must be domestically led and voluntary in nature, particularly if long-term security and prosperity guarantees involve some form of ‘West German’ trade-off. Whilst this is often seen as handing Putin a victory by in effect recognising his de facto hold of Ukrainian territory, with the right conditions and messaging, it could also be portrayed as a victory. With a genuine desire to bring a democratic Ukraine and Georgia into the fold, it would represent the Euro-Atlantic collective belatedly learning from its past missteps to help preserve sovereignty and democracy.
Georgia has undergone significantly more democratic backsliding than Ukraine has in recent years, and in doing so offers a cautionary tale for Ukraine (or rather, for NATO and the EU regarding Ukraine’s membership). But that is not to say that Georgia is a lost cause. Slow to non-existent advances in accession talks have allowed the conditions for more authoritarian actors to dominate politics, but also show what can be done to remedy anti-democratic forces. This does not mean extending a blank cheque that guarantees membership regardless of the state of democracy, but rather that conditionality should be selectively deployed to ensure genuine progress on democracy is aligned with progress on membership talks. Just as Ukraine can avoid such a fate through a change in course, so too Georgia can be brought back on the Euro-Atlantic path.
Among all of the geopolitical ramifications and analysis, the internal changes in Ukrainian and Georgian societies in this era of ‘high politics’ and the manner in which foreign policy has interacted with these evolutions have often been overlooked. Democratization is its own reward, and there is no shortage of citizens seeking to advance it. Amidst ongoing external and domestic threats, domestic development needs support and the incentive for cross-political and country-wide cooperation to ensure its survival. The EU and NATO must realize that, for all the warm words and cooperation programmes, it is only the real, tangible prospect of membership that can sufficiently spark and eventuate such reform at all levels required. Failure to do so out of misguided strategic security concerns or an unrealistically strict approach to democratic progress risks making the perfect the enemy of the good. It could end up turning away those countries that have the potential to become fully fledged Euro-Atlantic states, thus making them vulnerable to Russian interference, illiberal backsliding, and the prospect of territorial losses.
Endnotes:
[1] NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.
[2] Ariel Cohen and Kevin DeCorla-Souza, “Security Issues and US Interests in the South Caucasus 2021,” The South Caucasus 2021: Oil, Democracy and Geopolitics, ed. Fariz Ismailzade and Glen E Howard (Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2021).
[3] Andrew Gray, “Bucharest declaration: NATO’s Ukraine debate still haunted by 2008 summit,” Reuters, 10 July 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/natos-ukraine-debate-still-haunted-by-bucharest-pledge-2023-07-10/.
[4] Carole Cadwalladr, “Putin has already deployed a chemical weapon. In Salisbury,” The Guardian, 13 March 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/mar/13/putin-has-already-deployed-a-chemical-weapon-in-salisbury; Miranda Bryant, “Estonia accuses Russia of weaponizing immigration at Europe’s borders,” The Guardian, 23 November 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/23/estonia-accuses-russia-weaponising-immigration-europe-borders; Jarno Limmell, “Russian cyber activities in the EU,” in Hacks, Leaks and Disruptions: Russian Cyber Strategies, ed. Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2018): 66.
[5] Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Spoiler or facilitator of democratization? Russia’s role in Georgia and Ukraine,” Democratization 22, no. 3 (2015): 470.
[6] Lasha Markozashvili, “Transition toward democracy – Georgian problems,” Przegląd Politologiczny 3, no. 3 (2014): 190.
[7] Artur Amirov, “Conceptualization of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Choice as a Marker of Democratization,” Scientific Journal of Polonia University 55, no 2 (2023): 129.
[8] Economist Intelligence Unit, Frontline democracy and the battle for Ukraine (Economist Intelligence Unit: London): 9.
[9] Geoffrey Pridham, The Dynamics of Democratization (New York: Continuum, 2000).
[10] Paul D’Anieri, Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War (University of Cambridge Press, 2019): 12; Cory Welt, Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023), R45307.pdf (fas.org): 16.
[11] Uwe Halbach, “The Southern Caucasus’ Integration with NATO and the EU: Current Developments and Future Perspectives,” in The South Caucasus 2021: Oil, Democracy and Geopolitics, ed. Fariz Ismailzade and Glen E Howard (Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2021), 307; Serhii Plokhy, “The Quest for Europe,” The Frontline: Essays on Ukraine’s Past and Present, ed. Serhii Plokhy (Harvard University Press, 2021), 322.
[12] Lincoln A Mitchell, “Democracy in Georgia Since the Rose Revolution,” East European Democratization 50, no 4 (2006): 670; Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and democratization in Ukraine,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38, no 2 (2005): 284.
[13] Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or facilitator,” 459.
[14] Halbach, “Southern Caucasus’ Integration,” 296.
[15] Hanna Hopko, “Ukrainian democracy in action: Why a successful strategy to counter authoritarianism includes Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO,” New Eastern Europe 50, no 1 (2022): 27.
[16] Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or facilitator,” 466.
[17] Jamie Dettmer, “Putin: No More Color Revolutions,” VOA News, 10 January 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/putin-no-more-color-revolutions/6390636.html.
[18] Peter Wilkin, Hungary’s Crisis of Democracy: The Road to Serfdom (London: Lexington Books, 2016), 166.
[19] Kubicek, “The European Union,” 270.
[20] Steven Pifer, “Ukraine Looks West: European Mediators and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Problems of Post-Communism 54 no 6 (2007), 37-38.
[21] Kubicek, “The European Union,” 280.
[22] Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or facilitator,” 463-466.
[23] Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or facilitator,” 465.
[24] Plokhy, “Quest for Europe,” 313.
[25] Max Hunder, “Record 83% of Ukrainians want NATO membership – poll,” Reuters, 3 October 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/record-83-ukrainians-want-nato-membership-poll-2022-10-03/
[26] Economist Intelligence Unit, Frontline democracy, 15.
[27] Alexander J Motyl, “Ukraine’s Democracy Is (Almost) All Grown Up,” Foreign Policy, 28 August 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/28/ukraines-democracy-is-almost-all-grown-up/.
[28] Margaryta Khvostova, “Resist and reform: Ukraine’s democracy after a year of war.” ECFR, 8 March 2023, https://ecfr.eu/article/resist-and-reform-ukraines-democracy-after-a-year-of-war/.
[29] Tom Watling, “Ukraine-Russia war: Zelensky is turning into an autocrat, says Kyiv mayor Klitschko.” The Independent, 5 December 2023. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-war-russia-zelensky-klitschko-b2458171.html; Alexsander Palikot, “Wartime TV in Ukraine: Much-Needed Unity Or A ‘Marathon Of Propaganda’?” Radio Free Europe, 23 July 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-telemarathon-media-zelenskiy-propaganda-russia-invasion/32515429.html.
[30] European Commission, Key findings of the 2023 report on Ukraine, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_5631.
[31] “Constitution of Georgia,” Legislative Herald of Georgia, accessed 30 December 2023, CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA | სსიპ ”საქართველოს საკანონმდებლო მაცნე” (matsne.gov.ge).
[32] Economist Intelligence Unit, Frontline democracy, 14.
[33] Mitchell, “Democracy in Georgia,” 670-673.
[34] Felix Light, David Chkhikvishvili, Ben Taverner, and Vladimir Soldatkin, “Georgians throw bombs, petrol bombs at police in protest over new law,” Reuters, 7 March 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/parliament-georgia-gives-initial-approval-foreign-agents-law-2023-03-07/.
[35] RFE/RL’s Georgian Service, “Thousands Clash With Police In Georgia After Parliament Oks First Reading Of ‘Foreign Agent’ Law,” Radio Free Europe, 7 March 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-ngos-reject-foreign-agent-law/32307031.html; Liana Fix and Caroline Kapp, “The Dangers of Democratic Backsliding in Georgia,” Council on Foreign Relations, 21 June 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/dangers-democratic-backsliding-georgia.
[36] Dato Parulava, “Georgia appoints critic of the West as PM,” Politico, 9 February 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-appoints-critic-of-west-as-pm/.
[37] Rayhan Demytrie, Paul Brown, and Joshua Cheetham, “Russia’s new Black Sea naval base alarms Georgia,” BBC, 12 December 2023, Russia’s new Black Sea naval base alarms Georgia (bbc.com).
[38] Dato Parulava, “Georgia appoints,” Politico.
[39] Tata Shoshiashvili, “Georgian Dream ramps up homophobic rhetoric as Pride Week approaches,” OC Media, 27 June 2023, https://oc-media.org/features/georgian-dream-ramps-up-homophobic-rhetoric-as-pride-week-approaches; Thomas De Waal, “Orbanizing of Georgia,” Carnegie Europe, 31 August 2023, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/90465.
[40] Eka Janashia, “Georgia Endorses Anti-Discrimination Law,” The Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 21 May 2014, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12978-georgia-endorses-anti-discrimination-law.html.
[41] European Commission, Association Agreement, 2023, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/glossary/association-agreement_en/.
[42] Erwan Fouéré, “Macron’s ‘Non’ to EU Enlargement,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 22 October 2019, https://www.ceps.eu/macrons-non-to-eu-enlargement/.
[43] Maria Katamadze, “What happened with Georgia’s NATO ambitions?” Deutsche Welle (DW), 7 December 2023, https:www.dw.com/en/what-happened-with-georgias-nato-ambitions/a-66190054.
[44] Anna Kuchenbecker, “The geopolitical tightrope,” European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 24 October 2023, https://ecfr.eu/article/the-geopolitical-tightrope-balancing-georgias-eu-candidacy/.
[45] Caleb Davis, “Georgia to resume flights to Russia this week, drawing EU and Ukrainian criticism,” Reuters, 19 May 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/georgian-airways-resume-direct-flights-russia-may-20-2023-05-16/.
[46] Agenda, “Ruling party official: authorities will prevent “dragging country into war no matter what”,” Agenda, 2 March 2023, https://agenda.ge/en/news/2023/876.
[47] Mitchell, “Democracy in Georgia,” 673; Markozashvili, “Transition toward democracy,” 190.
[48] Alexander Atasuntsev, “Is Georgia’s Ruling Party Really Pro-Russian?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 May 2023, Is Georgia’s Ruling Party Really Pro-Russian? – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[49] Gabriel Gavin, “NATO aspirant country blames NATO for Russia’s war on Ukraine,” Politico, 30 May 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-blame-nato-russia-war-ukraine/.
[50] NDI, “Georgia March Opinion Poll,” accessed December 30, 2023, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Georgia_March%202023%20telephone%20poll_Eng_PUBLIC%20VERSION_FINAL_03.05%20%281%29.pdf.
[51] Economist Intelligence Unit, Frontline democracy, 14-15.
[52] Volodymyr Zelensky (@ZelenskyyUA), “We value our allies,” on Twitter, 11 July 2023, https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1678707674811187200?lang=en; “Zelenskiy fails in effort to secure invitation to join Nato at Vilnius summit,” The Guardian, 11 July 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/11/zelenskiy-accuses-nato-of-lack-of-respect-over-ukraine-membership.
[53] Mike Eckel, “Consider The Porcupine: Western Officials Struggle To Find A New Security Model For Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe, 26 May 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-porcupine-model-nato-membership-russia-invasion/32429441.html.
[54] Dan Sabbagh, “Zelenskiy fails in effort to secure invitation to join Nato at Vilnius summit,” The Guardian, 11 July 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/11/zelenskiy-accuses-nato-of-lack-of-respect-over-ukraine-membership.
[55] Vladyslav Kudryk, “Ukrainians criticize historic UK security agreement as weak, but encouraging,” Kyiv Independent, 18 January 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainians-criticize-uk-security-deal/.
[56] Jost Dülffer, “No more Potsdam! Konrad Adenauer’s Nightmare and the Basis of his International Orientation,” German Politics and Society82, no 25:2 (2007).
[57] Ben Hodges, “Hodges: accession of West Germany into NATO is a precedent for Georgia,” interview by Ia Meurmishvili, Voice of America(accessed on Civil Georgia), 13 February 2019, www.civil.ge/archives/276491
[58] Cohen and DeCorla-Souza, “Security Issues,” 189.
[59] Sergei Lavrov, “We will not start a war, I promise you,” interview by Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Chernenko, Kommersant, 25 September 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4103946.
[60] Michael John Williams, “Putin’s fear of democracy convinced him to invade Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, 6 March 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-putins-fear-of-democracy-convinced-him-to-invade-ukraine/.
[61] Eckel, “Consider The Porcupine”.
[62] Virginie Malingre, “Olaf Scholz’s successful coffee break strategy with Viktor Orban,” Le Monde, 20 December 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/12/20/olaf-scholz-s-successful-coffee-break-strategy-with-viktor-orban_6359543_4.html.
[63] Nicolas Camut, “Hungary seen as most corrupt country in the EU, study finds,” Politico, 31 January 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-orban-corruption-transparency-international/; Shaun Walker, “Ukraine’s Hungarians in spotlight as Orbán threatens to block EU accession,” The Guardian, 8 December 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/08/ukraines-hungarians-in-spotlight-as-orban-threatens-to-block-eu-accession/.
[64] Sofia Bettiza, “Orban: Is one man blackmailing the EU?” BBC News, 16 December 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67735680.
[65] Paola Tamma and Henry Foy, “Union readies $32 billion plan B to fund Ukraine,” Australian Financial Review, 27 December 2023,https://www.afr.com/world/europe/eu-readies-32b-plan-b-to-fund-ukraine-20231227-p5etwm.
[66] Jens Stoltenberg, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in a conversation on “The Road to Vilnius” at the Brussels Forum organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States,” interview by Helene Cooper, NATO, 24 May 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/214799.htm?selectedLocale=en
[67] Sabbagh, “Zelensky fails.”
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