By Michaela Nudo
Content Warning: Sexual Assualt
Abstract
The following paper seeks to review and analyze the treatment of displaced people, specifically refugees, in Greece, throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes COVID-19 safety measures, lockdown restrictions, and vaccination programs. I subsequently discuss specific challenges and barriers to successful safety and vaccination measures for vulnerable populations. Here, I have found that weak bureaucracy and soft policies, extended lockdowns, unsafe conditions in camps, linguistic barriers, xenophobia, and mistrust, all negatively impacted COVID-19 prevention and vaccination efforts amongst refugees. I believe the findings of this inquiry support the claim that refugees were unjustly treated since the beginning of the pandemic, and that this treatment continues to endanger vaccination efforts and unvaccinated refugees.
Contributions for this essay include field research and interviews conducted May 2022 in Athens.
Introduction
In July 2020, while tourists could once again visit the Greek islands, refugees remained under lockdowns in camps. Months later, this would be just one of the many problematic details of Greece’s COVID-19 response regarding refugees. While the Greek government was often described as efficient during the first wave of the pandemic, as the pandemic progressed, the once admirable response began to crumble. Written over two years after the first confirmed COVID-19 case in Greece, this article seeks to understand the implications of the relationship between the government, NGOs, and refugees from the first wave of the pandemic, the following outbreaks, and the vaccination rollout. I begin this inquiry by first analyzing the general COVID-19 response in Greece, later noting overall successes and failures. Following the general discourse, I aim to explain Greece’s response to COVID-19 as it impacted refugees. Subsequently, I discuss specific challenges and barriers to successful safety and vaccination measures for vulnerable populations. Here, I have found that weak bureaucracy and soft policies, extended lockdowns, unsafe conditions in camps, linguistic barriers, xenophobia, and mistrust, all negatively impacted COVID-19 prevention and vaccination efforts among refugees. I believe the findings of this inquiry support the claim that refugees were unjustly treated since the beginning of the pandemic, and that this treatment continues to endanger vaccination efforts and unvaccinated refugees.
Monastiraki Square during the Covid-19 pandemic, 2020. Photo: George E. Koronaios/Wikimedia Commons. No changes were made. View license here
To support statements made in this paper, I have utilized primary documents, academic literature, local and international news sources, and had the opportunity to conduct interviews with various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Athens between May 3rd and May 8th, 2022. For this paper, the names of interviewees have been concealed to protect their identities, given the sensitive nature of working with vulnerable populations. Throughout this paper, I will use the term refugees and vulnerable populations, the latter more broadly referring to at-risk individuals which do not wholly fall under the categorization of refugees such as some undocumented or Roma people. For a visual aid, please review Appendix A for a map of Greece’s refugee camps. Moreover, I will dedicate a brief disclaimer contribution at the end of this paper acknowledging any areas and external factors which may affect the results of this study.
Part One: Greece and COVID-19
The pandemic has tested and challenged governments around the world, and Greece has been no exception as it was already susceptible to cleavages as a result of the ongoing crisis the country has experienced since the financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, multiple factors impacting Greece’s COVID-19 response connect to how the country has handled the financial crisis, refugee crisis, and now the pandemic. In this part of the paper, I begin with Greece’s COVID-19 response, then discuss the later pandemic and vaccination, and complete this segment with the most recent COVID-19 statistics for Greece.
The weak public healthcare system in Greece, because of the financial uncertainty of the previous decade, was not ready for the pandemic. Heath spending represented a mere 7.8 percent of the gross domestic product in Greece and the country only had about 6 intensive care unit (ICU) beds per 100,000 people.1 This was 47.8 percent less than the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average.2 When the pandemic reached Greece it was announced by the Ministry of Health that a mere 120 ICU beds would be dedicated to COVID-19 patients.3 While the infrastructure was anything but prepared, the Greek government introduced social distancing measures in time to limit the outbreak of COVID-19 in the early stages of the pandemic.4 Greece’s first case occurred on February 26th, 2020 and, by March 3rd, the country announced a state of emergency.5 Moreover, one day after the first case, all large events were cancelled and other attractions were limited.6 To demonstrate this approach on a comparative scale, please note fig.1 from Takis Pappas:7
Fig. 1: Timing of nationwide response measures to COVID-19 in Italy, Spain, and Greece, “The politics of pandemic prevention in Spain and Greece.” Photo courtesy of https://pappaspopulism.com/coronavirus-spain-and-greece/
Similar to Greece’s approach to large events after the first confirmed COVID case, following the first confirmed COVID death, the country was very quick to launch other closures, and eventually a lockdown. Kousi et al. compares Spain and Italy due to their similarities to Greece and their shared financial weakness compared to other European Union (EU) member states, though it is worth noting that COVID-19 broke out in Italy almost a month before it did in Greece. Nonetheless, further into the first wave of the pandemic, Greece continued to contain the spread and deaths linked to COVID-19. By June 2020, Greece only had 8 COVID-19 deaths for every million people, whereas Spain had 326, Italy had 302, France had 167, and Germany had 28.8
The Greek government’s response during the beginning of the pandemic was well received, although the government’s strict lockdown posed significant health detriments. After the first lockdown, it was discovered that the mental health status of university students faced increased anxiety levels by more than 45 percent, depressive feelings by 40 percent, and increased suicidal thoughts by 10.4 percent.9 When researching the causes for the high increase in negative mental health trends, Konstantinos N. Fountoulakis et al. found over half of the students acknowledged some level of non-bizarre conspiracy regarding COVID-19 created distress.10 Overall, Fountoulakis et al, found beliefs in conspiracy theories to be very prevalent in Greece.11 Additionally, front-line workers were susceptible to intrusive mental health stressors. Sofia Pappa et al. discovered that there was a high link between the pandemic and a rise in depression, anxiety, traumatic stress, and burnout in Greece. During this time, vulnerability deeply impacted the morale of front-line workers.12 While Greece’s strict lockdowns mitigated the overall death toll of COVID-19, one must understand the vulnerabilities presented during this period.
Cumulatively, despite early success, Greece has had 3,442,963 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 29,784 deaths.13 Both cases and deaths peaked in January 2022, representing a high of nearly 36,000 daily cases and 107 deaths.14 By May 2022, the Greek government, and other public health aids, have administered 21,043,225 doses of COVID-19 vaccines. This represents 7,624,443 fully vaccinated individuals, or roughly 73.15% of the population.15 The highest level of vaccination against COVID-19 is found in the Greek islands Mykonos and Santorini, followed by North Athens, while the lowest levels of vaccination occurred in East and West Attica.16
From interviews conducted in participation with this paper in May 2022, all interviewees expressed dissatisfaction when asked if Greece adequately reacted and responded to the pandemic. Although, notably, the Greek Council for Refugees explained that due to the limited capacity of the public health system, the general population must be content with what was done.17 A HAIS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society) and Melissa Network lawyer explained that the implementation of strict lockdowns enabled the state to rely on individual responsibility for modernizing emergency response policy.18 Throughout the interviews, the issue of poor bureaucratic procedures in Greece was frequently brought into question.
Part Two: COVID-19 and Refugees in Greece
While grappling with COVID-19 was difficult globally, Greece’s relationship with refugees since the 2015 crisis increased challenges across COVID-19 response plans. Globally, whether displacement is climate-change based or sociopolitical, refugees are already exposed to challenging living conditions and face risks of deportation, physical and mental health challenges, and great uncertainty with their future. This is often paralleled with administrative, financial, and linguistic barriers.19 This was no exception for refugees in Greece, especially in secluded Greek refugee camps. Refugees in Greece faced various structural inequalities such as barriers to accessing healthcare and legal exclusions from European health systems, coupled with high levels of poverty and depression.20 As a result, refugees can be considered adverse to the health system as a result of fear and mistrust towards authorities.21 Moreover, Elias Kondilis et al. believes that pre-existing xenophobia would only be heightened under circumstances of a viral outbreak.22 In Greece, there are 32 open camps and 26,000 accommodation spaces provided by the United Nations Refugee Agency.23 During the second wave of the pandemic, there were an estimated 120,000 refugees in Greece. 67 percent of this refugee population consisted of women and children from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. On island camps, this percentage fell to 49 percent with the addition of more adults and refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia.24 Ultimately, it would be no surprise that refugees in reception centres and camps faced a higher likelihood of contracting COVID-19 due to the difficult living conditions and overcrowding.25
Inhabitants of Suda refugee camp at one of its alleys, Chios, Grece, Aegean Sea. 29 September, 2016. Photo: Mstyslav Chernov/Wikimedia Commons. No edits were made. View license here
By April 2020, the European Union had pledged 350 million euros to support refugees across Europe, Greece encompassing a large portion of this population.26 Moreover, the region of the North Aegean islands decided to create health facilities outside every camp to divert crowding in general hospitals.27 This practice was set to control the spread of COVID-19 within and between camps and outside towns, while also supporting access to health care for non-COVID matters.28 Furthermore, the International Organization for Migration assisted the movement of 2000 high-risk refugees from camps to the hotels and other accommodations on the mainland.29 For refugees who resided in camps on the North Aegean islands, such as Lesvos, a lockdown was in place until August 31st, 2020, while schools and international tourism had already reopened on the same islands since June 15th.30 Additionally, to try to combat movement in and out of the camps, refugees were subject to a 150 euro fine for “unnecessary travel,” even if the movement was necessary to attain legal assistance.31
As a result of extensive lockdown measures, the relationship between the Greek government and refugees quickly became increasingly fragile. Between February and June 2020, three outbreaks occurred in refugee camps. During all three COVID-19 outbreaks in camps, the rate of COVID-19 cases in Greece was declining.32 Despite testing sites being created within the camps, all three outbreaks were discovered when individuals tested positive outside of camps in sites such as local hospitals, and not part of government routine testing in camps.33 During the second wave of the pandemic, there were a total of 22 COVID-19 outbreaks detected in refugee camps across Greece.34 The largest outbreak occurred in the Kara Tepe camp on Lesvos in September 2020, although the final number of cases was not disclosed.35 Between the first and second wave of the pandemic, 1106 cases of COVID-19 were confirmed in reception facilities.36 At 2052 cases for every 100,000 people, refugees residing in camps were more likely to contact COVID-19 than refugees residing on mainland Greece. At its height, refugees on island camps were 28 times more likely to have COVID-19 than the general population.37 Over a nine-month period, this number changed to be roughly 2.5 to 3 times more likely than the general population.38 Unfortunately, there are not large amounts of accessible data on the later pandemic and refugees, and currently, Greece’s vaccination rates are not calculated for vulnerable populations, specifically.
Part Three: Findings
Understanding the implications of the Greek COVID-19 response requires a deeper investigation into various critical characteristics and implications of the pandemic. This segment of this paper will discuss the weak bureaucracy and soft policies in Greece, extended lockdowns, unsafe conditions in camps, linguistic barriers, xenophobia, mistrust, and vaccination efforts amongst refugees. The specific subpoints are supported and were inspired by testimonials of interviewees from Greek NGOs in Athens in May 2022.
Poor Bureaucracy and Soft Policies
Throughout my interviews, poor bureaucracy and soft policies continued to be a critical issue for refugees during the pandemic. During a discussion with a Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) representative that is also a member of the European Commission, the representative noted that Greece’s government is unique for many reasons. In our discussion on the ongoing crisis of the last decade, the GCR representative also brought up something tied to Greek thinking and language itself. In Greece, actions are a matter of “policy and politics,” which in Greek share the same word.39 Unlike other political systems, this mixture of policy and politics creates a challenging differentiation when it comes to modernization and specialized responses. Arguably, intersectional and collaborative policy challenges Greek institutions and reinforces lengthy bureaucracy as a result.40 Without change, the structure struggled to properly analyze COVID-19 restrictions. This did not go unnoticed by scholars studying the pandemic in Greece. During outbreaks in refugee camps, all outbreaks were discovered accidentally and late. Arguably, this has become an issue due to jurisdictional issues within camps, as camps are overseen by the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, and the Ministry of Health did not play a primary role in refugee health during the pandemic.41 A lack of understanding of the pandemic and stigmatization quickly paved the way for prolonged lockdowns in place of health-based approaches to care in refugee camps.42
Regarding soft laws, Evangelia Tsourdi and Niovi Vavoula question the means and the implications of Greek policy during the pandemic. Tsourdi and Vavoula discovered that the Greek constitution does not provide for a state of emergency and instead implemented/passed an “act of legislative content” (πράξη νομοθετικού περιεχομένου).43 Under the “act of legislative content,” the President of the Republic, upon the proposal of the Cabinet, deliberates and issues said content. During the pandemic, acts were used when adopting general measures.44 These guidelines created under the constitution enabled soft law.45 During this time, stay-at-home measures were introduced on April 6th, 2020, and later removed on May 4th, 2020.46 By March 21st, 2020, the same measure was used to create restrictions against freedom of movement. This measure stated that movement could only be granted between 7 am and 7 pm for the most basic needs, and faced continual renewal for roughly four months.47 By May 28th, 2020, the Greek NGO HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society) was finally able to intervene, requesting a credible rationale for the strict lockdown imposed on refugees.48 As a result, the European Commission, Members of the European Parliament, various civic organizations, and the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency, called for a mass evacuation of camps which had become hotspots during lockdowns.49 Nonetheless, the Greek government and the EU failed to implement a mass evacuation of these camps.50 Consequently, these soft policies enabled violations of international human rights law regarding freedom of movement.51 Additionally, while the general population enjoyed contact tracing technology, the Greek authorities did not establish inclusive or effective testing and tracing systems for refugees.52
While poor bureaucracy and soft policy cannot be solely to blame for failures within Greece’s policy, it is undeniably a reoccurring component of the barriers to success. Stronger intergovernmental relations and a shift in stakeholder relations would certainly deter COVID-19 cases and deaths among refugees. Moreover, while poor bureaucracy and soft policy greatly impacted refugees during the pandemic, it is also an ongoing issue in facilitating inclusive policies toward refugees in Greece more generally.
Lockdowns
As previously mentioned, both the general population and refugees experienced long lockdowns. Although, more so than the general population, vulnerable people endured many more challenges during the lockdowns. Not only were refugees subject to longer lockdowns, but these lockdowns were also stricter with the rationale of the public interest due to the overcrowding refugees are subject to in refugee camps, which were created to safeguard small populations for shorter periods of time.53 Moreover, they were enacted despite no positive COVID-19 cases until the mid-summer in some facilities, and the same type of lockdown was applied to more condensed island camps and various types of mainland facilities.54 Consequently, it was evident after the first wave that Greek authorities endangered refugees by increasing their risk of infection, while also failing to integrate vulnerable people into national/federal/general prevention and response plans.55 The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and World Health Organization (WHO) have all recognized these conditions in a joint statement explaining that refugee camps during the pandemic need to be uniquely planned for due to the many pre-existing vulnerabilities of these living conditions.56 Moreover, the joint statement re-instating the extended lockdown does not come as a justified decision based on public health, but rather traps refugees in precarious living conditions and enables the Greek state to exclude refugee children from their right to education, even after schools opened for the general population.57 On the mainland, refugees who were living in state-paid housing and receiving income support were endangered by the risk of homelessness. In May 2020, shortly before the middle of the first lockdown for refugees, roughly 10,000 refugees who had been granted asylum status living in state housing were given notices of eviction for June 1st and suspensions of their income assistance.58 This not only further endangered refugees in a period where they could be ticketed for leaving their homes, but also violated international protocol regarding protection against forced evictions.59
As a result of barriers to movement, and limited PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) in camps, refugees had to turn inwards to access and create solutions. This has subsequently further normalized practices of self- and community care in camps, and while this raises the living standards among refugees, it is not a suitable practice to replace government aid.60 For instance, the “Moria Corona Awareness Team” was created by refugees in the Moria camp to provide humanitarian aid within their camp. During the pandemic, the team set out to inform people about the virus and set up a facemask-making group, where over 50 refugees made and distributed free reusable facemasks.61 NGOs also invented a new way of delivering aid during the pandemic due to the lockdowns, and while some services were moved online, many vulnerable people did not have access to technology.62 NGOs were faced with the challenge of reinventing accessible means to facilities, technology, and information, while lockdowns disabled their ability to learn and find work. Although, if refugees did have access to technology, it was often shared by multiple members of a household and children risked losing access to their education.63
Nonetheless, one of the biggest issues with the lockdown was the marginalization and stigmatization of vulnerable people by the state. Similar to my discussion of poor bureaucracy, the implementation of long, alienating lockdowns worked to further intensify risks for refugees during the pandemic. The most critical concept to understand with the intersection of refugees and the pandemic in Greece is the intersection and multilateral way each element or barrier work together to endanger vulnerable people.
The Greek Refugee Camps
Before the pandemic, Greek refugee camps, especially the Moria camp in Lesvos, were very dangerous. Built to house 3,000 people for a short period during the peak of the migrant crisis, in 2020 Moria held more than 20,000 refugees at once.64 Without surprise, before the pandemic, the camp faced inhumane overcrowding and a lack of critical infrastructure.65 Notable limitations and absences included basic amenities, sanitary facilities and running water, medical equipment and personnel, and pharmaceuticals.66 Prior to the pandemic, half of the refugee children admitted to hospitals near the Moria camp were hospitalized as a result of hypothermia, sunstroke, trauma, staphylococcus infection, severe malnutrition, chemical poisoning, severe dehydration, and diabetic ketoacidosis.67 Due to the overcrowding and lack of electricity in camps, doctors working in camps reported that the threat of violence, both physical and sexual, was very high.68
Camp Moria in Lesvos, 2020. Photo: Faktengebunden/Wikimedia Commons. No changes were made. View license here
Just months into the pandemic, the Moria camp burned to the ground in fires that the government assumed were lit by refugees protesting.69 Nonetheless, despite Lesbos locals and refugees urging for the opening/set-up of a camp on mainland Greece instead of the island, the government set to rebuild a camp on Lesbos. It is believed this choice was made to pressure other European countries to establish a collaborative solution.70 Once again, refugees were slated to suffer in the newly constructed Kara Tepe camp. Regardless of it being new, the living conditions in the new camp have not improved from Moria and have exposed refugees to COVID-19 related and other health risks.71 Kara Tepe is tent-based with little to no access to food, water point, washrooms, and medical and psychological care.72 International humanitarian groups have urged camps such as Kara Tepe be evacuated.
Additionally, aided by overcrowding, the camps were unable to create containment or self-isolation measures during the pandemic, due to the queues residents are forced to wait in to receive food and essential goods.73 If a resident wants to access general hospitals, health services outside of the camp, and legal aid, they are faced with many administrative barriers to leave camps.74 During the pandemic, having lawyers on the ground in camps provided critical support to assist refugees in understanding violations of their rights and assisting the most vulnerable attain the care they require.75
Consequently, the camps play a critical role in understanding the dangers refugees faced when COVID-19 arrived in Greece. As a result of overcrowding in camps, it is easily understood why social distancing measures and lockdowns were impossible to achieve.
Linguistic Barriers
Again, while linguistic barriers between refugees and host countries is not a new phenomenon, communication in Greek refugee camps has long been difficult.76 Linguistic barriers exclude refugees from everyday necessities, but also from obtaining information about COVID-19. During the pandemic there was a lack of adapted literature to provide COVID-19 information to vulnerable people who do not understand Greek. This occurred with preventative measures and vaccination information later in the pandemic.77 Despite the encouragement of linguistic inclusion by June 2020, only half of the European member states had COVID-19 prevention information translated to one migrant language, and specialized literature was not provided for refugee camps.78
NGOs carried a large burden regarding the sharing of translated information during the pandemic. In May 2022, GCR noted that translations were key in providing refugees with factual information regarding the pandemic.79
Xenophobia
Xenophobia toward refugees is often an unfortunate stigma, which has enabled alienation and mistreatment throughout Europe. Likewise, due to the overt and invert nature of xenophobia demonstrated within, mistreatment, harassment, and violence may not be formally acknowledged or punished. During the pandemic, refugees experienced both invert and overt xenophobia.
An example of invert xenophobia occurred within healthcare provisioning in camps. When a refugee would wait to see a doctor, if there was even a doctor present, refugees risked being barred from accessing secondary, or suitable care for their conditions.80 Refugees experiencing mental illnesses, specifically, already encountered high levels of stigmatization in Greek hospitals.81 During encounters with health professionals, refugees experience a degree of xenophobia, which adversely impacts health-seeking behaviour when medical attention is needed. Consequently, it is suspected that both COVID-19 and other medical emergencies are under-reported.82 During my interview with a lawyer representing HAIS and the Melissa Network, they explained that for refugees to receive care, they would often escort them to their medical visits despite translators being available at the disposal of medical technicians and doctors.83 During assessments, they further noticed that regardless of third-party aid and doctors establishing and diagnosing mental health conditions, the results of these conditions were contested and would need to be reassessed by a quasi-governmental agency.84
Outside of medical malpractice, the movement of, and aid for, refugees was met with overt harassment and violence. The Ministry of Migration and Asylum attempted to rehome very vulnerable refugees, mostly women and children, to a hotel in Arnissa Pellas in Northern Greece. In response, violent opposition by a group of locals who ultimately set the hotel on fire stating that “the coronavirus is just a diversion tactic; they lock us inside out houses in order to transfer illegal immigrants to our cities.”85 Similarly, when a government-sponsored facility opened outside of Moria to aid COVID-19 within the camp, the site was attacked by anti-migrant protesters. As a result of the damage, the facility was rendered unusable.86 Locals were also accused of attacking refugees who attempted to flee to nearby villages.87
Intrusive Thoughts, Alienation, and Mistrust
Mistrust, mental health decline, and alienation all contributed to a very challenging study when trying to understand the impacts of the pandemic on vulnerable people. Due to the multivariable nature of issues refugees face, they suffer informational disadvantages, thus creating a shortage of trustworthy medical personnel whom they can confide in.88 Refugees who already experienced mental health trauma, often because of the instability of migration, likely experienced an increase during the pandemic because of the discrimination and elevated stress surrounding COVID-19.89 Moreover, skepticism as a result of the risk of deportation for those who were undocumented caused vulnerable people to avoid seeking COVID-19 information, assistance, testing, and vaccination.90
Mistrust in institutions is an unfortunate component of being a refugee in Greece. The uncertainty of being granted residency in Greece has made aid very hard to deliver. Misinformation fueling mistrust was widespread throughout the pandemic, and the government was unable to build trust.91 This becomes particularly relevant concerning COVID-19 vaccinations since 2021. While refugees received vaccinations in some circumstances very early, later vaccination efforts were often unsuccessful due to mistrust of public health services. GCR detailed that even under refugee-aimed vaccination programs, which were designed to not endanger undocumented people, the latter did not participate due to fear of punishment and deportation.92
The Uncertainty of Refugee Vaccination
Tracking vaccination status amongst refugees has been increasingly difficult in Greece. Since there is already an established under-reporting of illnesses among refugees, it is also true that precise rates of COVID-19 have been hard to track.93 In June 2021, it was reported that a mass vaccination campaign had begun in Greek refugee camps. In camps, the single-shot Johnson & Johnson vaccine was provided by the Hellenic National Public Health Organisation (EODY).94 When questioned regarding vaccine hesitancy, Manos Logothetis of the Ministry for Migration and Asylum believed vaccination rates among refugees would rise.95 Unfortunately, by late 2021, it was reported that roughly 700 applications were filed due to vulnerable people being turned away from vaccination facilities at pharmacies and Citizens’ Advice Bureaus despite holding temporary social security IDs.96 Likewise, in 60% of successful appointments to attain a temporary card to receive a vaccine, volunteers from NGOs had to accompany vulnerable people to ensure the card was rightfully issued.97 Since late 2021, there has been no update regarding vaccination statistics or changes for vulnerable people.98
Disclaimers
To discuss refugees in Greece, it is critical to also understand the external factors that may impede access to aid and health services. While Greek bureaucracy has contributed greatly to the barriers and factors discussed in this paper, in a matter of policy and politics, one must understand the barriers established in EU asylum policy and agreements made with Turkey. The Dublin III Regulation stating the ‘responsible’ state is the entry point, which primarily represents Italy and Greece, creates a geographical bias regarding refugees.99 This regulation also does not consider the refugees’ preferred endpoint in other EU member states when it comes to responsibility.100 Therefore, the system does not create responsibility-sharing among the member states and stresses entry states.101 The practice of emergency relocation, which would enable refugees to move from Greece to another member state, has been destabilized due to many factors. The legislative and administrative setup of the practice capped the volume of candidates, while restrictively creating criteria for eligibility, and tenured the emergency status for only two years.102 Moreover, some Member States, such as Poland, refused to relocate refugees resulting in a violation of EU law and the action remained uncontested.103 Under this scheme, only 35,000 refugees were moved between Greece and Italy to other member states.104 Currently, over 20,000 refugees which have reverted to Greece’s responsibility are in Germany and are unable to return to Greece because of public health safety measures.105 Furthermore, as a result of the EU-Turkey agreement of 2016, thousands of refugees have also been confined to Lesvos, other Greek Islands, and the Greek-Turkish land border.106 Therefore, while the circumstances of Greek malpractice during the pandemic are genuine, it is important to consider the conditions supporting the unsafe migration policies in Europe.
Conclusion
The cost of the COVID-19 pandemic on the most vulnerable people has yet to end. In Greece, the pandemic was not only challenging for the general population but also rather highlighted the dangerous conditions and barriers vulnerable people live with every day. In this inquiry, I examined the national COVID-19 response, the intersection between refugees and COVID-19, and the many findings discovered during my fieldwork completed in Athens. I conclude that the treatment of vulnerable populations during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Greece failed to stop the spread of COVID-19 and adhere to responsible practices. Refugees and vulnerable people were subject to poor bureaucratic practices, unreasonable and unsafe lockdowns, inhumane living conditions, linguistic barriers, xenophobia, alienation, and were susceptible to mistrust during the pandemic. Consequently, an accurate number of infections and the rate of vaccination amongst vulnerable people are not accessible. From my analysis, barriers imposed on refugees during the pandemic likely increased infections and had an adverse effect on vaccination rates due to mistrust in government institutions. In May 2022, given the national vaccination rate of 73.15 %, future research, once recorded data is shared, may confirm if refugees fall under the national average and if refugees had access to a second vaccine. Since then, and nearly a year later, vaccination rates have not rose significantly, nor has further vaccination data been shared.
Appendix A:
Map of refugee camps in Greece. Photo: UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency. No changes were made. Find details here
Footnotes
1. Ilias Gountas, Georgios Hillas, and Kyriakos Souliotis, “Act Early, Save Lives: Managing COVID-19 in Greece,” Public Health (2020): 136.
2. Gountas et al., “Act Early, Save Lives: Managing COVID-19 in Greece,” 136.
3. Gountas et al, “Act Early, Save Lives: Managing COVID-19 in Greece,” 136.
4. Gountas et al, “Act Early, Save Lives: Managing COVID-19 in Greece,” 138.
5. Timokelia Kousi, Lefkothea-Christina Mitsi, and Jean Simos, “The Early Stage of COVID-19 Outbreak in Greece: A Review of the National Response and the Socioeconomic Impact,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 1 (2021): 3.
6. Kousi, et al, “The Early Stage of COVID-19 Outbreak in Greece,” 6.
7. Timokelia Takis Pappas, “The politics of pandemic prevention in Spain and Greece,” Takis S Pappas Because this is the era of populist democracy, April 5, 2020, https://pappaspopulism.com/coronavirus-spain-and-greece/;Kousi, et al, “The Early Stage of COVID-19 Outbreak in Greece,” 12.
8. Kousi, et al. 13.
9. Konstantinos N. Fountoulakis, Maria K. Apostolidou, Marina B. Atsiova, Anna K. Filippidou, Angeliki K. Florou, Dimitra S. Gousiou, Aikaterini R. Katsara, et al., “Self-Reported Changes in Anxiety, Depression and Suicidality During the COVID-19 Lockdown in Greece,” Journal of Affective Disorders (2021): 625.
10. Fountoulakis et al., “Self-Reported Changes in Anxiety, Depression and Suicidality During the COVID-19 Lockdown in Greece,” 625.
11. Fountoulakis, et al. “Self-Reported Changes in Anxiety, Depression and Suicidality During the -19 Lockdown in Greece,” 628.
12. Sofia Pappa, Nikolaos Athanasiou, Nikolaos Sakkas, Stavros Patrinos, Elpitha Sakka, Zafeiria Barmparessou, Stamatoula Tsikrika, et al., “From Recession to Depression? Prevalence and Correlates of Depression, Anxiety, Traumatic Stress and Burnout in Healthcare Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Greece: a Multi-Center, Cross-Sectional Study,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 5 (2021): 13.
13. “Greece – COVID-19 Overview – Johns Hopkins,” Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, consulted May 2022, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/greece.
14. John Hopkins Unviersity, “Greece – COVID-19 Overview.”
15. Johns Hopkins University, “Greece – COVID-19 Overview.”
16. “COVID-19 Interactive Map: Vaccine Tracker Across Greece – Imedd Lab,” Imedd Lab, January 15, 2022, https://lab.imedd.org/en/interactive-map-vaccination-tracker-greece/.
17. Greek Council for Refugees, in discussion with the author, May 3, 2022.
18. HAIS and Melissa Network, in a discussion with the author, May 4, 2022.
19. Hanne Dahl Vonen, Merete Lan Olsen, Sara Soraya Eriksen, Signe Smith Jervelund, and Terje Andreas Eikemo, “Refugee Camps and COVID-19: Can We Prevent a Humanitarian Crisis?” Scandinavian Journal of Public Health 49, no. 1 (2021): 27.
20. Elias Kondilis, Dimitris Papamichail, Sophie McCann, Elspeth Carruthers, Apostolos Veizis, Miriam Orcutt, and Sally Hargreaves, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece: A Retrospective Analysis of National Surveillance Data from 2020,” EClinicalMedicine, 37, 2021, 2.
21. Kondilis, et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece,” 2.
22. Kondilis, et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece,” 2.
23. Kondilis, et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece,” 2.
24. Kondilis, et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece,” 2.
25. Kondilis, et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece,” 2.
26. Nidhi Subbaraman, “‘Distancing Is Impossible’: Refugee Camps Race to Avert Coronavirus Catastrophe,” Nature, London, 581, no 7806, 2020, 18.
27. Kousi et al, “The Early Stage of COVID-19 Outbreak in Greece,” 7.
28. Kousi, et al, “The Early Stage of COVID-19 Outbreak in Greece,” 7.
29. Kousi, et al, “The Early Stage of COVID-19 Outbreak in Greece,” 7.
30. Charalampos Tsavdaroglou, and Maria Kaika, “Refugees’ Caring and Commoning Practices Against Marginalisation Under COVID‐19 in Greece,” Geographical Research 60, no. 2 (2022): 234.
31. Tsavdaroglou et al. “Refugees’ Caring and Commoning Practices Against Marginalisation Under COVID‐19 in Greece,” 234.
32. Kondilis et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees,” 3.
33. Kondilis, et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees” 3.
34. Kondilis, et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees 3.
35. Kondilis, et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees,” 4.
36. Kondilis, et al, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees,” 4.
37. Kondilis et al. “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees,” 4-5.
38. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Refugees,” 5.
39. Greek Council for Refugees, in discussion with the author, May 3, 2022.
40. Greek Council for Refugees, in discussion with the author, May 3, 2022.
41. Elias Kondilis, Karl Puchner, Apostolos Veizis, Christos Papatheodorou, and Alexis Benos, “COVID-19 and Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants in Greece,” BMJ (2020): 369. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1557
42. Ibid.
43. Evangelia Tsourdi, and Niovi Vavoula, “Killing Me Softly? Scrutinising the Role of Soft Law in Greece’s Response to COVID-19,” European Journal of Risk Regulation 12, no. 1 (2021): 61.
44. Tsourdi, et al. “Killing Me Softly?” 61.
45. Tsourdi et al “Killing Me Softly? ” 62.
46. Tsourdi et al, “Killing Me Softly?” 63.
47. Tsourdi et al, “Killing Me Softly? ” 65.
48. Tsourdi et al, “Killing Me Softly? ” 66.
49. Tsourdi, et al, “Killing Me Softly? ” 66.
50. Tsourdi et al, “Killing Me Softly?” 67.
51. Evangelia Tsourdi, et al, “Killing Me Softly?” 67.
52. Kondilis et al. “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 6.
53. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 6.
54. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 6.
55. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 6
56. Tsavdaroglou et al. “Refugees’ Caring,” 234.
57. Tsavdaroglou et al. “Refugees’ Caring,” 234.
58. Tsavdaroglou, et al, “Refugees’ Caring ” 234.
59. Tsavdaroglou et al. “Refugees’ Caring,” 235.
60. Tsavdaroglou et al. “Refugees’ Caring,” 233.
61. Tsavdaroglou et al. “Refugees’ Caring,” 235.
62. Greek Council for Refugees, in discussion with the author, May 3, 2022; Bridges Humanitarian Initiative, in discussion with the author, May 4, 2022; Network for Childrens Rights, in discussion with the author, May 6 and May 18, 2022.
63. Greek Council for Refugees, in discussion with the author, May 3, 2022.
64. Vonen et al. “Refugee Camps and COVID-19,” 27.
65. Vonen et al, “Refugee Camps and COVID-19,” 27.
66. Vonen et al. “Refugee Camps and COVID-19,” 27.
67. Vonen et al. “Refugee Camps and COVID-19,” 27.
68. Heidrun Bohnet and Seraina Rüegger, “Refugees and COVID‐19: Beyond Health Risks to Insecurity,” Swiss Political Science Review 27, no. 2 (2021): 359.
69. Bohnet and Rüegger 360.
70. Bohnet and Rüegger, “Refugees and Covid‐19,” 360.
71. Bohnet, and Rüegger, “Refugees and Covid‐19,” 360.
72. Kondilis et al. “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 2.
73. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 2.
74. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 2.
75. HAIS and Melissa Network, in discussion with the author, May 4, 2022.
76. Bohnet and Rüegger, “Refugees and Covid‐19,” 359.
77. Kondilis et al. “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 6.
78. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 6.
79. Greek Council for Refugees, in discussion with the author, May 3, 2022.
80. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 6.
81. L.E., Peppou, A. Bechraki, G. Petraki, M. Marouga, D. Mareta, K. Kontoangelos, and M. Economou, “Prejudice Against and Desired Social Distance from Refugees, People with Mental Illness and Patients with COVID-19 in Athens,” European Psychiatry 64, no. S1 (2021): S119.
82. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 6.
83. HAIS and Melissa Network, in discussion with the author, May 4, 2022.
84. HAIS and Melissa Network, in discussion with the author, May 4, 2022.
85. Tsavdaroglou et al. “Refugees’ Caring,” 235.
86. Bohnet and Rüegger, “Refugees and Covid‐19,” 360.
87. Bohnet and Rüegger, “Refugees and Covid‐19,360.
88. Bohnet and Rüegger, “Refugees and Covid‐19,” 359.
89. Eva Spiritus-Beerden, An Verelst, Ines Devlieger, Nina Langer Primdahl, Fabio Botelho Guedes, Antonio Chiarenza, M.E.T.C. van den Muijsenbergh, Morten Skovdal, and Ilse Derluyn, “Mental Health of Refugees and Migrants During the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Role of Experienced Discrimination and Daily Stressors,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 12 (2021): 6354.
90. Greek Council for Refugees, in discussion with the author, May 3, 2022.
91. Humanitarian Bridges Initiative, in discussion with the author, May 5, 2022.
92. Greek Council for Refugees, in discussion with the author, May 3, 2022.
93. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 5.
94. Katy Fallon, “Greece Rolls Out ‘Long-Awaited’ Mass Vaccine Campaign To Refugees,” Coronavirus pandemic, Al Jazeera, June 6, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/3/greece-rolls-out-vaccination-programme-in-refugee-camps.
95. Fallon, “Greece Rolls Out ‘Long-Awaited’ Mass Vaccine Campaign To Refugees.”
96. “Greece’s COVID Vaccination Program for Migrants Problematic: NGO,” News, Infomigrants, December 2, 2021, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/36939/greeces-COVID-vaccination-program-for-migrants-problematic-ngo.
97. “Greece’s COVID Vaccination Program For Migrants Problematic: NGO,” Infomigrants.
98. “The COVID-19 Vaccines and Undocumented Migrants In Greece,” PICUM, July 26, 2021, https://picum.org/COVID-19-vaccines-undocumented-migrants-greece/.
99. Evangelia Tsourdi, “COVID-19, Asylum in the EU, and the Great Expectations of Solidarity,” International Journal of Refugee Law 32, no 2 (2020): 376.
100. Tsourdi, “COVID-19, Asylum in the EU, and the Great Expectations of Solidarity,” 376.
101. Tsourdi, “COVID-19, Asylum in the EU, and the Great Expectations of Solidarity,” 376.
102. Tsourdi, “COVID-19, Asylum in the EU, and the Great Expectations of Solidarity,” 378.
103. Tsourdi, “COVID-19, Asylum in the EU, and the Great Expectations of Solidarity,” 378.
104. Tsourdi, “COVID-19, Asylum in the EU, and the Great Expectations of Solidarity,” 378.
105. Greek Council for Refugees, in discussion with the author, May, 2022.
106. Kondilis et al., “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 2.
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