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European Energy Security and Pipelines in the South Caucasus: Carriers of Energy and Conflict

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Photo:  Ilham Aliyev attended official opening ceremony of Southern Gas Corridor. Sangachal Terminal. Photo: Official website the President of Azerbaijan. No changes made. View the license here.

By Sasha Slobodov

Issue Statement

In order to move away from reliance on Russia for natural gas imports, the European Union (EU) has identified the South Caucasus as a key corridor for achieving energy security. Known as the “Southern Gas Corridor,” it serves as the first network of pipelines to transport non-Russian gas to Europe, but carries with it many political and economic considerations.[1]

Executive Summary

As former Eastern Bloc states and Soviet republics began to join the EU in the post-Cold War period, existing energy trade relations with Russia meant that the EU grew increasingly reliant on Moscow and its gas companies. There was originally debate about which approach to take when dealing with Russia, specifically regarding whether to engage with Russia or to start work on energy diversification. However, the gas crises in 2006 and 2009, in which Russian company Gazprom shut off gas destined for Ukraine and Europe, served as turning points as European officials agreed on the need to diversify and find other gas suppliers. This led the EU to identify the Southern Gas Corridor, which would transport gas from Azerbaijan via Georgia and Turkey to the European market, as a priority corridor for energy diversification. While the Southern Gas Corridor is a preferred energy strategy for the EU, it has been complicated by a variety of factors, including the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, as well as human rights issues in Azerbaijan and concerns regarding limited gas supplies.

Background

Soviet Legacy of Eastern European Dependency on Russia

During the Cold War, states that were part of the Eastern Bloc, as well as Soviet republics, relied on Russia for natural gas imports. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War these states continued to utilize these existing trading relations.2 However, once former Eastern Bloc and Soviet states began to join the European Union, it meant that the EU as a whole grew increasingly dependent on Russia.

Cooperation with Russia in the 1990s

In the 1990s, there were differing perspectives on what strategy to take in regard to political and economic engagement in the South Caucasus. While there was some sentiment in the EU that they should “take advantage of the geopolitical vacuum in this region” in order to develop critical energy transit corridors, states such as France and Germany did not want to antagonize Russia.3 At that point in time it was considered acceptable to promote democracy in the South Caucasus but not to engage in economic projects in what was considered to be Russia’s backyard.4 However, over time the situation became reversed, as economic projects became acceptable and democracy promotion became off-limits in the eyes of Russia. These differing points of view prevented the EU from adopting a cohesive approach to the South Caucasus until the gas crises of the late 2000s incentivized a collective decision to increase diversification.5

Gas Crises of 2006 and 2009 and Russian ‘Energy Bullying’

In January 2006, the largely Russian state-owned company Gazprom became involved in a dispute with Ukraine over gas prices. Ukraine wanted to receive European gas prices, rather than world prices. Gazprom did not approve of this and ultimately shut off gas to Ukraine.6 As Russian gas is transported via Ukraine to the rest of Europe, this meant that then EU-newcomer states such as Poland and Hungary experienced a significant drop in gas supply.7 This is considered to have marked the beginning of a turning point in Europe’s strategy toward Russian energy imports, as the EU saw itself as vulnerable to volatile decision making.8 Soon after the 2006 crisis, energy security – which had not previously been a key concern – climbed to the top of the agenda for the European Union.9 That year, the EU began to look at alternative suppliers of natural gas and signed a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan in order to bypass Russia.10

A second dispute occurred in 2009 when Gazprom again shut off gas to Ukraine, this time impacting the Czech Republic, Romania, Austria, Poland, Croatia, and Slovakia – reportedly leading to 10 people in Poland freezing to death due to a lack of natural gas supply to warm their homes in freezing winter temperatures.11 This was “the last straw” for the EU, with its executive branch, the European Commission, issuing a statement in the wake of the crisis that called Russia’s “energy bullying” unacceptable. Despite these concerns raised by the EU, similar crises in which Gazprom would temporarily shut off gas supplies continued to occur in the years that followed.12

Attempt to Circumvent Russia via the Nabucco Pipeline

In order to circumvent Russian natural gas networks, the EU decided to initiate the “ill-fated” Nabucco Pipeline, which was to carry Azerbaijan’s natural gas via Georgia and Turkey into Southeast Europe.14 First signed in 2009, this project which was politically rather than economically motivated, faced major delays. This was attributed to Russia launching a proposal for the rival South Steam project and Azerbaijan choosing to participate in the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) instead of Nabucco.15 The project was ultimately cancelled in 2013.

The Impact of the Annexation of Crimea and War in Eastern Ukraine

Following the ousting of pro-Kremlin President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014, Gazprom again shut off gas to Ukraine, leading Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland to send reverse flows of gas to assist Ukraine.16 These actions, in addition to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, added further impetus to diversifying away from reliance on Russian gas.

Where Are We Now

The European Commission identifies the Southern Gas Corridor as one of four priority corridors for energy diversification and securing supply.17 This corridor consists of three parts: the South Caucasus Pipeline which transports gas from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, where it connects to the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, and then links with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline which transits Southeastern Europe.

Map of the Southern Gas Corridor, consisting of Southern Caucasus pipeline (SCP), Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP), Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP), which was completed in 2020. Photo: Golden/Wikimedia Commons. No changes made. View the license here.

As domestic European reserves of natural gas dwindle, it is estimated that the EU will import 80 percent of its energy by 2030.18 This coincides with a growing demand for natural gas as the EU moves away from oil and toward green energy.19 A document released by the European Commission last updated in 2020 on the “Diversification of gas supply sources and routes” stressed the importance of diversification of natural gas suppliers for states in Central and Southeastern Europe which largely rely on Russia as their primary supplier.20 Azerbaijan is key to the EU’s strategy due to its relatively large energy reserves and its strategic positioning close to Europe. Given the EU and Azerbaijan’s growing strategic partnership, it is likely that the EU will continue to strengthen its presence in the South Caucasus region.21

Challenges


Conflicts in the South Caucasus: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh

The unresolved “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the recently thawed and refrozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, are concerning for the EU as they are considered to be a political risk which could undermine EU energy security.22 While Georgia has benefited significantly from its preferential position as a primary corridor to deliver natural resources from the oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea to Western markets, renewed tensions in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts could significantly damage the progress it has made as an energy transit state.23 This situation is mirrored in Nagorno-Karabakh, as the EU continues to express concern about the conflict while it deepens its energy integration with Azerbaijan.24 As such, the EU has a vested economic interest in ensuring that there are no flare ups in the conflicts.

In terms of threats posed to the pipelines by the conflicts, during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russian forces destroyed a bridge that transported oil westward, disrupting shipments.25 Tbilisi also reported attacks near pipelines that carry oil destined for the European markets either through Turkey or to Georgia’s ports.26 In 2015, the Georgian Interior Ministry stated that Russia-backed forces in South Ossetia had taken control of a 1.6-kilometre portion of the Baku-Supsa pipeline.27

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), and Baku-Supsa pipelines all pass through a narrow corridor often referred to as the “Ganja Gap” that lies near the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone.28 The Second Karabakh War, which took place in 2020, resulted in Azerbaijan taking the territory in Nagorno-Karabakh that Armenia previously held since the First Karabakh War. During the 44-day war, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of intentionally targeting energy infrastructure.29 As the EU hopes to increase its reliance on these pipelines, their location near the conflict zone poses a clear risk to energy infrastructure and energy security.30 However, the overall risk to the European market is considered to be minimal as Azerbaijan is not currently the primary provider of natural gas to the EU.

The ceasefire that ended the Second Karabakh War resulted in efforts to identify potential future energy transport routes that could run through both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was previously impossible due to resistance from both states.32 As Georgia currently enjoys the privileged position as the country of choice to transport oil westward due to the isolation of Armenia by Azerbaijan, it became concerned by the prospect of Armenia participating in the region’s energy transit.33 This is one of the reasons that Georgia has supported Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as it keeps Armenia excluded from energy transit deals that could threaten Georgia’s energy monopoly.34

Concerns over Limited Gas Supplies

The Southern Gas Corridor is largely reliant on the ability of Azerbaijan to supply gas to European markets. However, there is doubt regarding whether Azerbaijan actually has a sufficient amount of gas reserves that could satisfy European demand.35 In 2016, Azerbaijan was forced to import gas in order to meet its own domestic demand, adding further uncertainty to how much it is actually able to export to Europe, as the majority of its gas exports already go to Georgia and Turkey.36 Also notable is that the Baku-Supsa, BTC, and SCP pipelines carry less than 10 percent of the volumes of competing Russian pipelines.37 As such, there are arguments that these pipelines cannot be seen as alternatives to Russian gas lines, but rather complement the existing networks.

Human Rights Concerns

The EU’s level of engagement with Azerbaijan and its role as key to the Southern Gas Corridor has been criticized as the state is considered to be a dictatorship with a track record of human rights abuses, limited free media, fraudulent elections, and political prisoners.38

Perspectives

European Union

The EU’s 2020 Energy Strategy states: “Energy security is closely intertwined with EU’s foreign and security priorities. Diversification of fuels, sources of supply and transit routes is essential for EU security.”39 Despite the imperative to diversify away from Russia, there is concern regarding relying too heavily on Azerbaijan given the nature of the regime – specifically given aforementioned issues with human rights, corruption, organized crime, political prisoners, and rule of law.40 Baku’s actions have not been swayed by inclusion in the European Neighbourhood Policy, an EU foreign policy instrument which was “initially developed as a substitute for enlargement, aimed at providing countries at the EU’s external borders, without an accession perspective, with deeper political and economic relations.”41 On the contrary, some argue that Baku has actually gained more autonomy as it accumulates more revenues from its energy exports.42

Russia

Russia considers the West to be encroaching on its sphere of influence which encompasses the former Soviet republics, and as such has taken issue with Georgia and Ukraine electing pro-Western leaders and demonstrating their intention to eventually join NATO. As early as 2003, some Russian observers noted that they believed the West, particularly the US, was attempting to isolate former Soviet republics from Russia, and that the Caspian region was to be a “battle for domination.”43 Russia has responded to the establishment of the Southern Gas Corridor by engaging in a competing pipeline project, TurkStream, which carries gas from Russia to Southeastern Europe via Turkey.44

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan aims to engage in an independent foreign policy that can maintain a balance between Russia and the EU. However, if it were to move closer to the EU it would have to engage in many legal, judicial, and human rights reforms.45 Many in Azerbaijan see the EU as an entity which could help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, arguing that the bloc has “a unique combination of economic power and possibilities for solid political dialogue, adding value to conventional multilateral diplomacy.”46 Also notable is that Nagorno-Karabakh serves as a critical source of water, leading Azerbaijan to consider using this water for hydropower in order to decrease domestic reliance on natural gas and allow it to export more to the European market.47

Georgia

Though not a significant producer of energy, Georgia considers itself to be an integral state for energy transit. However, Tbilisi is concerned that its role could be jeopardized if Armenia and Azerbaijan are able to reach an agreement regarding transit lines crossing their territories.48 Georgia currently receives significant revenues from allowing gas bound for Armenia to be sent from Russia via a pipeline running through its territory.49 While some say Georgia benefits from reduced tensions in the region which make it safer for investors, others believe that continued conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan better serves Georgia as it makes it the preferred country to serve as an energy corridor, thus receiving lucrative transit fees.

Armenia

Due to its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia is largely excluded from the region’s energy networks. Armenia largely relies on its relationships with Russia and Iran for energy, narrowing opportunities for engagement with the EU. However, following the Second Karabakh War, Armenia has been in talks with Azerbaijan to restore railway links that would allow it to have “reliable railway and land communication with [Russia] and [Iran].”50 This could improve its positioning within the region’s energy transit networks.

Recommendations

  1. Further energy diversification. In the short-term, the EU should continue to develop policies that minimize external shocks and energy supply disruptions, while in the long-term decreasing dependency on individual suppliers and routes, to make sure that every EU state maintains at least two different suppliers.51 Adopting an approach of “complimentary pipelines,” which involves the “establishment of partnership between the parties producing, transporting and consuming energy resources,” rather than seeking out “alternative pipelines” could help avoid total reliance on one supplier.52 Framing this diversification strategy as “complementary” rather than “alternative” could also help in reducing the possibility of antagonizing Russia.
  2. Responsible engagement with Azerbaijan. The EU can further cultivate its energy relationship with Azerbaijan while also engaging in active dialogue regarding its issues with human rights and support reforms in the rule of law, combat corruption, and organized crime.53 An effective relationship would also entail assisting Azerbaijan to efficiently and sustainably develop its energy sector in order for it to better function as an energy partner and prepare for a green energy future.54
  3. Preparation for the global shift to green energy. The global shift to green energy will undoubtedly impact energy markets in the South Caucasus. There have already been criticisms of the EU for continuing to invest in natural gas pipelines while it also works to fight climate change through its European Green Deal.55 The EU must work to ensure that its investment in the Southern Gas Corridor is consistent with its Green Deal.56 It would also be advisable for the EU to support Georgia and Azerbaijan in preparing for a shift to green energy, as the two states’ economies largely rely on energy extraction and transit revenues.57

Footnotes:

  1. Rauf Mammadov, “Azerbaijani gas is now ready to flow all the way to Europe,” Middle East Institute (December 2019), https://www.mei.edu/publications/azerbaijani-gas-now-ready-flow-all-way-europe.
  2. Agnia Grigas, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 146,
  3.  Samuel James Lussac, “Ensuring European Energy Security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’: The Case of the South Caucasus,” European Security 19, no. 4 (2010): 607–25, 613, 621.
  4.  Lussac, “Ensuring European Energy Security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’,” 616.
  5.  Lussac, “Ensuring European Energy Security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’,” 613.
  6.  Lussac, “Ensuring European Energy Security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’,” 618.
  7.  Lussac, “Ensuring European Energy Security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’,” 618.
  8.  Lussac, “Ensuring European Energy Security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’,” 619.
  9.  Lussac, “Ensuring European Energy Security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’,” 619.
  10.  Lussac, “Ensuring European Energy Security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’,” 619.
  11.  Grigas, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, 148.
  12.  Grigas, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, 148.
  13.  Grigas, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, 147-48.
  14.  Grigas, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, 160.
  15.  Grigas, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, 161.
  16.  Grigas, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, 148-149.
  17.  “Gas regional groups,” European Commission, last modified **date** https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest/regional-groups-and-their-role-pci-process/gas-regional-groups/.
  18.  Tracey German, “Pipeline Politics: The South Caucasus and European Energy Security,” in The South Caucasus – Security, Energy and Europeanization, eds. Meliha B. Altunisik and Oktay F. Tanrisever (London: Routledge, 2017), 181–95.
  19.  Ibid.
  20.  “Diversification of gas supply sources and routes,” European Commission, last modified March 17, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/energy-security/diversification-of-gas-supply-sources-and-routes_en.
  21.  Elkhan Nuriyev, “Azerbaijan and the European Union: New Landmarks of Strategic Partnership in the South Caucasus-Caspian Basin,” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 8, no. 2 (2008): 155–67.
  22.  Tracey German, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Security Issues in the Caucasus,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 32, no. 2 (2012): 216–29.
  23.  Marat Terterov, “The Energy Charter as a Framework for Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Energy Markets of the South Caucasus States,” in The South Caucasus – Security, Energy and Europeanization, eds. Meliha B. Altunisik and Oktay F. Tanrisever (London: Routledge, 2018), 213–31.
  24.  Nuriyev, “Azerbaijan and the European Union: New Landmarks of Strategic Partnership in the South Caucasus-Caspian Basin,” 162.
  25.  Bruce Pannier, “Georgia-Russia Conflict Changes The Energy Equation,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, September 2, 2008, https://www.rferl.org/a/Georgia_Russia_Conflict_Changes_Energy_Equation/1194496.html. 
  26.  John Roberts, “Regional Energy Cooperation Along Europe’s Southern Energy Corridor,” in The South Caucasus – Security, Energy and Europeanization, eds. Meliha B. Altunisik and Oktay F. Tanrisever (London: Routledge, 2018), 196–212.
  27.  RFE/RL’s Georgian Service, “Russian Troops Demarcate Part Of Georgian Oil Pipeline,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, July 14, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-troops-demarcate-georgian-oil-pipeline/27126985.html.
  28.  David O’Byrne, “Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict poses threat to regional energy corridor,” EurasiaNet, October 9, 2020, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-armenia-conflict-poses-threat-to-regional-energy-corridor. 
  29.  O’Byrne, “Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict poses threat to regional energy corridor.”
  30.  O’Byrne, “Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict poses threat to regional energy corridor.”
  31.  O’Byrne, “Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict poses threat to regional energy corridor.”
  32.  Paul Stronski, “The Shifting Geography of the South Caucasus,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 23, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/23/shifting-geography-of-south-caucasus-pub-84814.  
  33.  Stronski, “The Shifting Geography of the South Caucasus.”; Emmanuel Karagiannis, Energy and Security in the Caucasus, (London: Routledge, 2002), 148.
  34.  Stronski, “The Shifting Geography of the South Caucasus.”
  35.  German, “Pipeline Politics: The South Caucasus and European Energy Security,” 188.
  36.  German, “Pipeline Politics: The South Caucasus and European Energy Security,” 188.
  37.  Vladimer Papava, “The Evolution of Economic Relations between Georgia and Russia in the Post-Soviet Period: Past Trends and Perspectives,” in Russia and Georgia: Searching the Way Out, (Carnegie Moscow Center, 2011), 62.https://carnegieendowment.org/files/RUSSIA_AND_GEORGIA_SEARCHING_THE_WAY_OUT_English_Publication.pdf.
  38.  “Azerbaijan,” Human Rights Watch, last modified 2019, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/azerbaijan#
  39.  German, “Pipeline Politics: The South Caucasus and European Energy Security,” 182.
  40.  Licínia Simão, “The European Neighbourhood Policy and the South Caucasus,” in The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy, eds. Tobias Schumacher, Andreas Marchetti, and Thomas Demmelhuber (London: Routledge, 2018) 312–23. Routledge, 2018.
  41.  Simão, “The European Neighbourhood Policy and the South Caucasus,” 317; Tobias Schumacher, “The European Neighbourhood Policy,” in The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy, eds. Tobias Schumacher, Andreas Marchetti, and Thomas Demmelhuber (London: Routledge, 2018), 312–23, https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315691244-1.
  42.  Laurence Broers, “The EU and Karabakh: Picking up the pieces, looking for a role,” EurasiaNet. January 20, 2021, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-the-eu-and-karabakh-picking-up-the-pieces-looking-for-a-role.   
  43.  German, “Pipeline Politics: The South Caucasus and European Energy Security,” 190.
  44.  Grigas, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, 211.
  45.  Nuriyev, “Azerbaijan and the European Union,” 161.
  46.  Nuriyev, “Azerbaijan and the European Union,” 162.
  47.  Nareg Kuyumjian, “Don’t water it down: The role of water security in the Armenia-Azerbaijan war,” EurasiaNet, December 22, 2021, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-dont-water-it-down-the-role-of-water-security-in-the-armenia-azerbaijan-war.
  48.  Tornike Sharashenidze, “Armenia, Azerbaijan agree on transport corridors –what’s changing for Georgia?” JAM News, January 14, 2021, https://jam-news.net/georgia-south-caucasus-karabakh-transit-corridor-lars-sharashenidze/. 
  49.  Mammadov, “Azerbaijani gas is now ready to flow all the way to Europe.”
  50.  Emmanuel Dreyfus and Jules Hugot, “Opening the Araxes Rail Link between Armenia and Azerbaijan: Why the EU Should Support the Connection,” Ponars Eurasia, October 18, 2021, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/opening-the-araxes-rail-link-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-why-the-eu-should-support-the-connection/.
  51.  German, “Pipeline Politics: The South Caucasus and European Energy Security,” 183.
  52.  Papava, “The Evolution of Economic Relations between Georgia and Russia in the Post-Soviet Period,” 63.
  53.  Nuriyev, “Azerbaijan and the European Union,” 165.
  54.  German, “Pipeline Politics: The South Caucasus and European Energy Security,” 184.
  55.  Aled Jones, “The EU wants to fight climate change – so why is it spending billions on a gas pipeline?” The Conversation, February 9, 2018, https://theconversation.com/the-eu-wants-to-fight-climate-change-so-why-is-it-spending-billions-on-a-gas-pipeline-91442.
  56.  Jones, “spending billions on a gas pipeline.”
  57.  Jones, “spending billions on a gas pipeline.”

References:

Broers, Laurence. “The EU and Karabakh: Picking up the pieces, looking for a role.” Eurasianet, January 20, 2021. https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-the-eu-and-karabakh-picking-up-the-pieces-looking-for-a-role

Dreyfus, Emmanuel and Jules Hugot. “Opening the Araxes Rail Link between Armenia and Azerbaijan: Why the EU Should Support the Connection.” Ponars Eurasia, October 18, 2021. https://www.ponarseurasia.org/opening-the-araxes-rail-link-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-why-the-eu-should-support-the-connection/.

European Commission. “Diversification of gas supply sources and routes.” Last modified March 17, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/energy-security/diversification-of-gas-supply-sources-and-routes_en.

European Commission. “Energy infrastructure: Commission proposes EU priority corridors for power grids and gas pipelines.” November 17, 2010. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_10_1512.

European Commission. “Gas regional groups.” Accessed March 15, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest/regional-groups-and-their-role-pci-process/gas-regional-groups/.

German, Tracey. “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Security Issues in the Caucasus.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 32, no. 2 (2012): 216–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2012.694666.

German, Tracey. “Pipeline Politics: The South Caucasus and European Energy Security.” In The South Caucasus – Security, Energy and Europeanization, edited by Meliha B.Altunisik and Oktay F. Tanrisever, 181–95. London: Routledge, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717821-11.

Grigas, Agnia. The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv253f7jj.

Human Rights Watch. “Azerbaijan.” Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/azerbaijan#.

Jones, Aled. “The EU wants to fight climate change – so why is it spending billions on a gas pipeline?” The Conversation, February 9, 2018. https://theconversation.com/the-eu-wants-to-fight-climate-change-so-why-is-it-spending-billions-on-a-gas-pipeline-91442.

Karagiannis, Emmanuel. Energy and Security in the Caucasus. Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315888507.

Kuyumjian, Nareg. “Don’t water it down: The role of water security in the Armenia-Azerbaijan war.” EurasiaNet, December 22, 2021. https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-dont-water-it-down-the-role-of-water-security-in-the-armenia-azerbaijan-war.

Lussac, Samuel James. “Ensuring European Energy Security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’: The Case of the South Caucasus.” European Security (London, England) 19, no. 4 (2010): 607–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.526939.

Mammadov, Rauf. “Azerbaijani gas is now ready to flow all the way to Europe.” Middle East Institute, December 11, 2019. https://www.mei.edu/publications/azerbaijani-gas-now-ready-flow-all-way-europe.

Nuriyev, Elkhan. “Azerbaijan and the European Union: New Landmarks of Strategic Partnership in the South Caucasus-Caspian Basin.” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 8, no. 2 (2008): 155–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683850802117773.

O’Byrne, David. “Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict poses threat to regional energy corridor.” EurasiaNet, October 9, 2020. https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-armenia-conflict-poses-threat-to-regional-energy-corridor

Pannier, Bruce. “Georgia-Russia Conflict Changes The Energy Equation.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, September 2, 2008. https://www.rferl.org/a/Georgia_Russia_Conflict_Changes_Energy_Equation/1194496.html.

Papava, Vladimer. “The Evolution of Economic Relations between Georgia and Russia in the Post-Soviet Period: Past Trends and Perspectives.” Russia and Georgia: Searching the Way Out, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2011. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/RUSSIA_AND_GEORGIA_SEARCHING_THE_WAY_OUT_English_Publication.pdf

RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. “Russian Troops Demarcate Part of Georgian Oil Pipeline.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, July 14, 2015. https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-troops-demarcate-georgian-oil-pipeline/27126985.html.

Roberts, John. “Regional Energy Cooperation Along Europe’s Southern Energy Corridor.” The South Caucasus – Security, Energy and Europeanization, 1st ed., 196–212. Routledge, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717821-12.

Schumacher, Tobias. “The European Neighbourhood Policy.” The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy, 1st ed., 312–23. Routledge, 2018. https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315691244-1.

Sharashenidze, Tornike. “Armenia, Azerbaijan agree on transport corridors –what’s changing for Georgia?” JAM News. January 14, 2021. https://jam-news.net/georgia-south-caucasus-karabakh-transit-corridor-lars-sharashenidze/.

Simão, Licínia. “The European Neighbourhood Policy and the South Caucasus.” The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy, 1st ed., 312–23. Routledge, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315691244-28.

Stronski, Paul. “The Shifting Geography of the South Caucasus.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. June 23, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/23/shifting-geography-of-south-caucasus-pub-84814.

Terterov, Marat. “The Energy Charter as a Framework for Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Energy Markets of the South Caucasus States.” The South Caucasus – Security, Energy and Europeanization, 1st ed., 213–31. Routledge, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717821-13.

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